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THESSALONIKI INTERNATIONAL STUDENT  
MODEL UNITED NATIONS

## NATO North Atlantic Council

*Topic area A: "Integrating NATO Partners in  
NATO-led operations and crisis  
management: taking the Partnership  
Interoperability Initiative and the EU-NATO  
Joint Declaration in Warsaw forward"*



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## 1. List of Abbreviations

- A2/AD** (Anti-Access/Area Denial)
- CFI** (Connected Forces Initiative)
- CTI** (Combined Training Initiative)
- DCB** (Defence and Related Security Capacity Building)
- DIP** (Defence Investment Pledge)
- EAPC** (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council)
- Hybrid COE** (European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats)
- ICI** (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative)
- IP** (Interoperability Platform)
- JCAP** (Joint Common Academic Program)
- JDW** (Joint Declaration in Warsaw)
- JMRC** (Joint Multinational Readiness Centre)
- JMSC** (Joint Multinational Science Centre)
- JMTC** (Joint Multinational Training Centre)
- JOC** (Joint Operations Center)
- NATO** (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)
- NDPP** (NATO Defence Planning Process)
- NGO** (Non-Governmental Organisation)
- NORDEF** (Nordic Defence Cooperation)
- NRF** (NATO Response Force)
- OSCE** (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe)
- PfP** (Partnership for Peace)
- PII** (Partnership Interoperability Initiative)
- STANAG** (Standardisation Agreement)
- STO** (Science and Technology Organisation)
- UN** (United Nations)
- VJTF** (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force)

## 2. Welcoming Letter

Dear delegates,

It is our genuine pleasure to officially welcome you to this assembly of NATO's North Atlantic Council, as simulated in the 2019 edition of "Thessaloniki International Student Model United Nations". We feel truly honored and delighted to be serving as your board, and we would like to affirm to you that we shall do anything in our capacity to help render your participation in this year's conference an unforgettable experience.

We are convinced that your choice to participate in this simulation and specifically our committee positively proves your keenness and enthusiasm to further engage in the area of regional cooperation and particularly our topic area under discussion; "Integrating NATO Partners in NATO-led operations and crisis management: taking forward the Partnership Interoperability Initiative and the EU-NATO Joint Declaration in Warsaw". That being said, it cannot be stressed enough that your participation in the committee as well as your overall preparation for the conference rests primarily with your personal effort and determination. In order to facilitate the process and set the initial foundation for your research, we have prepared for you the present guide. This Study Guide shall act as a useful handbook to direct your research and present to you with all necessary information to thoroughly comprehend the challenges of the subject matter. However, the role of the present document is merely supportive of your own investigation, also focusing on the particularities of your delegation. So, you will need to engage yourselves in a further research regarding your country's policy, the role of NAC upon this matter and the substance of this topic, in order to better prepare yourselves for the upcoming challenging debate.

During the upcoming days of the conference, you will be called upon to represent the interests of your assigned sovereign state while concurrently debating on concrete proposals to be added in a communiqué, showcasing your acquired expertise but also your creativity and inventiveness in policy building. With view to effectively participating in this endeavor, you are urged to also very closely study the Rules of



Procedure document. What we expect from you as your board, is enthusiasm, readiness and punctuality. Fully acknowledging that the aforementioned is not a simple task, we assure you that we are committed to assisting you along the way by any means necessary so as to reach the finest potential results. We also remind you that, from this point on and until the end of the conference, we remain at your disposal for any further inquiry or specification.

We cannot describe how excited we are to meet each and every one of you in Thessaloniki! Until then,

Best regards,

Stavros-Christos Papakyriazis (President of the North Atlantic Council)

Emmanuela Diakaki (Vice-President of the North Atlantic Council)

Dionisis Menagias (Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Council)

### 3. Introduction to the North Atlantic Council

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded on April 4<sup>th</sup> 1949 with the signing of the Washington Treaty. The founding members were Norway, Denmark, Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Luxemburg, Iceland, United Kingdom, France and the United States of America. All were sworn to stand together against any form of aggression. NATO, as a political and military alliance, focuses on safeguarding the freedom and security of its member states' citizens, using political and military means. While NATO serves as a proponent of democratic values, providing its members with a forum to consult and cooperate on security issues, NATO also remains committed to peaceful conflict resolution. However, in case diplomatic efforts come to an impasse, crisis-management operations can be carried out by NATO's military force.

The aforementioned operations were embodied in the Washington Treaty and, more specifically, in Article 5, which represents the will of member-states to collectively respond to either an armed or a cyber-attack against a NATO ally, by any means they deem necessary. An attack against one is an attack against all. Furthermore, those operations can be carried out under a United Nations mandate. In addition to member-states, NATO can also operate alongside other countries and international organizations. Notably, Article 5 has only been invoked once in the past, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks that struck the United States in 2001.

NATO's first and main objective was to prevent the spread of the Soviet threat, an objective that was carried out very successfully. Following the end of the Cold War, many expected that the Alliance to ceased to exist, mainly due to the fact that it had fulfilled its purpose. Albeit the alliance adapted to current events. NATO broadened its role in order to build fundamental bonds between European countries and former communist states, resolve regional and national conflicts in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Nowadays, NATO additionally aims to actively construct comprehensive communication with Russia, Ukraine and other non member states in order to combat terrorism and other major threats for humanity, such as the nuclear

weapons proliferation and nationalism ideology revival within Europe and other parts of the world.

NATO's members have expanded from 12 founding members to 29 as of 2018, through various processes of enlargement. The last of which took place in 2017 with the addition of Montenegro. Every member state is committed to funding NATO with a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on the alliance common defense efforts. This practice has been in effect since 2006 and in 2017 only 5 members met the 2% goal; Estonia, Poland, Greece, UK, and USA. NATO membership is open to any state that is in a position to respect and broaden the principles of the Washington treaty and to commit to a collective effort for the security of the North Atlantic Area. In addition, 40 non-members and international organizations cooperate with the Organization as far as political and security issues are concerned. All member states are equal and this is reflected via the decision making process of NATO.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is arguably the heart of the Alliance, since it is the principal political decision-making body of NATO. It is the main governing body of the Alliance and the only whose authority is guaranteed by the North Atlantic Treaty and, more specifically, article 9<sup>1</sup>. The NAC is one of the two NATO delegations, with the Nuclear Planning Group being the other. Also, the Nuclear Planning Group has a comparable authority to the NAC, as far as nuclear policy is concerned.

Security issues of the Alliance are discussed during NAC's meetings and every member state has a seat and only one vote at the Council. The NAC meets at least once a week and, in any case, when there is a need that ought to be addressed. A decision by the Council requires unanimity and common accord in order to be adopted. Thus, all member countries have to provide the Council with their positive vote for a policy decision with no exceptions, since all members are equal. This is a prerequisite aiming to ensure that every decision taken by the Council reflects the will and the collective effort of all member states. The North Atlantic Council is chaired

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<sup>1</sup>NATO. *NATO Treaty en Light*. [Online], 2018 [Accessed on 4 December 2018]. Available from: [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/stock\\_publications/20120822\\_nato\\_treaty\\_en\\_light\\_2009.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf)

by the Secretary General of NATO who makes sure that all opinions are aligned so an agreement can be reached.<sup>2</sup>

## 4. Introduction to Topic Area

The North Atlantic Organization (hereinafter NATO) faces a variety of challenges across the globe. Defense spending under its umbrella as well as use of its members' military equipment are employed to prevent the occurrence of crises in heated conflicts in the Middle East and the Eastern Europe, to deal with incidents of piracy and terrorism and to promote a stable and secure environment for its members. However, diversification of threats, both with regard to their location and type, makes resolving these issues increasingly complex. This is one of the main reasons why NATO seeks to expand by acquiring Partners for the promotion of its goals. The history of the organization can highlight a large amount of negotiations and documents between NATO and third countries or other organizations, so as to achieve the amelioration of their crisis management preparedness and the function of their common missions.

The **Partnership Interoperability Initiative** (hereinafter **PII**) is an example of NATO's aforementioned policy as well as its goal to ensure the effectiveness of its forces<sup>3</sup>. The large amount of changes in the context of NATO's agenda, mostly due to territorial disputes or multinational expeditionary operations, demonstrates the urgency of a framework between NATO and its partners to coordinate and discuss the most sufficient approach to respond to modern threats and even prevent them from occurring<sup>4</sup>. Emerging modern challenges render the accomplishment of a functional interoperability between NATO and its partners more crucial than ever, so as to

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<sup>2</sup> NATO.int, *What is NATO* [Online], 2018 [Accessed on 4 December 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>

<sup>3</sup> NATO.int, *Partnership Interoperability Initiative*. [Online]. 2017 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics\\_132726.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_132726.htm)

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Derleth JAMES. "Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations". *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm>



enhance NATO's capacity for future crisis management and also the effectiveness of the NATO led operations worldwide. The PII serves as the framework for preparedness, connection and coordination of NATO members and partners' forces<sup>5</sup>. The Partnership of NATO with the European Union (hereinafter EU), in particular, has moved a step forward from the initial PII. NATO and the EU have signed a **Joint Declaration in Warsaw in 2016** (hereinafter JDW) in order to expand their collaboration and structure it in 7 respective defence sectors<sup>6</sup>. The JDW is in total compliance with the PII but, at the same time, stands as an autonomous document, which provides essential guidelines for the coordination of resources and focus between the two regional organisations with regard to the 7 specific defense sectors. Since some, if not all, sectors fall under the framework of the PII, interconnection between the two initiatives could advance their implementation and operability of their substance<sup>7</sup>. Ultimately, the PII offers a forum for defence discussions between NATO and the EU-members, which are still non-NATO members, and subsequently promotes the EU-NATO JDW via new proposals on the EU with regard to ameliorating the function of the JDW 7 sectors.

## 5. Useful Definitions

- a. **Crisis Management:** NATO defines crisis management as “coordinated actions taken to diffuse crises, prevent their escalation into armed conflict and/or contain resulting hostilities”. It also adds to the definition that “the crisis management machinery provides decision-makers with the necessary information and arrangements to use appropriate political, diplomatic, economic and military instruments in a timely and coordinated manner”<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>5</sup>Nato.int, *Partnership Interoperability Initiative*. [Online]. 2017 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics\\_132726.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_132726.htm)

<sup>6</sup>Consilium.europa.eu, *EU cooperation on security and defence*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/>

<sup>7</sup>Consilium.europa.eu, *EU cooperation on security and defence*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/>

<sup>8</sup>Nato.int, *Annex A, Definitions*. [Online]. 1997 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/defini.htm>

- b. Doctrine:** NATO defines the concept of a doctrine as “fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives”. It adds that “it is authoritative but requires judgment in application”<sup>9</sup>.
- c. Generic Planning:** NATO defines the concept of generic planning as “plans which are developed for possible operations where some of the planning factors, like scope, forces, destination, risks, area of responsibility, have not yet been fully identified or cannot be assumed”. It adds that “these plans are produced at the level of detail required by the remit concerned and identify the capabilities needed”<sup>10</sup>.
- d. Interoperability:** There are many similar NATO definitions for the concept of interoperability. One is “the ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks”. A second definition is “the ability for Allies to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives”. A third NATO definition for interoperability is “the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together”<sup>11</sup>.
- e. Multinational Forces:** NATO defines the multinational forces as “forces of more than one nation under a NATO Commander or non-NATO Commander within a NATO-led operation”<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>9</sup>Nato.int, *Annex A, Definitions*. [Online]. 1997 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/defini.htm>

<sup>10</sup>Nato.int, *Annex A, Definitions*. [Online]. 1997 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/defini.htm>

<sup>11</sup>Nato.int, *Annex A, Definitions*. [Online]. 1997 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/defini.htm>

<sup>12</sup>Nato.int, *Annex A, Definitions*. [Online]. 1997 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/defini.htm>

- f. Mutual Support:** There are many similar definitions to the concept of mutual support. NATO defines mutual support as “that support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities”<sup>13</sup>.
- g. Operational Mobility:** NATO defines the concept of operational mobility as “the capability to move forces and their associated logistic support quickly and effectively within a region, and also the capability to concentrate regional forces against the major enemy thrust and to counter-concentrate operational reserves”<sup>14</sup>.
- h. Reaction Forces:** NATO defines the Reaction Forces as “highly mobile and capable multinational land, air and maritime forces allocated to Major NATO Commanders and available at short notice, in order to provide an early military response to a crisis”, It further adds that “*these forces will demonstrate NATO’s cohesion and resolve and may facilitate the timely build-up of forces in the crisis area. Should crisis management fail, Reaction Forces should contribute to the defence. They will be divided into smaller Immediate Reaction Forces and more capable Rapid Reaction Forces, both with maritime, ground and air components*”<sup>15</sup>.
- i. Standardization Agreement:** NATO defines a Standardisation Agreement as “the record of an agreement among several or all the member nations to adopt like or similar military equipment, ammunition, supplies, and stores;

<sup>13</sup>Nato.int, *Annex A, Definitions*. [Online]. 1997 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/defini.htm>

<sup>14</sup>Nato.int, *Annex A, Definitions*. [Online]. 1997 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/defini.htm>

<sup>15</sup>Nato.int, *Annex A, Definitions*. [Online]. 1997 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/defini.htm>



and operational, logistic, and administrative procedures”. NATO further adds that “National acceptance of a NATO Allied Publication issued by the Military Agency for Standardisation may be recorded as a Standardisation Agreement”<sup>16</sup>.

**j. Strategic Mobility:** NATO defines the concept of strategic mobility as “the capability to move forces and their associated logistic support quickly and effectively over long distances, between theatres, between regions or beyond NATO’s Area of Responsibility”<sup>17</sup>.

**k. Tactical Mobility:** NATO defines the concept of tactical mobility as “quality or capability to concentrate regional in-place forces up to division level against the major local enemy thrust and to counter-concentrate tactical reserves”<sup>18</sup>.

## 6. Historical Background

After the end of World War II, tensions rose between the Western and Soviet blocs. Western European countries asked for the provision of the Marshall Plan, since they wanted the blockade of the communist expansion and their own resurgence after the war. Rapid expansion of communism alarmed the USA and the Western European leaders, who sought the establishment of an institution with the capacity to stand against the Soviet threat. The USA wanted a regional military institution which would exceed mere military affairs. On 17 March 1948, the UK, France and the Benelux

<sup>16</sup>Nato.int, *Annex A, Definitions*. [Online]. 1997 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/defini.htm>

<sup>17</sup>Nato.int, *Annex A, Definitions*. [Online]. 1997 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/defini.htm>

<sup>18</sup>Nato.int, *Annex A, Definitions*. [Online]. 1997 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/defini.htm>



countries signed the Brussels Treaty, establishing the Western Union, in order to deal with any future military aggression against any of its members<sup>19</sup>.

In the meantime, Sweden, Denmark and Norway negotiated upon the idea of a Scandinavian defence union, without resolving its neutral status and its lack of siding with either of the two blocs. These countries asked from the USA for sufficient armaments to deter any potential aggression, but the USA were not eager to support via armaments a neutral alliance and as such this regional initiative failed<sup>20</sup>.

The Brussels Treaty failed to deliver a defence union due to the succession of its field by other treaties, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, on April 1949, which demonstrated the US interests to have a European defence organisation not completely independent from the US bloc. The failed attempt to promote a European Defence Community with the addition of West Germany, led to the end of the Western Union and to its succession by the Western European Union on 23 October 1954, which retained the mutual guaranteed defence clauses from its predecessor but left the complete operation of defence to NATO<sup>21</sup>.

Since the beginning of the post-Cold War era, interoperability has been an issue of controversy within the very core of NATO, due to the relevance of the Alliance within the new security environment. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the main goal to preserve the security of the Western Allies from any potential Soviet aggression, the focus shifted to missions in specific areas, like Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan and to the difficulty of their implementation<sup>22</sup>. These new missions have highlighted the many obstacles in the interoperability of forces between Allies.

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<sup>19</sup>Cvce.eu, *Western Union* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/803b2430-7d1c-4e7b-9101-47415702fc8e/d16547a7-de20-4a4f-9bfe-29dbfc79be69>

<sup>20</sup>Cvce.eu, *Western Union* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/803b2430-7d1c-4e7b-9101-47415702fc8e/d16547a7-de20-4a4f-9bfe-29dbfc79be69>

<sup>21</sup>Cvce.eu, *The establishment of Western European Union (WEU)* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/803b2430-7d1c-4e7b-9101-47415702fc8e/6d9db05c-1e8c-487a-a6bc-ff25cf1681e0>

<sup>22</sup>Dr. Derleth JAMES. "Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations". *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm>

Cooperation of NATO and the Western European Union continued through the 1990s and led to the advancement of responsibility in defence matters in 2001 via the institutionalization of the relations between NATO and the EU<sup>23</sup>. NATO provided the EU with access to its generic planning capabilities, so as to ameliorate EU's military operations and the coordination between them via the NATO-EU Declaration on a European Security and Defence Policy on 2002<sup>24</sup>. This Declaration also provided some general political principles for partnership of the two institutions. Further interconnection between NATO and EU was set out in 2003, in the "Berlin Plus" arrangements, developing the provision of NATO's support to EU-led operations<sup>25</sup>. These arrangements set the basis for the future interoperability between the two organisations. In 2010, Allies emphasized, at the Lisbon Summit, the necessity of enhancing the NATO-EU strategic partnership<sup>26</sup>. During the same year, the 2010 Strategic Concept of NATO contained close cooperation of NATO with other international organisations, like the EU, in order to raise crisis management preparedness of the Alliance, to manage conflicts in heated areas worldwide and to promote stability in post-conflict situations<sup>27</sup>. At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO launched the PII to ensure the adoption of strong connections between its partners' forces and its own in the sectors of crisis management and NATO-led operations<sup>28</sup>. Under the auspices of the PII, NATO strengthened interoperability initiatives that had been developed during NATO-led operations over the past few decades and, at the same time, offered an operational framework for the amelioration and deployment of relevant initiatives. This forum set the basis for interconnection of defense initiatives between NATO and third

<sup>23</sup>Nato.int, *Relations with the European Union*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49217.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm)

<sup>24</sup>Nato.int, *Relations with the European Union*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49217.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm)

<sup>25</sup>Nato.int, *Relations with the European Union*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49217.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm)

<sup>26</sup>Nato.int, *Relations with the European Union*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49217.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm)

<sup>27</sup>Nato.int, *Strategic Concepts*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_56626.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm)

<sup>28</sup>Nato.int, *Partnership Interoperability Initiative*. [Online]. 2017 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics\\_132726.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_132726.htm)

partners<sup>29</sup>, besides the EU. With regard to the partnership of NATO solely with the EU, the two organizations worked under the auspices of their military and political precedent and the PII, targeting specific areas for advanced cooperation in light of common challenges of eastern and southern dimensions. This was the substance of the JDW in July 2016<sup>30</sup> and it was followed by 42 suggested measures by NATO foreign ministers, in order to advance NATO-EU cooperation in the agreed sectors, in December 2016. These sectors of collaboration were augmented in December 2017<sup>31</sup>.

## 7. NATO'S Operational Framework

The JDW and the PII represent NATO measures to promote the goals of security and crisis management preparedness in NATO's Area of Responsibility. NATO's strategy is demonstrated via a variety of documents and agreements, which were constructed in order to aid the organisation in the planning and implementation process of necessary means for the achievement of its goals. Although in its nature, it remains an alliance, NATO has an extensive legal framework. Firstly, it operates under the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 as it was aforementioned, which is also the document behind its establishment.

The core principal of NATO lies in **Article 5**<sup>32</sup> of the North Atlantic Treaty, which underlines the provision of collective defence between the Allies, via any necessary measures, including armed force, in accordance with **Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations**. In 2001, Article 5 was invoked by NATO in response to the events of 9/11. The geographic scope of NATO is delineated in **Article 6**, which states that

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<sup>29</sup>Nato.int, *Partnership Interoperability Initiative*. [Online]. 2017 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics\\_132726.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_132726.htm)

<sup>30</sup>President of the European Council, President of the European Commission, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. *Joint Declaration (8 July 2016)* [Online]. 2016 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf>

<sup>31</sup>Consilium.europa.eu, *EU cooperation on security and defence*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/>

<sup>32</sup>*North Atlantic Treaty*. [Online]. 1949, signed at 4 April 1949 and entered into force 24 August 1949. [Accessed 25 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock\\_publications/20120822\\_nato\\_treaty\\_en\\_light\\_2009.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf)



NATO's scope covers "*an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America*"<sup>33</sup>. This is NATO's Area of Responsibility. The remaining articles of the Treaty urge Allies to ameliorate their collective military capability, to remain in a state of consultation with one another, to enhance their democratic institutions and to negotiate on the invitation of other European states to join NATO<sup>34</sup>.

The Alliance promotes interoperability between its forces and its partners' forces so as to counter all contemporary security challenges in specific areas. Respectively, the NAC adopts strategic documents, the **Strategic Concepts**, which are manifested via a drafting process led by the political authorities of NATO's members in compliance with military guidance<sup>35</sup>. The prioritization of the political sector over the military highlights the shift of NATO's strategic thinking towards dialogue and cooperation. A Strategic Concept is an official document which identifies NATO's long-term purpose and nature, as well as its essential security tasks. Furthermore, it demonstrates changes in the contemporary security environment, the most efficient political and military approach to security issues and the means to further advance NATO's military forces with view to current challenges<sup>36</sup>.

The latest Strategic Concept was adopted by a NAC meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government at the 2010 summit in Portugal. New editions of the Strategic Concept demonstrate the changes of the security environment from the Cold War period and the immediate post-Cold War period to the period after the events of 9/11. NATO's strategic thinking shifted from defence and deterrence to the fight against terrorism, countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction, energy security and

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<sup>33</sup>North Atlantic Treaty. [Online]. 1949, signed at 4 April 1949 and entered into force 24 August 1949. [Accessed 25 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock\\_publications/20120822\\_nato\\_treaty\\_en\\_light\\_2009.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf)

<sup>34</sup>North Atlantic Treaty. [Online]. 1949, signed at 4 April 1949 and entered into force 24 August 1949. [Accessed 25 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock\\_publications/20120822\\_nato\\_treaty\\_en\\_light\\_2009.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf)

<sup>35</sup>Nato.int, *Strategic Concepts*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_56626.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm)

<sup>36</sup>Nato.int, *Strategic Concepts*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_56626.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm)



cyber-attacks, all of which were incorporated in the latest Strategic Concept of 2010. This Strategic Concept is called “Active Engagement Modern Defence” and identifies three fundamental core tasks, which are collective defence, cooperative security and crisis management<sup>37</sup>. As such, it constitutes a carefully structured guide for the coordination of NATO with its partners in the respective fields under the auspices of the PII and the JDW.

Furthermore, NATO established the **Connected Forces Initiative** (hereinafter **CFI**), so as to face tactical challenges to partnership interoperability, such as challenges of tactical mobility<sup>38</sup>. The main objective of the CFI is to increase NATO’s and its partners’ steadiness and combat efficiency by advanced interoperability via increased education and training, extensive exercises and development of Allies’ technological capabilities. It is supported by the **Combined Training Initiative** (hereinafter **CTI**) under the auspices of the **Joint Multinational Training Command** (hereinafter **JMTC**)<sup>39</sup>. The JMTC’s goal is to promote education and training of NATO allies and their partners, while the CTI provides technological means for the promotion of this training via simultaneous, virtual and practical exercises. The role of the CTI consists of reducing the Alliance’s cost of training, enhancing NATO partnerships with other countries and advancing the interoperability between them<sup>40</sup>.

The CTI examines the current security environment and exploits changes of conditions worldwide to advance NATO interoperability and operational readiness, so as to protect the members of the Alliance, deter conflicts and promote a stable global environment. It is comprised of technical, human and procedural sectors. The first

<sup>37</sup>Nato.int, *Strategic Concepts*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_56626.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm)

<sup>38</sup>Dr. Derleth JAMES. “Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations”. *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm>

<sup>39</sup>Dr. Derleth JAMES. “Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations”. *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm>

<sup>40</sup>Dr. Derleth JAMES. “Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations”. *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm>

sector encompasses armaments, equipment and hardware, the second covers terminology and training, and the third concerns doctrines and procedures of missions and operations<sup>41</sup>. In order for NATO to avoid disorganization or duplications in defence planning and implementation processes and in order to use its resources in the most efficient way, the Alliance utilizes the **NATO Defence Planning Process** (hereinafter **NDPP**). The NDPP offers a framework for the harmonization and organization of defence initiatives by the Allies at a NATO level and at a national level, which subsequently leads to advanced coordination of Allies with their partners<sup>42</sup>.

In practice, it facilitates the identification, development and deployment of forces that are interoperable and adequately braced, trained, equipped and supported by concurrently considering essential time schedules and the number of forces that are needed per mission. In addition, it examines all the relevant military and political capabilities, in order to achieve the Alliance's highest potential in all of its missions. Therefore, the NDPP is essential to coordinating national defense plans with those of NATO, without leading to compromise of their national sovereignty<sup>43</sup>.

The NDPP operates through the distribution of requirements to each Ally, which Allies have to meet, while they serve as Capability Targets under the auspices of a fair share of the NATO overall requirements. Specifically, there are two sets of requirements for the Allies. There is one separate set of requirements for each Ally, based on the distinctiveness and the special capabilities of said Ally. By meeting these first requirements, each Ally serves as a Capability Target and shares portions of NATO's overall requirement with the rest of the Allies. Accordingly, it monitors the respective progress of each Ally and aids them on the implementation of the requirements. It consists of 14 different planning sectors, all of which are included in

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<sup>41</sup>Dr. Derleth JAMES. "Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations". *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm>

<sup>42</sup>Nato.int, *NATO Defence Planning Process*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 2 December 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49202.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm)

<sup>43</sup>Nato.int, *NATO Defence Planning Process*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 2 December 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49202.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm)

the capability development. The NDPP's goal is to achieve organization and coherence across the various and different planning sectors<sup>44</sup>.

## 8. The Partnership Interoperability Initiative

### a. The substance of the Partnership Interoperability Initiative

As it was mentioned above, NATO defines interoperability as the ability of Allies to act together. The PII expands the field of this definition with the addition of NATO partners to the Alliance's interoperability framework. Interoperability does not necessarily include a clause for common military equipment, but mostly clauses for coordination of Allies and Partners via common facilities, communication and exchange of intellect and other services<sup>45</sup>. The PII was launched at the Wales Summit in 2014 in order to boost coordination and functionality of operations between NATO and partner forces. It sets the goal of deepening the interoperability that has been advanced by NATO and its partners during NATO-led operations and missions over the past decades.

Under its auspices, NATO is able to work with its partners on political and military missions and undertake common exercises with them via utilisation of their multinational forces. Furthermore, NATO partners can contribute to the overall crisis management preparedness and participate in NATO-led operations<sup>46</sup>. In certain cases they can even be a part of the **NATO Response Force** (hereinafter **NRF**), a technological advanced multinational force comprised of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces, which are rapidly active and deployable for collective defence and rapid response to crises in NATO's Area of Responsibility. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (hereinafter **VJTF**) is part of the NRF's structure

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<sup>44</sup>Nato.int, *NATO Defence Planning Process*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 2 December 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49202.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm)

<sup>45</sup>Nato.int, *Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces*. [Online]. 2017 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics\\_84112.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_84112.htm)

<sup>46</sup>Nato.int, *Partnership Interoperability Initiative*. [Online]. 2017 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics\\_132726.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_132726.htm)



and also part of NATO's response at the 2014 Wales Summit to this new security environment in the eastern and southern borders of the Alliance<sup>47</sup>.

The fundamental prerequisite for the inclusion of partners to NATO-led operations and missions is the interoperable nature of their forces and their synchronization with NATO forces in accordance with **NATO Standardisation Agreements** (hereinafter **STANAG**) and in compliance with NATO's equipment<sup>48</sup>. The STANAG serves as a facilitator of the efficient use of resources from NATO and its partners and subsequently promotes the Alliance's operational efficiency<sup>49</sup>. The PII highlighted the significance of the interoperability in NATO's partnerships and the potential advancement of it with willing partners. To this end, NATO advanced its cooperation with five of its partners through the provision of tailor-made enhanced opportunities; namely, Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden<sup>50</sup>. The provision of tailor-made opportunities meant that NATO offered different opportunities to each of its partners taking into consideration the respective partner's needs and capacity for development, under the principle of proportionality.

Furthermore, the PII established the **Interoperability Platform** (hereinafter **IP**), in order to expand portions of the PII framework to a larger group of partners. Currently, NATO works closely with 24 selected partners under the scope of the IP, to boost their interoperability and preparedness for potential future crisis. Some of these partners include Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. The JMTC's **Joint Multinational Simulations Center** (hereinafter **JMSC**), in order to boost the interoperability of NATO and its partners' forces in common exercises and joint training via enhanced technology, has established the **Joint Operations Center**

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<sup>47</sup>Shape.nato.int, *NATO Response Force/Very High Readiness Joint Task Force*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://shape.nato.int/nato-response-force--very-high-readiness-joint-task-force>

<sup>48</sup>Dr. Derleth JAMES. "Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations". *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm>

<sup>49</sup>Nato.int, *Standardisation*. [Online]. 2017 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics\\_69269.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_69269.htm)

<sup>50</sup>Nato.int, *Partnership Interoperability Initiative*. [Online]. 2017 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics\\_132726.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_132726.htm)



(hereinafter **JOC**), under the auspices of the CTI. This forum provides the capacity for both live and virtual training of the Allies and their partners' forces.

The CTI enhances interoperability via integration of NATO and partner assets, relationships, capabilities and technology in live and virtual exercises across the world, in order to raise their capacity for tactical and strategic mobility. Indicatively, partners have the opportunity train together in many areas virtually and concurrently while staying in their continent and without the need to deploy forces in order to take part. This is how they accomplish the promotion of interoperability while reducing the relevant costs. The JMTC's **Joint Multinational Readiness Center** (hereinafter **JMRC**), boosts interoperability via doctrinal changes and organisational modifications. The JMRC regularly advances the STANAGs and demonstrates tactics, techniques and procedures for the adaption of procedural diversification. NATO **Centers of Excellence** aid on the distribution of these tactics and techniques. As for the interoperability component of human personnel, the JMTC's **Joint Common Academic Program** (hereinafter **JCAP**), uses mobile training teams for special training programs and events, while supports the development of local training centers. At the same time, it provides instruction guides to Joint Task Forces prior to common exercises regarding mission command, terminology, maneuver, logistics, protection, engagement and know-how intelligence. These are challenges which explain the so far limited interoperability and they are alleviated by the Joint Task Force in compliance with these instructions<sup>51</sup>.

In general, NATO partners may receive essential information via political consultation and intelligence-sharing, reform and boost their defence institutions and capabilities, prepare for future missions via advanced training and defence education, participate in common exercises, contribute to NATO-led operations and civilian and military missions, collaborate on research on the defence sector and gain an expanded vision of security. This new and advanced concept includes counter-corruption initiatives in the defence sector, joint scientific and technological projects, and the

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<sup>51</sup>Dr. Derleth JAMES. "Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations". *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm>

integration of gender perspectives into security and combined efforts to control or disarm armories, ammunitions and explosives<sup>52</sup>.

### **b. The various Partnership Initiatives**

NATO has gained many partners throughout the years, with which they have developed their functionality, coordination and interoperability under the auspices of the PII. Currently, NATO preserves a variety of partners and is open for dialogue concerning the addition of more countries to the PII<sup>53</sup>. Its current partners are countries working with NATO at a bilateral level or are part of multilateral defence agreements and structures<sup>54</sup>. NATO also closely cooperates with various international organizations. The European Union is such an example but due to the JDW and the significance of the close partnership between the two organisations, it consists of an autonomous portion of this Guide. NATO is also a close partner with the UN and cooperates with the organisation in the area of safeguarding international peace and security since the 1990s, mostly in peacekeeping and crisis management operations<sup>55</sup>. The UN Security Council Resolutions have offered the necessary mandate for NATO to undertake operations in the Western Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya, but also NATO's training mission in Iraq<sup>56</sup>.

NATO has also assisted various UN-sponsored operations, like the African Union's UN-endorsed peacekeeping operations in Sudan, Darfur and Somalia, the UN disaster relief operations in Pakistan and the provision for the protection of merchant ships carrying humanitarian supplies off the coast of Somalia. Some areas of their cooperation include education, military missions, joint training, mine action, civilian missions and civilian capabilities and the fight against terrorism. Their Joint

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<sup>52</sup>Nato.int, *Partnerships: projecting stability through cooperation*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_84336.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84336.htm)

<sup>53</sup>Nato.int, *Partnerships: projecting stability through cooperation*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_84336.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84336.htm)

<sup>54</sup>Nato.int, *Partners*. [Online]. 2015 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/51288.htm>

<sup>55</sup>Nato.int, *Relations with the United Nations*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50321.htm?](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50321.htm?)

<sup>56</sup>Nato.int, *Relations with the United Nations*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50321.htm?](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50321.htm?)

Declaration on 26 October 2018 set out new priority fields for further collaboration, like countering terrorism, peacekeeping operations and the protection of civilians. This coordination showcases NATO's commitment to a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management and peacekeeping operations<sup>57</sup>.

The Alliance's partnership with the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (hereinafter OSCE) also positively confirms its commitment. They cooperate at a supplementary level to safeguard the security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, while following a comprehensive approach to crisis management by use of military and civilian assets. NATO and OSCE undertake common initiatives in areas like South Caucasus, the Western Balkans and Central Asia<sup>58</sup>.

NATO has also increased its cooperation with the African Union mostly in operational support and assistance in the development of the African Standby Force. Pertaining to operational support, NATO and the African Union jointly advanced their strategic air and sealift, while NATO aided the African Union in its Mission to Somalia via generic planning support. The Alliance also utilized its Mobile Training Teams to develop capacity building of the African Union Members via NATO training and education<sup>59</sup>.

At a national level, NATO enhances its bilateral cooperation with other countries, under the scope of the PII, through programs, such as the **Partnership for Peace** (hereinafter **PfP**) Programme. This is a programme of practical bilateral coordination of NATO with its Euro-Atlantic partners, which offers each partner the capacity to choose the areas and the priorities of its individual cooperation with NATO. It follows the spirit of the tailor-made enhanced opportunities of the PII and it focuses on the individual needs of the respective NATO partner and also on the partner's discretion for the range and time of the joint implementation of the security initiatives. Some of these initiatives are the civil emergency planning, the disaster response, and the

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<sup>57</sup>Nato.int, *Relations with the United Nations*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50321.htm?](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50321.htm?)

<sup>58</sup>Nato.int, *Relations with the OSCE*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49911.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49911.htm)

<sup>59</sup>Nato.int, *Cooperation with the African Union*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics\\_8191.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_8191.htm)



civilian and military missions. The PfP has significantly developed through the years with several action plans and programmes. At the Lisbon Summit, in November 2010, a decision was made on opening and expanding the PfP to a variety of NATO partners. Currently, 21 non-NATO members, including Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Finland, Kazakhstan, Malta, Russian Federation, Sweden, Serbia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and FYROM are parts of NATO's PfP Programme<sup>60</sup>.



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The **Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council** (hereinafter **EAPC**), consisting of all NATO members and other countries like Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Russia and Malta, serves as a framework of partnership between NATO and the other countries. It provides the overall political forum for NATO's cooperation with its Euro-Atlantic partners via the **EAP Work Programme** and also the forum for the Individual Partnership Programmes of each Partner within the PfP. The **Science and**

<sup>60</sup>Sto.nato.int, *The Partnership for Peace Programme*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018]  
Available from: <https://www.sto.nato.int/Pages/partnership-for-peace.aspx>

<sup>61</sup>Nato.int, *NATO member and partner countries*. [Online]. 2016 [Accessed 27 November 2018]  
Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_81136.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_81136.htm)



**Technology Organization** (hereinafter **STO**), also works under the auspices of NATO's PfP in order to advance the defense technology and science of the PfP members, including Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Part of the NATO-Russian Partnership is undertaken under the scope of the NATO-Russia Council, especially with regard to counter terrorism. However, the full range of defence initiatives between the two parties is discussed under the framework of the EAPC and its Work Programme. This Work Programme enlists the overall activities of NATO and its Euro-Atlantic partners under the PfP Programme, while the Individual Partnership Programmes refer to individual cooperation between NATO and each of its partners<sup>62</sup>. **NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue**<sup>63</sup> consists of seven countries- Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia- and includes an annual Work Programme and Individual Partnership Programmes<sup>64</sup> under the auspices of the PfP. Furthermore, there is the **Istanbul Cooperation Initiative**<sup>65</sup>, consisting of the four countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and United Arab Emirates. NATO further cooperates with several countries which are not part of these structures in emerging security challenges and even in NATO-led operations, in specific occasions. These "Partners across the globe"<sup>66</sup> are Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan.

Regarding the area of the Baltic Sea, NATO also cooperates with the **Nordic Defence Cooperation** (hereinafter **NORDEFCO**), to boost interoperability of joint defence programmes, such as air defense training, and maritime surveillance in the region. Finland and Sweden are two of the five members of the NORDEFCO but also two of the five NATO Partners with Enhanced Opportunities under the PII. The remaining

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<sup>62</sup>Sto.nato.int, *The Partnership for Peace Programme*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.sto.nato.int/Pages/partnership-for-peace.aspx>

<sup>63</sup>Nato.int, *Partners*. [Online]. 2015 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/51288.htm>

<sup>64</sup>Sto.nato.int, *The Partnership for Peace Programme*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.sto.nato.int/Pages/partnership-for-peace.aspx>

<sup>65</sup>Nato.int, *Partners*. [Online]. 2015 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/51288.htm>

<sup>66</sup>Nato.int, *Partners*. [Online]. 2015 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/51288.htm>

three members of NORDEFCO, Norway, Denmark and Iceland are also NATO members. These facts highlight the interconnection between the two organizations and NATO closely cooperates with NORDEFCO and its members to safeguard the Nordic-Baltic region and the Arctic Ocean from the increase in Russian military activities in these areas<sup>67</sup>.

### c. Selected case studies of the current security environment

#### i. NATO's southern dimension

NATO uses the overall structure of the PII to efficiently coordinate with its partners, in order to overcome modern security challenges in heated areas that pose a threat to Allies and their partners. NATO's southern dimension is largely heterogeneous, facing complex and diverse threats from both State and non-State actors. Constant conflicts in the Middle-East and North African regions, global migration deriving from the area and the augmentation of terrorist groups in this dimension are all indicators of the intricate nature of the challenges that NATO is to manage in the region. NATO's Package on the South contains a comprehensive approach to the Middle East and North Africa challenges in order to boost the Alliance's defense and deterrence from southern threats, aid NATO partners increase their resilience against security threats in the area and enhance international crisis management preparedness in the region<sup>68</sup>.

The impact of the NATO partnership with the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (hereinafter ICI) is included in this Package. In 2017, NATO launched a **Strategic Direction South Hub** under the lead of the **Allies Joint Force Command Naples**, to counter security issues deriving from the Middle East and North Africa, regarding terrorist activity, radicalization and migration. In

<sup>67</sup>Ndc.int, *New Research Division Publication* [Online]. 2017 [Accessed 28 November 2018]  
Available from: <http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=674>

<sup>68</sup>Ugen SINAN, Kasapoglu CAN. "NATO's Southern Flank". *Carnegie Europe*. [Online]. 2016  
[Accessed 1 December 2018] Available from: <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/06/10/threat-based-strategy-for-nato-s-southern-flank-pub-63785>

practice, it serves as a facilitator of situational awareness between NATO and its Partners, as well as intelligence exchange via information collection and management concerning southern threats<sup>69</sup>. The ICI Regional Centre in Kuwait and the collaboration of NATO with the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council are also measures to respond to common challenges and crises in the area.

NATO has operated under the PII in training Afghan forces to promote stability in Afghanistan, which still is a dangerous place due to the remaining Al-Qaeda elements and the weakened, yet existing, Taliban forces there. The current Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, which is a NATO-led mission, is an example of the coordination of NATO with its “Partners across the globe”, like Afghanistan. Other partners of NATO, like Georgia, are also contributing troops and intellect in the preservation of stability in the area. The role of this mission is the advancement of training, oversight, supporting planning and budgeting of the Afghan forces to prevent any crisis from occurring<sup>70</sup>. The insurgents constantly fail to capture any major city but they continue to cause human casualties. Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani recently stated that some 29.000 Afghan soldiers and police have been killed since 2015. The US casualties have been reduced due to the latest US withdrawal from direct conflicts<sup>71</sup>.

In regard to the situation in Iraq, the Iraqi security forces have recently defeated ISIS/Da’esh and have restored their sovereign control over their full territory, and NATO has launched a military training and capacity building mission in Iraq in order to support it in countering terrorism and promoting stability in the area. Under the scope of the PII, Australia, Finland and Sweden have committed their means and

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<sup>69</sup>Patton MARK. “Naples-based “HUB” holds grand opening”. *Allied Joint Force Command* [Online]. 2017 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from:

<https://jfcnaples.nato.int/newsroom/news/2017/naplesbased-hub-holds-grand-opening>

<sup>70</sup>North Atlantic Council. *Press Release PR/CP(2018)074: Brussels Summit Declaration (11-12 July 2018)*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 28 November 2018]. Available from:

[https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2018\\_07/20180713\\_180711-summit-declaration-eng.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_07/20180713_180711-summit-declaration-eng.pdf)

<sup>71</sup>Browne RYAN. “17 years in, Afghan war at a ‘stalemate’”. *CNN politics*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 26 November 2018] Available from: <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/27/politics/us-afghan-war-stalemate/index.html>



capabilities in this NATO-led mission. Jordan also contributed to these NATO-led missions and hosted the NATO training activities for Iraq<sup>72</sup>.

NATO has approved this year another **Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (hereinafter DCB)** Initiative to support Tunisia in the development of its defence capabilities<sup>73</sup>. This DCB Initiative included cyber-defence tools, counter-improvised explosive devices and transparency measures in resource management. This DCB Initiative will be implemented via education and training missions in accordance with NATO STANAGs. NATO in collaboration with the UN and EU has offered defence and security institution building advice to Libya, in order to advance its security status and develop a long-term partnership with this country, which could lead to Libya's membership in the Mediterranean Dialogue.

Other challenges that NATO and its partners face in the area are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among non-State actors, the Russia's anti-access and area-denial (hereinafter A2/AD) armaments, hybrid warfare, the proliferation of Iran's ballistic missiles and the terrorist insurgency. The education and training missions, the enhancement of missile-defence capabilities and weapons of massive destruction proliferation surveillance capacity, the distribution of mine detection mechanisms, the augmentation of the Reaction Forces, the operation of Special Forces and the use of clearing technology are some of the measures that NATO aims to deploy in coordination with its partners to resolve these security threats<sup>74</sup>.

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<sup>72</sup>North Atlantic Council. *Press Release PR/CP(2018)074: Brussels Summit Declaration (11-12 July 2018)*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 28 November 2018]. Available from:

[https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2018\\_07/20180713\\_180711-summit-declaration-eng.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_07/20180713_180711-summit-declaration-eng.pdf)

<sup>73</sup>Nato.int, *Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 30 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_132756.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132756.htm)

<sup>74</sup>Ulgen SINAN, Kasapoglu CAN. "NATO's Southern Flank". *Carnegie Europe*. [Online]. 2016 [Accessed 1 December 2018] Available from: <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/06/10/threat-based-strategy-for-nato-s-southern-flank-pub-63785>

ii. *Mediterranean Sea and the Horn of Africa*

The Alliance has undertaken in coordination with its partners many common exercises and monitoring missions of maritime activities in the Mediterranean Sea and off the Horn of Africa. NATO's Alliance Maritime Strategy of 2011 offers a framework for collective defence, crisis management and cooperative maritime security via maritime operations. NATO uses the IP forum to cooperate with other countries and organisations for the promotion of security in the areas of Mediterranean Sea and the Horn of Africa. One of these partners is the European Union, which cooperates closely with NATO in this domain since the coordination in maritime activities is one of the 7 sectors of the JDW. NATO Standing Naval Forces have an immediate-response capacity, which the Alliance seeks to transit to its regional partners so as to boost their crisis management preparedness<sup>75</sup>.

The Alliance has increased security during the last ten years in the Gulf of Aden, off the Horn of Africa and in the Indian Ocean and has countered piracy elements in the area, which were a constant threat to maritime routes. It led many counter-piracy military operations for the protection of trade and fishing vessels there, like the Operation Ocean Shield during 2009-2016, the Operation Allied Protector in 2009 and the Operation Allied Provider in 2008. The support of NATO via the Operation Ocean Shield was boosted by Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, the EU's Atalanta and the US-led Combined Task Force 151, following the spirit of the 2014 Wales Summit. Other partner countries which contributed to this Operation were Australia, Colombia, New Zealand and Ukraine. The other two NATO-led Operations were launched in response to the UN requests<sup>76</sup>.

NATO maintains close links with its partners in regard to international counter-piracy strategy. Furthermore, it aids its regional partners to advance their counter-piracy capabilities via DCB packages. Besides the piracy threat, the partners currently

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<sup>75</sup>Nato.int, *NATO's maritime activities*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 30 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics\\_70759.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_70759.htm)

<sup>76</sup>Nato.int, *Counter-piracy operations*. [Online]. 2016 [Accessed 30 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics\\_48815.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_48815.htm)

commit to the NATO-led Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean, which offers assistance to the Mediterranean countries in response to the refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea during the recent years<sup>77</sup>.

### *iii. NATO's eastern dimension*

As for NATO's eastern dimension, the main challenge for the alliance on this front is Russia. The Russian military activities in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova and the imminent threat that Russia poses for the Baltic States, which are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are all indicators to NATO about the increased Russian presence in its Eastern flank. The Alliance is lacking interoperability regarding its forces and the forces of its partners, but at the same time the interoperability element is absent even in the NATO ranks. It faces various challenges in the operational mobility of its troops and their equipment across the European continent to the Eastern flank. At the same time, many of its southern members and partners claim that NATO prioritises the discussions on the eastern dimension over the discussions on the southern dimension, which subtracts from NATO the elements of cohesion and unity.

At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO decided to provide membership to Georgia after their long-standing cooperation and extensive political dialogue. Georgia remains an enhanced opportunities partner of the Alliance in accordance with the PII and continues to follow suggested reforms so as to increase its defence capacity and interoperability capabilities with NATO. Georgia has continuously aided NATO in Black Sea security operations and has implemented a variety of measures under the auspices of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package, while contributing to the NATO Response Force<sup>78</sup>.

Furthermore, NATO has stated that the existence of an independent, stable and secure Ukraine is crucial for the promotion of Euro-Atlantic security. NATO follows with

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<sup>77</sup>Nato.int, *NATO's maritime activities*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 30 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics\\_70759.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_70759.htm)

<sup>78</sup>North Atlantic Council. *Press Release PR/CP(2018)074: Brussels Summit Declaration (11-12 July 2018)*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 28 November 2018]. Available from: [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2018\\_07/20180713\\_180711-summit-declaration-eng.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_07/20180713_180711-summit-declaration-eng.pdf)



Ukraine the same policy that it follows with its other partners and supports the advancement of Ukraine's forces interoperability with the Alliance's forces under the auspices of the EAPC's Ukraine Individual Partnership Programme. At the same time, NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package to boost Ukraine's self-resilience and the NATO-Ukraine Platform on Countering Hybrid Warfare are tools of the Alliance to foster Ukraine's defense sector. Ukraine is also a contributor to the NATO Response Force and commits to Euro-Atlantic security and stability via the NATO-Ukraine partnership. Ukraine continues to advance its interoperability capabilities with NATO forces due to its objective to obtain the status of an enhanced opportunities partner under the framework of the PII<sup>79</sup>.

At the 2014 Wales Summit, there was a NATO consensus that the eastern dimension had to be defended in response to the latest Russian aggression. The increase of NATO presence in the area was approved solely at a level of planning support due to technical, political and military obstacles. By 2017, NATO had deployed 4.530 troops on the borders with Russia separated in four groups of Reaction Forces led by USA, Germany, UK and Canada. Relevant reports highlighted the fact that NATO's adequate response to a potential Russian aggression could take days to occur. Increased capacity of Allies and their Partners to respond via NATO's Reaction Forces to any type of conventional aggression from the Russian side is the only safety valve for security preservation in NATO's eastern dimension<sup>80</sup>.

## 9. The EU-NATO Joint Declaration in Warsaw

The JDW represents the next step in the partnership of the two organisations so as to preserve Euro-Atlantic area security and increase resilience and the defense capacity of all Euro-Atlantic countries. As mentioned above, it falls under the spirit of the PII

<sup>79</sup>North Atlantic Council. *Press Release PR/CP(2018)074: Brussels Summit Declaration (11-12 July 2018)*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 28 November 2018]. Available from:

[https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2018\\_07/20180713\\_180711-summit-declaration-eng.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_07/20180713_180711-summit-declaration-eng.pdf)

<sup>80</sup>Dempsey JUDY. "NATO's Eastern Flank and its Future Relationship with Russia". *Carnegie Europe*. [Online]. 2017 [Accessed 2 December 2018] Available from:

[https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP\\_318\\_Eastern\\_Flank\\_FNL4WEB.pdf](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_318_Eastern_Flank_FNL4WEB.pdf)

and many of the JDW agreed sectors are correspondent to those currently being discussed with third Partners under the PfP Programme. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO Secretary General together with the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission agreed upon a joint declaration with regard to the NATO-EU strategic partnership. The JDW contains a common set of proposals consisted of 74 actions pertaining to hybrid threats, strategic communication, operational capabilities and cyber security<sup>81</sup>.



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## a. Hybrid threats

Through the JDW, the two institutions aim to enhance their capacity to counter hybrid threats, boost their resilience, adopt coordinated procedures, undertake joint analysis, prevent and timely detect projects, exchange vital information, share intelligence between staff and advance their strategic communication and mobility. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (hereinafter Hybrid COE) in Helsinki has worked as a facilitator of their cooperation on this sector. Hybrid threats

<sup>81</sup>President of the European Council, President of the European Commission, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. *Joint Declaration (8 July 2016)* [Online]. 2016 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf>

<sup>82</sup>Consilium.europa.eu, *EU cooperation on security and defence*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/>

are one of the most challenging issues of the current security environment, due to their complex, diverse, ever- changing and, subsequently, unpredictable nature. They could include threats from fake social media profiles to coordinated cyber-attacks and even use of conventional means and military force. The capacity of a hybrid tools user to exploit some of these tools or all at once increases the magnitude of the danger of a potential hybrid attack<sup>83</sup>.

These hybrid attacks can adjust to the nature of their target and the desired outcome of their initiator. During the last US presidential elections, the emphasis of NATO's hybrid strategy was on disinformation and strategic communication. Prior to this, focus of countering hybrid threats was on the little green men and Russia's strategy to achieve the illegal annexation of Crimea with a different, smart use of military force. Another example was the incident of the nerve agent attacks in Salisbury, which placing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks in the priorities of hybrid strategy<sup>84</sup>.

A mutually agreed understanding of hybrid threats between NATO and EU is essential, in order to achieve a coordinated effort on the same fields<sup>85</sup>. However, since both organisations contain almost 30 members each and since each of these members has its own strengths and vulnerabilities, the adoption of a universal definition of hybrid warfare that does not recognise this reality, is both extremely difficult and a deteriorating aspect of the situation.

In addition, the existence of vulnerabilities of an EU or NATO member against hybrid threats could lead to the overall exposure of the other members as well, via transportation systems and interconnected electric grids. In September 2018, NAC and the EU Political and Security Committee shared some ideas about training and

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<sup>83</sup>Hagelstam AXEL, Narinen KIRSTI. "Cooperating to counter hybrid threats". *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/cooperating-to-counter-hybrid-threats/EN/index.htm>

<sup>84</sup>Hagelstam AXEL, Narinen KIRSTI. "Cooperating to counter hybrid threats". *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/cooperating-to-counter-hybrid-threats/EN/index.htm>

<sup>85</sup>Hagelstam AXEL, Narinen KIRSTI. "Cooperating to counter hybrid threats". *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/cooperating-to-counter-hybrid-threats/EN/index.htm>



exercises at both joint and individual levels based on hybrid scenarios, under the instructions of the Hybrid COE. Notable is the fact that discussions have mostly focused on describing hybrid threats, rather than facing them. In addition, there are still members of both NATO and the EU that are not part of the Hybrid COE. Therefore, the two organizations are far from achieving their maximum capacity in this sector<sup>86</sup>.

## b. Operational Cooperation

The second JDW sector is operational cooperation between NATO and the EU, including maritime issues. This sector aims at the enhancement and effective adaptation of operational cooperation between NATO and EU, with special focus on the fields of maritime security and migration, via increase sharing of maritime situational awareness, advanced coordination, as well as mutual reinforcement of their activities in areas such as the Mediterranean Sea<sup>87</sup>. As it was aforementioned, NATO, through the forum of the IP and its Alliance Maritime Strategy, possesses the tools for the advancement of cooperation and coordination in this respective sector<sup>88</sup>. NATO and the EU have undertaken many common missions in the Mediterranean and elsewhere in the past, in order to raise their maritime situational awareness. This sector sets the goal of ameliorating the efficiency of the operational mobility of the two Organisations in order to deal with threats to Euro-Atlantic maritime security and beyond, along with other issues like the current increase in migration. Bewaring the challenges of coordinating so many different members of both parties in the field of operational mobility, this sector shall remain one of great complexity.

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<sup>86</sup>Hagelstam AXEL, Narinen KIRSTI. "Cooperating to counter hybrid threats". *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/cooperating-to-counter-hybrid-threats/EN/index.htm>

<sup>87</sup>President of the European Council, President of the European Commission, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. *Joint Declaration (8 July 2016)* [Online]. 2016 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf>

<sup>88</sup>Nato.int, *NATO's maritime activities*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 30 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics\\_70759.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_70759.htm)

### c. Cyber security

Discussions on cyber security have focused on the expansion of coordinated cyber security and defence between NATO and the EU, but also on the use of cyber technology for the advancement of their common missions, operations, exercises and the amelioration of their staff and units' education and training<sup>89</sup>. Taking into consideration the development of technology and the augmentation and evolution of cyber attacks in many countries within NATO's Area of Responsibility, this sector identifies some major challenges for NATO's core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. Furthermore, cyber warfare is a tool which can be used both individually and as part of a wider hybrid attack. Therefore, it covers a wide range of targets, which NATO and the EU are tasked to protect and secure.

One of NATO's most important measures to advance the implementation of this sector's tasks is the utilization of NATO Cyber Rapid Reaction teams to support each of the Allies in the occurrence of a cyber attack. The 2016 Technical Arrangement between NATO and the EU aims at the increase of their information sharing so as to boost their prevention, mitigation, preparedness and recovery efforts against cyber warfare. Furthermore, NATO cooperates closely with the industry of its members for the aforementioned goal via NATO Industry Cyber Partnership framework. At the 2018 Brussels Summit, NATO agreed upon the creation of a new Cyberspace Operations Centre under the umbrella of NATO's Command Structure in order to establish a forum for NATO to make use of national cyber capabilities of its members for NATO-led operations and missions<sup>90</sup>.

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<sup>89</sup>President of the European Council, President of the European Commission, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. *Joint Declaration (8 July 2016)* [Online]. 2016 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf>

<sup>90</sup>Nato.int, *Cyber defence*. [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 30 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_78170.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm)

#### **d. Defense capabilities**

This sector shares the exact same core with the PII, since it sets the goal of advancing coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities and the multilateral projects of EU members and the Alliance. NATO's strategy to advance interoperability of its forces with partner forces, in all human, technical and procedural sectors via the CFI and the NDPP, provides the perfect framework for the accomplishment of said sector's goals<sup>91</sup>.

#### **e. Industry and research**

It was stated before that NATO has intensified its cooperation with the industrial sector via NATO's Industry Cyber Partnership. This is an example of NATO's policy to expand the potential of the defense industry and defense research by concurrently promoting industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic<sup>92</sup>.

#### **f. Common exercises**

This sector functions as a framework for common coordinated exercises between NATO and the EU, to the inclusion of exercises based on hybrid scenarios. Parallel and coordinated exercises for 2017 and 2018 were the initial goal of this sector.

#### **g. Capacity building**

This sector also includes specific provisions for the eastern and southern partners of NATO and the EU and sets the basis for the enhancement of their defence and

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<sup>91</sup>President of the European Council, President of the European Commission, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. *Joint Declaration (8 July 2016)* [Online]. 2016 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf>

<sup>92</sup>President of the European Council, President of the European Commission, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. *Joint Declaration (8 July 2016)* [Online]. 2016 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf>



security capacity, their resilience in conventional and cyber warfare and their crisis management preparedness. The two JDW parties have adopted a set of tailor-made projects in a variety of areas for individual recipient countries under the auspices of this cause. Many of these shared projects have already been addressed in the section of the PII regarding advanced maritime capacity, generic planning capacity and exchange of advanced technology; such as mechanisms for countering improvised explosive devices<sup>93</sup>.

## 10. Recent Developments and Future Challenges

A variety of new elements have made the current topic even more complex. At the 2018 Brussels Summit, NATO and the EU signed a new Joint Declaration in order to reinforce their commitment towards their cooperation. In this new Declaration, increased involvement of EU members that are not part of NATO to the Joint Declaration's projects was encouraged. In addition, the Parties of the Declaration discussed upon progress made in the respective seven sectors, in particular their advanced maritime cooperation against migrant smuggling and trafficking, enhancement of the defence and security capacity of their eastern and southern partners, the success of their common exercises and their increased capability to address hybrid threats, respond to crises and cyber attacks. They have also addressed some further areas that need to demonstrate progress, like military mobility, counter-terrorism, resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related risks and the promotion of the women peace and security agenda<sup>94</sup>.

In recent years, NATO has demonstrated its will to advance its partnership status with its other partners, following the example of its partnership with the EU. During

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<sup>93</sup>President of the European Council, President of the European Commission, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. *Joint Declaration (8 July 2016)* [Online]. 2016 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf>

<sup>94</sup>President of the European Council, President of the European Commission, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. *Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation (10 July 2018)* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 28 November 2018] Available from: [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36096/nato\\_eu\\_final\\_eng.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36096/nato_eu_final_eng.pdf)

discussions under the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, the majority of the Dialogue's members approach NATO with the idea of a Maghreb Security System in order to foster their security and defence capacities in response to modern threats that the North African states are facing. This request was also brought up due to slow development of the multilateral consultation process of the Mediterranean Dialogue after the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the blocking policy of the Dialogue by a number of Arab states. The question for the establishment of a Maghreb Security System complicates the situation due to potential distancing of the respective North African NATO partners from the forum of the Dialogue and the coordinated strategies<sup>95</sup>.

Some developments were also present in the case of NATO's ICI partners. The latest statements of the Trump administration have focused on the realization of an Arab NATO between Egypt, Jordan and the six Gulf Arab states, which are Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. This policy aims at the potential creation of a "Middle East Strategic Alliance" between the aforementioned members of the ICI and the Mediterranean Dialogue. This policy, which was thoroughly discussed during the US-Gulf Summit in Washington during 12-13 October 2018, aims to set a barrier against the Iranian aggression in the area and to promote stability in the Middle East<sup>96</sup>. Nonetheless, failed efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council to agree on joint defence capabilities and the general belief on the unrealistic nature of such an initiative have blocked the progress on the implementation of this policy of NATO. Gulf countries are unwilling to discuss the creation of a regional strategic alliance, because they perceive each other as economic

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<sup>95</sup>Razoux PIERRE. "How to revitalize the dialogue between NATO and the Maghreb countries". *NATO Defense College Research Paper* [Online]. 2010 [Accessed 3 December 2018] Available from: [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126238/rp\\_64en.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126238/rp_64en.pdf)

<sup>96</sup>Bayoumy YARA, Landay JONATHAN, Strobel WARREN. "Trump seeks to revive 'Arab NATO' to confront Iran". *Reuters* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 3 December 2018] Available from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-gulf-alliance/trump-seeks-to-revive-arab-nato-to-confront-iran-idUSKBN1KH2IK>

and political competitors. NATO responds that strict military cooperation is the key to overcome these obstacles between them and proceed to the realization of this goal<sup>97</sup>. However, this was not the sole NATO goal that failed to produce any results. In the past few years there have been some discussions on the adoption of a new Strategic Concept by the Alliance, due to the failure of NATO's current Strategic concept to address the latest changes of the security environment<sup>98</sup>. Civil wars and the insurgency of ISIS, increased Russian aggression in the Baltic Sea and Eastern Europe and the complex nature of the newest hybrid and cyber threats are topics that are not addressed through the 2010 Strategic Concept of the Alliance. However, Allies have not yet discussed the possibility of a new Strategic Concept due to statements of the current US administration about the necessity of the Alliance's existence. NATO has found other ways to establish its strategic priorities and respond to these various challenges<sup>99</sup>. The PII and the JDW are such examples. Furthermore, the latest Russian aggression has made the demonstration of progress on the seven initial JDW sectors even more difficult. NATO has shown its interest to reduce its strategic, operational and tactical vulnerabilities, especially in order to respond to the non-military section of hybrid warfare. For instance, Russia's strategy considers energy and disinformation as some of its most important tools in its hybrid warfare arsenal. Its latest strategic movements have highlighted the necessity of NATO to advance its efforts in coordination with its partners upon this sector<sup>100</sup>.

<sup>97</sup>Mouchantaf CHIRINE. "What are the chances an 'Arab NATO' will work?". *DefenseNews* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 3 December 2018] Available from: <https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2018/08/29/what-are-the-chances-an-arab-nato-will-work/>

<sup>98</sup>Kamp KARL-HEINZ. "Why NATO Needs a New Strategic Concept". *ETHzurich* [Online]. 2016 [Accessed 1 December 2018] Available from: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/b82e0322-3507-4360-b25f-aeccdbe5e6f5>

<sup>99</sup>R. Sloan STANLEY. "Don't Expect a New NATO Strategic Concept Any Time Soon". *Atlantic Council* [Online]. 2017 [Accessed 2 December 2018] Available from: <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/don-t-expect-a-new-nato-strategic-concept-any-time-soon>

<sup>100</sup>Ratsiborynska VIRA. "Russia's hybrid warfare in the form of its energy manoeuvres against Europe: how the EU and NATO can respond together". *NATO Defense College Research Paper* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 1 December 2018] Available from: [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/NDU\\_Russia%C2%B4s%20Hybrid%20Warfare%20Energy%20Manoeuvres.pdf](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/NDU_Russia%C2%B4s%20Hybrid%20Warfare%20Energy%20Manoeuvres.pdf)



These developments have also posed a question about the status of the other sectors, such as capacity building, cyber defence and defence capabilities.

A recent highly controversial development in this area where statements made by US President Donald Trump in October 2018 to end the arms race with China and Russia and start negotiating a peaceful settlement of their contradictory interests. However, a few months ago all three of the above countries announced significant increase in their defence spending. It will take more time for the Alliance to see if these statements are part of a solid policy of these three states to re-establish a strong, mutual partnership in NATO's Area of Responsibility<sup>101</sup>. Recent history has demonstrated that much can change from one day to the next.

Furthermore, the PII itself faces a variety of challenges, mostly due to the need of many different parties to coordinate their efforts in the goal of its implementation. Some of these strategic interoperability challenges are sovereignty concerns, different national interests, disparities in local defence industries and subsequently in technological capabilities between the Allies and the Partners, but also between the Allies themselves. Also, there is a variety of tactical challenges like technological inequalities, doctrinal and procedural differences, resource gaps and different understanding of the concept of command and control. NATO has deployed tools that the CFI and the JMTC are providing, in order to respond in the best way possible to these challenges in the human, procedural and technical sectors of the PII<sup>102</sup>.

Nevertheless, political and economic differences between Allies and the various Partners of the Alliance will always remain a fact, which NATO officials claim that should be resolved via strict military focus. One last major challenge for both the PII and the JDW are the cuts in defence spending and the gaps between the parties of the partnership in regard to this sector. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO signed a

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<sup>101</sup>Economictimes.indiatimes.com, *Trump to discuss 'arms race' with China, Russia some time in the future* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 4 December 2018] Available from:

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/trump-to-discuss-arms-race-with-china-russia-some-time-in-the-future/articleshow/66934980.cms>

<sup>102</sup>Dr. Derleth JAMES. "Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations". *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from:

<https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm>

Defence Investment Pledge (hereinafter DIP) in order to increase defense spending of all Allies in an annual 2% of their national GDP and simultaneously reduce their cuts to associated budgets. The goal under DIP was to make all Allies meet the NATO-agreed guideline of the specific percentage of defence spending within a decade. The last four years have shown that the Allies are committed to meet the requirements of the DIP<sup>103</sup>. Yet, the issue of cuts in defence spending is still a reality with regard to the Partners of the Alliance<sup>104</sup>. This last element sets a weakened link in the very core of the PII structure.

## 11. Conclusion

The complex and ever-changing nature of the modern security environment sets a wide range of challenges for NATO to address. In reality, the PII has yet many challenges to address within its structure. Furthermore, NATO has already realised the important defence and security role of the EU for the establishment of a secure environment in the Euro-Atlantic area. Many NATO officials have discussed upon the need for a NATO-EU summit per year in order to achieve a more substantial and mutually beneficial cooperation, while other NATO officials question the relevance and the importance of such a measure. In addition, NATO recognises the need for a worldwide network of strategic partnerships and structures in order to achieve the best potential political, civilian and military efficiency for the Alliance itself but also for its Partners. Consultative councils that were created between NATO and countries

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<sup>103</sup>Banks MARTIN. "Results are in: Here's how much NATO allies spent on defense in 2017". *DefenseNews* [Online]. 2017 [Accessed 2 December 2018] Available from: <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/03/15/results-are-in-heres-how-much-nato-allies-spent-on-defense-in-2017/>

<sup>104</sup>Dr. Derleth JAMES. "Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations". *NATO Review Magazine* [Online]. 2018 [Accessed 29 November 2018] Available from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm>

like Australia, China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea are good examples of this NATO goal<sup>105</sup>.

Taking all of the above facts into consideration, a few subtopics that should be addressed by NAC this year are crisis management preparedness of NATO and its partners, the efficiency of NATO-led operations and missions, the challenges of the three sectors of the PII, the future of the various partnership forums of NATO, like ICI and the Mediterranean Dialogue, the role of the PII and the JDW in NATO's eastern and southern dimension and in the Mediterranean and the threats of hybrid and cyber warfare, in particular, for the Alliance. The adoption of innovative solutions by NAC in response to these challenges will help taking the PII and the JDW to the next level and subsequently lead to a more secure environment in NATO's Area of Responsibility.

## 12. Points to be Addressed

1. How can NAC best address the various challenges of the human, procedural and technical sectors of the PII?
2. How can NAC increase the strategic, operational and tactical mobility of the Alliance and of its Partners? What is the best NAC strategy for advancing the defence capabilities of the NATO Partners?
3. How can NAC further promote the seven sectors of the JDW? Which measures should be adopted in regard to the new areas that have been agreed upon in the 2018 Joint Declaration in Brussels?
4. What is the role of the PII in NATO's eastern dimension? Should there be considerations for new enhanced opportunities partners in the area?
5. What is the role of the PII in NATO's southern dimension?
6. What is the future of the ICI, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the other PII structures after the recent developments?

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7. How can NAC overcome at the best possible way the economic and political challenges between the Allies and their Partners?
8. How should NAC respond to the threat of hybrid warfare?
9. How should NAC enhance the crisis management preparedness of the Alliance, but also of its Partners? What is the present and future role of NATO Reaction Forces?
10. How can NAC ameliorate the operational cooperation of the Alliance with the EU in order to safeguard the Mediterranean Sea and other areas?

### 13. Further Reading

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