Dear friends.

You will soon be embarking on simulation exercises involving the United Nations but also other International Organizations, including NATO. I thought it might be useful if I spoke a bit regarding "the bigger picture", in other words the environment in which international actors currently find themselves. I will then move to the consequent need for International Organizations to adapt, and the additional need to cooperate, using NATO in both cases as an example.

World War II and the ensuing Cold War led nations to opt for a rules-based international order, and the creation of a number of multilateral organizations, including the UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE. This rules-based international order is now in a state of flux. We see a number of inter-related dynamics whose interaction is still in progress, with an outcome that is still unknown. I will limit myself to three.

One such dynamic is globalization. It is a multifaceted one. Culturally, it has engendered globally uniform characteristics, on a scale that dwarfs similar experiences, for instance under the Hellenistic and Roman empires. Economically, it has increased cross-border trade and investment exponentially, resulting in some redistribution of global wealth and consequently of some global power as well. The rise of China is a case in point.

At the same time it has had a serious negative impact on some social groups, mostly in developed societies (parts of the working class for instance) thus fuelling considerable political backlash and the rise of nationalistic and populist movements which are claiming domestic political power, in some cases successfully. In this context let us not forget that International Organizations are, to a very large extent, the sum of their parts, namely of their member states; and that whatever drives the political leadership of these states has a direct impact on these Organizations.

Globalization has resulted in an unprecedented degree of global interconnectivity, which means that problems in one part of the world can swiftly affect the rest. This is more obvious in the economic sphere; but it also holds true as regards potential threats that know no borders, such as weapons proliferation, migration,

terrorism and pandemics. And global governance <u>has not</u> been able to keep up with developments.

We now seem to be entering a phase in which globalization, as we have known it for the last three decades, is receding according to pertinent indicators. Compared to overall economic output, global trade is barely growing. International capital flows are down by as much as two thirds and cross-border bank lending has also been reduced significantly. Increasing political pressure for protectionist measures could further impact international trade, and could also result in a reversal of what gains some developing countries have made through globalization, with investment and production having taken advantage of favourable labour costs. This in turn could add to migratory pressures, social unrest, and the rise of extremism.

A second dynamic to watch is a tendency to return to 19th century-style power politics. The assumptions of a rules-based order, as established post-WWII and further strengthened after the end of the Cold War, cannot be relied upon as previously. The 2008 invasion of Georgia by Russia was a first such indication, one that was not taken seriously by the West for a number of reasons. The aggressive action against Ukraine in 2014, however, and especially the illegal annexation of

Crimea and the relevant argumentation employed by Russia, show us that we are drifting back to a logic of spheres of influence and of power politics. There are several reasons why Crimea is important but I will stop at three:

> 1. it is the first time since WWII that part of the territory of a European State is annexed by another

> 2. this was done despite the existence of an International Treaty (the Budapest Memorandum), which was concluded specifically to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and which was violated by a State <u>signatory</u> of this Treaty

> 3. the annexation was effected following the employment of sophisticated techniques of hybrid warfare, which have led at least two Organizations you will be dealing with in the next 3 days, NATO and the EU, to the realization that they need to develop appropriate defences.

The return of spheres of influence and power politics is to be monitored in other parts of the world as well, notably in South-East Asia where China has been

engaging in activities I am sure you are all aware of, but also in positions taken by decision-shapers, not least in the inner circle of the new US President.

The return to this type of international behaviour I expect will impact the way International Organizations act, or more likely do not act. This will particularly be the case for Organizations that require consensus for decision-making.

A third dynamic, that I would like to mention briefly, is rapid technological change. We have already witnessed the fundamental repercussions it has had on the spread of information, virtually immediate and almost unfettered, positive but also very negative. Although it would be presumptuous to claim that we are able to foretell what further rapid change will bring, there are a few possibilities that we should keep in mind. I expect that the gap between those countries that are technologically advanced and those less developed, will grow. Goods requiring very sophisticated methods of production could revert to installations in developed countries, contributing to a reversal of some advantages globalization has brought to low-wage developing nations. At the same time this trend will not necessarily benefit the working classes in these developed countries by recovering jobs they lost to

globalization, as much of the production line could be expected to favour advanced robotics more than human labour. This in turn would not help in alleviating the political phenomena in developed societies that I mentioned earlier, while at the same time increasing pressures encouraging radicalism and migration in poorer countries.

Perhaps more relevant to our discussion, where I expect rapid technological change to manifest itself with greater consequence and more immediate effect, is in warfare. We have already seen the impact of precision-guided munitions and of UAVs or drones as they are commonly known (an impact admittedly not entirely negative as they generally limit collateral damage). But there are already thoughts, if not developments, regarding other types of unmanned weaponry, electronic warfare including in cyberspace, missile technology and so on. And here also the gap between the haves of this military technology and the have-nots will grow and the risk of human casualties will diminish for the haves but not for the have-nots, which in turn could have consequences in a decision of whether or not to use force.

Of note for our discussion is the political impact this could have on the workings of International Organizations involved in security and conflict

resolution and on their own relevance, especially given their current slogging rhythm and method of work.

The volatility of the international system, elements of which I have attempted to describe, compounded by other significant factors such as the uncertainty injected by the new US Administration, upcoming elections in major EU countries and BREXIT, North Korean adventurism etc, argues strongly for the need for International Organizations to adapt. As I said earlier, I will use NATO, which has shown its ability to do so with some success so far, as an example.

When it was founded in 1949, NATO was essentially a defensive military Alliance. For the next 40 years, it was almost exclusively focused on collective defence and the deterrence of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. When the Cold War ended, priority shifted to building partnerships; first and foremost with Russia but also with other former members of the Warsaw Pact. This lead to the creation of fora for dialogue and co-operation with these countries; initially the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and later the NATO-Russia Council. Co-operation with some of these countries, especially from Central and Eastern Europe evolved into membership of the Alliance.

Understandably, in this light people started to question the need for NATO to exist. But developments led to further adaptation which addressed this existential question. With crises in the Balkans in the 1990s and the lack of other actors to adequately assume the task, NATO member-states decided that the Alliance should engage in "out of area" operations, meaning beyond their borders, in the context of its second core task, after that of collective defence, that of crisis management. Thus NATO undertook UN-mandated operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo, and later in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The 9/11 attack on the United States lead to two significant developments: the invocation of Article 5 on collective defence for the very first time but also to what became the largest ever NATO military operation with a counter-terrorism mandate in Afghanistan. Further "out of area" operations under UN mandate were undertaken later in Libya and against piracy off the coast of Somalia.

At the same time during the post-Cold War period, in the context of its third core task, that of co-operative security, NATO was also developing partnerships with countries in North Africa, the Gulf and with countries across the globe such as Australia, Japan and South Korea; but also with a number of International

Organizations and entities, on which I will elaborate further down.

Russian actions against Georgia and especially against Ukraine, as well as the serious spread of radicalism and terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa, launched further NATO adaptation. With the international security situation changing dramatically and with Allies thus experiencing a new perception of threat in their immediate vicinity, primary emphasis reverted to collective defence.

In adapting to this new situation NATO has so far taken the following steps:

It has tripled the size of the NATO Response Force to 40,000 and has established a 5,000 strong Very High Readiness Joint Task Force which is ready to move within very few days.

It has enhanced its forward presence deploying a battlegroup in each of the Baltic states and in Poland. These forces are there on a rotational rather than on a permanent basis and their numbers (about 4,000 in total) are such that preclude any offensive action. In fact their military value is limited. Their essential purpose is political; to act as a trip-wire; to display the collective resolve of the Alliance as a whole (given their multi-national composition) to defend all of its members; and to reassure the Allies in that region of this resolve.

NATO is also in the process of increasing its presence in the South-East of the Alliance, through a multi-national brigade in Romania, as a response to the change in the security situation in the Black Sea area following the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent installation of significant Russian military capability there.

It has increased air-policing (essentially a monitoring function) in the Baltic and Black Seas.

The number of various kinds of exercises by NATO and Allies has increased across the northern, eastern and southern periphery of the Alliance.

A strategy against hybrid warfare has been developed taking into account methods used by Russia in its actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (the use of what came to be known as "little green men", the employment of sophisticated strategic communications techniques, and so on).

Cyber attacks, as we have seen recently, are becoming more frequent and sophisticated. It is considered that they could become as harmful as a conventional attack, potentially triggering an Article 5 collective defence response. As a result NATO has strengthened the protection of its networks, and cyber defence has been included in its operational planning, training, education and exercises. At the Warsaw Summit last July, NATO Heads of State and Government designated cyber

as an operational domain alongside the land, sea and air domains.

Besides the above measures of adaptation that mainly concern the protection and defence of Allies themselves, NATO has increasingly come to realize that security is not only about deterrence and defence at home but also about what happens in its neighbourhood. In this light NATO leaders decided in Warsaw to enhance Alliance efforts to project stability, working with all of its 41 partner nations but mainly with those nearest in Eastern Europe, the Black Sea and the MENA region.

The effort to project stability contains a number of elements.

Experience, especially in Afghanistan where NATO is still present, has shown that training local forces to defend their own country against terrorism is more acceptable (to their own population as well as that of NATO nations) than NATO assuming the burden of military action directly. It could also be argued that it is more effective in the long run. In this vein, such activities have been undertaken with a number of close partners, including but not only, Ukraine and Georgia to the East, and Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia to the South. These activities entail training, education, and defence capacity building. But of equal importance they can and usually do include defence reform, democratic control of the armed forces and anti-corruption programmes. To the above we should add other initiatives, such

as the assistance by NATO to the international Counter-ISIS Coalition (of which NATO is not a member), mainly through the provision of air surveillance support, as well as the Aegean activity against illegal trafficking of migrants and the maritime security operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean Sea.

Each International Organization adapting is well and good. But given the weakness of global governance in keeping up with change, I believe it is imperative that Organizations do what they can to enhance cooperation among themselves. To learn from each others' experience; to offer their own particular capabilities to enhance the <u>others'</u> ability to contribute; and to work together, where possible, for the common good.

As Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy I was, among other things, in charge of NATO's partnerships, including those with a number of International Organizations. And I made cooperation with them a top priority. I will give you a brief overview of what we did, limiting myself to the UN and the EU.

Although I am sure it is not obvious to most, the UN has been central to NATO since its inception. The 1949 founding Treaty of the Alliance is very short, containing only 14 brief articles. Yet the UN is mentioned six times, including in the preamble. NATO-UN partnership goes back 20 years, during which time it

has grown considerably. Annual high-level staff talks, which I led from the NATO side, usually last two days and cover a broad range of topics. To start with, cooperation in the field where both Organizations operate side-by-side, in Afghanistan and Kosovo for instance. There are also discussions concerning hot-spots of common concern such as Iraq, Syria, Libya, sub-Saharan Africa, in order to increase each other's situational awareness but also to scope out possible future NATO-UN cooperation or further assistance to others such as the Organization of the African Union.

Human security aspects are also covered. For instance NATO cooperates with the UN and has developed a policy and an Action Plan implementing UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; cooperation also extends to conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence and Children and Armed Conflict, all now incorporated in NATO operational planning. Furthermore, in the last two years NATO has developed its policy on Protection of Civilians in cooperation with the UN but also with the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In 2015 we took part with the NATO Secretary General in a Peacekeeping Summit organized by the UN and US President Obama aimed at assisting the UN in its Peacekeeping efforts. NATO pledged the following concrete elements:

1. Enhancing support for the protection of UN forces, particularly in the area of Counter Improvised Explosive Devices.

2. Enhancing support in the area of training and preparedness

3. Rapid deployment -helping the UN improve its ability to get into the field quickly

4. Targeted support to address specific operational needs, for example strategic airlift

5. Closer cooperation on capacity building in countries at risk, both with the UN but as we proposed also with the EU

Implementation of these various elements was made a key part of the regular staff-to-staff cooperation. Importantly Allied leaders added their explicit endorsement of this pledge through the Warsaw Summit Declaration. I am sure that NATO-UN cooperation, aimed largely at enhancing UN capacity to better perform its duties, will continue, as it should. But realistically speaking, it will be tempered by the stereotypical perception some UN member-states have of NATO as a strictly military Alliance, which is an anachronistic view, or simply as an instrument of the US, which is inaccurate.

The most important relationship that NATO is developing, is that with the EU. Despite the slogan that would have the two Organizations be by definition in full alignment, not only is this inaccurate but when I first arrived at NATO 17 years ago after 5 years on the EU side, I was astounded by the lack of understanding as to what the EU was and of how it worked.

Things have moved on since then. Full cooperation is still limited by political considerations, the most visible of which is the fear by Turkey that inclusion of the Republic of Cyprus in formal NATO-EU cooperation could be seen as recognition. But that aside, based on the organization-to-organization principle (which I first proposed in 2009), there is very close mostly staff-to-staff cooperation that now spans virtually all areas of common interest at all levels of the hierarchy. Efforts also continue, with intermittent success, to keep holding three joint meetings per year at Ambassadorial level between the North Atlantic Council and the EU Political and Security Committee.

Understandably this close cooperation first manifested itself in the field, in areas where both Organisations operated in parallel. In the Western Balkans, starting in Bosnia-Herzegovina where a NATO operation has been succeeded by an EU one; and later in Kosovo where KFOR has worked side-by-side with EULEX for years and where NATO provides the security environment necessary for the conduct of the important Belgrade-Pristina dialogue run by the EU; in Afghanistan where NATO forces provided in extremis support and medical evacuation to EU personnel and where NATO is training the Afghan army and the EU the police; in close maritime cooperation which developed during the counter-piracy operations off the cost of Somalia and which continues today between the NATO operation Sea Guardian and the EU operation Sophia in the Mediterranean,

and in the Aegean between NATO's Aegean Activity and EU's FRONTEX.

Staff interaction grew gradually to the point that, during my tenure, I would very frequently meet with my counterparts, the two Deputy Secretaries General of the European External Action Service, and occasionally even with high-level officials of the Commission and the European Defence Agency. These meetings provided us with the opportunity to exchange information on developments and brief each other on our respective work in full transparency, and would function as an informal coordination mechanism. It was on this basis that we were able to overcome considerable institutional obstacles and cut short bureaucratic procedures, enabling the setting-up of the Aegean maritime activity which made the EU-Turkey agreement possible, stemming the flow of illegally trafficked migrants from Turkey to Greece.

In this context we were further able to put together a Joint Declaration which was signed in Warsaw last July by the Presidents of the European Council and of the Commission on the EU side, and by the Secretary General on the NATO side. This unprecedented document, which I urge those of you who are interested to look up, was immediately welcomed by the NATO Heads. This Joint Declaration makes clear that, given the new security environment, it is imperative that the two Organizations develop their cooperation and coordination to the maximum extent possible. Based on this Declaration, the North

Atlantic Council meeting in Foreign Ministers format, and the EU Council of Ministers, have since endorsed a series of 42 concrete proposals for cooperation to be taken forward this year. They include such matters as countering hybrid threats, operational cooperation including on maritime issues, cyber security and defence, defence capabilities being developed within each Organization, defence industry and research, exercises, and defence and security capacity-building of partner countries in the Western Balkans as well as in Eastern Europe and the MENA region, to help them build capacity and resilience.

Building on the solid foundation that was laid out these last three years, this close cooperation should continue to grow in response to the uncertainties, threats and risks that have manifested themselves during this time and that are likely to continue.

The efforts for cooperation between International Organizations of the type I have briefly described, do not provide a complete answer to all the challenges. But they are a step in the right direction, towards what some call "effective multilateralism", and provide a partial response until you, the next generation of world leaders, set things right as I am confident you will.

I thank you for your kind attention and wish you success and enjoyment in your simulation exercises these next three days.