



# THESSISMUN



20<sup>TH</sup> EDITION

## **NATO – NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL**

Topic Area:

NATO's Crisis Coordination and Internal Reform

Study Guide



## NATO – NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

### STUDY GUIDE

#### Topic Area :

*“NATO’s Crisis Coordination and Internal Reform.”*



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## 1. WELCOMING LETTER

Distinguished Delegates,

It is with great pleasure that we welcome you to NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) of ThessISMUN 20th Edition 2023. We feel both honored and excited to serve as the Board of this iconic committee, especially since 2023 is marked by the celebration of 20 years since the birth of ThessISMUN. This year's topic, '**NATO's Crisis Coordination and Internal Reform**', revolves around today's complicated security environment, specifically, the forms of crises arising and NATO's response through coordination and reform. Crises may no longer be primarily waged with military forces, however, they require serious planning operations, involving military measures. The Alliance has developed a fully strategic concept and crisis management response plan that aims in facing the new security challenges. The more complicated the crises, the more complicated the plan is but at the end of the day, its effectiveness is questionable. In this study guide, we aimed to provide you with all the relevant background information that will help you understand the topic in depth. Additionally, we strived to incentivize you to conduct your own research as well, which is always necessary in order to fully grasp every aspect of a complex international issue. The bibliography and further reading sections at the end of the guide can be great starting points for that research. On a special note, we kindly want to ask all of you to not only carefully read this study guide, but also the Rules of Procedure (RoP) of NATO's NAC. As familiar as we make ourselves with the topic of the committee, we can never fully shine as delegates without a firm grasp of the rules of the game. Should any questions arise concerning the conference, the committee, the topic, or the procedure, feel free to ask for our help and we'll be happy to assist you. On behalf of the Organizing Team and the Secretariat, we welcome you to ThessiISMUN 2023 and the capturing city of Thessaloniki!

Best regards,

Alexia Papailiopolou, Secretary-General of NATO's North Atlantic Council

Anna Kalamata, Deputy Secretary-General of NATO's North Atlantic Council,

Alexandra Delianidou, Rapporteur, of NATO's North Atlantic Council



## 2. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE:

### 2.1. Historical Background

After World War II, most of the world, especially Europe, was left devastated, plagued by the ongoing refugee crisis, and destabilized by the destruction of its military forces. Simultaneously, the rise of Communism in many countries, through the Soviet Union, was perceived as a threat to American domination. NATO's visionaries felt the need to better confine the Soviet influence, to prevent further imperialistic tendencies in Europe, while also strengthening transatlantic relations. It was this vision that led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Organisation (NATO).<sup>1</sup>

### 2.2. NATO Treaty

"The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments"

4th of April, 1949: The United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom signed the North Atlantic Treaty<sup>2</sup> in Washington, DC, forming the strongest military alliance other than the United Nations (UN). Article 5 highlights the sole purpose of the alliance: "an armed attack against one or more of them... shall be considered an attack against them all" and in such cases, each Ally would take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force". Articles 2 and 3 immediately established a ground base for military and non-military cooperation between the Allies. However, only after the outbreak of the Korean War and the first detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union, did the alliance create a consolidated command structure with military headquarters (based in the Parisian suburb of Rocquencourt, near Versailles). Hence, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE, had come to serve as a security umbrella for the coordination of this military alliance.<sup>3</sup>

### 2.3. Modern-Day NATO

After the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on the 25th of December 1991,<sup>4</sup> there was one question left to be answered: Is there any further need for the Alliance?

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<sup>1</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified\\_139339.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm)

<sup>2</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_52044.htm#:~:text=At%20present%2C%20NATO%20has%2030,Kingdom%20and%20the%20United%20States.](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm#:~:text=At%20present%2C%20NATO%20has%2030,Kingdom%20and%20the%20United%20States.)

<sup>3</sup> *ibid*

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.exploros.com/summary/Exploring-5-Reasons-for-the-Collapse-of-the-Soviet-Union>





With Russia being the inheritor of the Soviet Union – at least in the eyes of the West – it is not wrong to imply that the Cold War never ended. The tension between the two parties kept disturbing the feeling of peace and security around the globe. Furthermore, the need for a pan-European military structure that would prevent another world war conflict was still urgent and NATO would be the key factor to that purpose. Modern-day conflicts in Syria and Libya and terrorist attacks are a few of the threats that create the need not only for peace-making but also for peacekeeping policies. Has NATO fulfilled those purposes? Only time will tell. But the Russian –Ukrainian War strongly indicates what the world seems to forget sometimes: the alliance is – above all – military cooperation.

## 2.4. North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military and security alliance of 30 countries from North America and Europe established by the North Atlantic Treaty (also called the Washington Treaty) on April 4, 1949, which sought to create a counterweight to Soviet armies stationed in central and Eastern Europe after World War II. Its original members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.<sup>5</sup>

NATO remains the principal security instrument of the transatlantic community. NATO's fundamental goal has always been safeguarding its Allies' freedom and security by political and military means. When it comes to political means, NATO promotes democratic values and enables members to consult and cooperate on defense and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust and prevent conflict. NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. When it comes to military means, the alliance has the military power to undertake crisis management operations. These are carried out under the collective defense clause of NATO's founding treaty- Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.<sup>6</sup>

Based on NATO's fundamental principles and Article 5, NATO is an alliance that is founded on the principle of collective defense, which means that it's a clearly defensive alliance. If one NATO Ally is attacked, then all NATO Allies are attacked and have to respond by any means they deem necessary. This means that they can provide military, political, logistic, or financial support and are not limited to engaging in armed conflict.<sup>7</sup>

In terms of funding, every NATO country contributes to the costs of running the Alliance. By far the Allies' biggest contribution comes in the form of taking part in NATO-led missions and operations. For example, one country might provide fighter jets, while another provides ships,

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/North-Atlantic-Treaty-Organization>

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/126169.htm>



equipment, or troops. NATO Allies also provide direct funding to NATO to cover the costs of NATO staff and facilities.

Due to various threats, NATO is committed to cooperation with its global partners in order to overcome them. It is important to note that the Alliance cooperates with over 40 partner countries around the world, as well as organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the African Union (AU), to spread stability and security.<sup>8</sup>

## 2.5. The North Atlantic Council

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal political decision-making body within NATO. It oversees the political and military process relating to security issues affecting the whole Alliance. It brings together representatives of each member country to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions, providing a forum for wide-ranging consultation between members on all issues affecting their peace and security.<sup>9</sup>

The NAC meets at least every week at the level of permanent representatives; it meets twice a year at the level of ministers of foreign affairs, three times a year at the level of ministers of defense, and occasionally at the summit level with the participation of heads of state and government. Permanent representatives act on instruction from their capitals, informing and explaining the views and the policy decisions of their governments to their colleagues around the table.

The Council has an important public profile and issues declarations and communiqués explaining the Alliance's policies and decisions. These documents are normally published after ministerial or summit meetings.

All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries. Consensus decision-making is a fundamental principle that has been accepted as the sole basis for decision-making in NATO. Consensus decision-making means that there is no voting at NATO and all member states have to be unanimous in order for a decision to be passed. Consultations take place until a decision that is acceptable to all is reached.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/126169.htm>

<sup>9</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49763.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49763.htm)

<sup>10</sup> [NATO - Topic: Consensus decision-making at NATO](#)





### 3. INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC:

The word "crisis" comes from the Greek verb "kpiveiv" (to decide) and was first used exclusively in relation to medicine. It described the point when a disease changed for the better or worse. The term's medical roots still seem to apply to the political sphere as well; just as a successful therapy would need to begin long before the turning point is reached, effective crisis management would seem most appropriate if used prior to a specific scenario reaching its "critical" stage.

In 3.500 B.C. the ancient world witnessed the transition from unorganized unions to organized city-states. This transition can be described as the very first form of crisis management, which took place so that people could efficiently and collectively defend themselves from external threats; thus, reassuring not only survival but also qualitative life and continuation in time. The modern-day world may have ensured well-being (at least in most parts of it) however, it has yet to demolish the threats of peace and prosperity. 21<sup>st</sup> century cannot settle with a simply organized civilization in order to face modern problems, which are intensively more complex. As a result, the need to develop a collective system, multidimensional and capable of responding to crises, is more urgent than ever. NATO, with a complete understanding of the situation, became the first military alliance to address crisis management collectively and comprehensively.

One of NATO's key functions in terms of security is crisis management. It incorporates both military and non-military methods to address the complete spectrum of crises, before, during, and after conflicts. With the use of tried-and-true crisis management techniques and an



integrated military command structure, NATO's plan for crisis response is undoubtedly one of its most resilient tools.

### 3.1. Historical Background<sup>11</sup>

In July 1992, twenty years ago, NATO attempted the first efforts in crisis management with a restricted yet active role in support of global efforts to put an end to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. After the fall of the Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, consisting of 6 republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, experienced severe political and economical instability, leading to the declaration of independence of the six republics.<sup>12</sup> The most heated conflicts appeared in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. In front of this bloody conflict, the United Nations made efforts to monitor the ceasefire, leading to NATO's significant presence in those areas. Within a small period of time, the Alliance was required to take on a more significant role and so in 1995, it sent its first-ever peace-support operation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, to supervise the execution of the Dayton Peace Accords' military annex. Ultimately, in 1999, it intervened to end the Kosovo crisis leading to the deployment of its second Balkan peacekeeping operation.

In only one decade NATO showcased its commitment to bringing about stability in the Western Balkans, making a crucial transition of the Alliance, as a crisis coordinator and ending the debate about whether NATO should expand its role beyond its borders. Additionally, it marked the start of peacekeeping and stabilization operations involving troops from allied nations and other international organizations. The lessons acquired in the Balkans regarding the necessity of a comprehensive strategy involving both military and civilian actors were utilized and further expanded, especially in Afghanistan.

### 3.2. Evolution of NATO and Crisis Management: <sup>13</sup>

The types of crises that NATO members agreed they should handle and the conflicts that they wanted to prevent along with the tools that the Alliance is able to use have changed significantly as a result of the security environment's radical evolution. The Alliance encountered mostly (but not exclusively) military-related crises during the Cold War, and as a result, the alliance

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<sup>11</sup> Nato, "Twenty Years Ago: The Birth of Nato's Crisis-Management Role," NATO, accessed January 16, 2023, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_89206.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_89206.htm)

<sup>12</sup> "The Conflicts," The Conflicts | International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, accessed January 16, 2023, <https://www.icty.org/en/about/what-formeryugoslavia/conflicts#:~:text=The%20first%20of%20the%20six,as%20the%20Ten%2DDay%20War.>

<sup>13</sup> Kriendler, John. "NATO Crisis Management: Cooperation with PfP Partners and Other International Organizations." *Connections* 3, no. 4 (2004): 59–68. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26323065>.



would mostly use (but not exclusively) military-related crisis management and conflict prevention measures. The emphasis in the post-Cold War era is on crises brought on by tensions and hostilities caused by racial conflicts, radical nationalism, intra-state political turmoil, unsuccessful or insufficient political change, severe economic issues, terrorism, and the threat posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).

The new position was outlined in Rome in 1991 as a part of the Alliance's new Strategic Concept. This new model anticipated more opportunities to accomplish long-term goals through political methods and took a more comprehensive approach to the security issue. Significant reforms to NATO's command and force structures, tight interaction and coordination with other international organizations, and more active use of political and diplomatic methods were some of the key components of the new strategy.

At the Washington Summit in April 1999, additional substantial advances in the field of crisis management and conflict prevention were made. Generally speaking, the Strategic Concept and Washington Summit Declaration outlined a broad approach to security that included complementary political and military means and placed an emphasis on cooperation with other states that share the Alliance's goals as well as with other international organizations. The creation of the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO received particular attention. The Alliance's political authorities would need to select and coordinate suitable responses from a variety of both political and military actions and to exercise close political control at all phases in order to take a coherent approach to crisis management, as in any use of force by the Alliance.

### 3.3. 9/11 Attack<sup>14</sup>

One of the most concrete examples of NATO's strategy in crisis management is the alliance's response to the terrorist attack from Al-Qaeda against the United States of America on September, 9 of 2001. Under a United Nations (UN) Security Council mandate, NATO Allies and partner nations have had military personnel stationed in Afghanistan for nearly 20 years, so as to ensure that the state wouldn't once again serve as a refuge for foreign terrorists planning strikes on NATO member countries. It is with no doubt that NATO's involvement in Afghanistan ended in a controversial way, however, for as many as 20 years, under the aegis of NATO forces, there haven't been any terrorist assaults from Afghanistan against any Allied territory.

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<sup>14</sup>Nato, "NATO and Afghanistan", NATO, August 31, 2022. Accessed January 19, 2023 [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_8189.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm)



## 3.4. NATO's current and terminated missions<sup>15</sup>

NATO is the leading factor in the maintenance of security and peace on the international stage. It represents democratic values, and it is dedicated to the peaceful resolution of controversies. Although if the diplomatic actions and efforts are not successful it has the right to undertake crisis management operations on its own or in cooperation with other countries or other organizations at the international level.

### 3.4.1. Terminated NATO Missions:

#### • *NATO in Afghanistan*

Following the terrorist attacks against the United States of America, on 11th September, the international security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established after a request of Afghan authorities and the UN's commandment in 2001. NATO was playing the leading role in ISAF from August 2003 until December 2014 and was succeeded on January 2015 by the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) which terminated in September 2021.

ISAF's mission was to evolve new Afghan security forces and allow the Afghan authorities to provide effective security in the whole country in order to create an environment that fosters the function of democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law, targeting the prevention of the creation of a safe haven for terrorists in Afghanistan.

The ISAF contributed to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. That was principally achieved through Prevention Reconstruction teams (PRTs) – led by individual ISAF troop countries – securing areas where reconstruction work could take place with the contribution of national and international actors. PRTs assisted the Afghan authorities in gradually empowering the institutions required to completely establish effective governance and the rule of law, and certainly the promotion of human rights. The remarkable role of the PRTs in this respect was to create capacity, support the improvement of governance structures and encourage an environment in which governance can evolve.

ISAF was also one of the largest crisis management operations ever. It brought together contributions from up to 51 different countries. By the end of 2014, the process of transitioning full security responsibility from ISAF troops to the Afghan army and police forces was completed and the ISAF mission came to a close. It was immediately succeeded by a new

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<sup>15</sup> Nato. "Operations and Missions: Past and Present." NATO. Accessed January 19, 2023. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_52060.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm).



NATO-led non-combat mission, resolute support to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions.

The legal validity of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) was based on a formal invitation from the Afghan government and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between NATO and Afghanistan, which governed the presence of Allied troops. The Resolute Support was supported by the international community as well, a fact that is proven considering the UN Security Council's Resolution 2189, which was unanimously adopted on 12 December 2014.

- ***NATO and Iraq***

NATO conducted a small yet important support operation in Iraq from 2004 to 2011 that was including training, mentoring, and assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces. During the Istanbul Summit the allies despite their differences agreed to be part of an international effort to assist Iraq to establish effective and accountable security forces.

As a result, NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) was created and contributed with mentoring, training, and advice in different fields. All NATO allies assisted in the training effort either in Iraq or out of its borders, through financial assistance or equipment donations.

- ***NATO and Libya***

The Gadhafi regime in Benghazi, Libya in February 2011 and the popular uprising against it forced UN Security Council to adopt Resolutions 1970 and 1973 in order to support Libyan people, "condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights". The resolutions included active measures such as a no-fly zone, an arms embargo, and last but not least the authorization of the allies to act when necessary through regional organizations in order to take "all necessary measures" to protect Libyan civilians. The NATO-led Operation Unified Protector had three distinct parts

1. The implementation of an arms embargo on the high seas of the Mediterranean in order to inhibit the transfer of arms or any related material to Libya
2. the implementation of a no-fly zone in order to avoid any bombing of civilian targets by any aircraft.
3. Air and naval strikes against military forces Implicated in attacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.





The UN Mandate was followed to the letter and the operation was terminated on 31 October 2011 having accomplished all of its targets.

- ***Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan***

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was aiming to eliminate violence and upgrade the humanitarian situation in an area that has been experiencing conflict since 2003. From June 2005 to 31 December 2007, NATO arranged air transportation for 37,000 AMIS and trained over 250 AMIS officials. When NATO's support to this specific mission ended the AMIS was succeeded by UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and the Alliance immediately expressed its preparedness to consider any call for help to the new peacekeeping mission.

- ***Hurricane Katrina - USA***

On 29 August 2005, the United States experiences a cataclysmic Hurricane which caused plenty of fatalities, damages, and flooding. The U.S. government was calling for help and needed food, medical and logistics supplies, and assistance in moving the above-mentioned supplies to the afflicted areas. NAC approved the military assistance plan on 9 September 2005 which included assistance in the coordination of the movement of urgently required material and the support of humanitarian operations. During the operation, from 9 September until 2 October, nine of the allies donated 189 tons of material to the United States.

- ***NATO in North Macedonia***

After a request that was placed by the Government of North Macedonia to assist mitigate rising ethnic tension, NATO applied three successive operations in the country, which at the moment was just a NATO partner and not an official member yet, till March 2003 when it entered officially the alliance. The operations were performed from August 2001 to March 2003. Firstly the operation Essential Harvest disarmed some Albanian ethnic groups which were acting in the whole country. In the following operation, Amber Fox was providing protection to the nation for the national monitors who were supervising the appliance of the peace plan. Lastly, operation Allied Harmony which started in December 2002 was providing advisory information in order to support the government in its attempt to ensure stability throughout the country. These operations are the proof and the reflection of the strong inter-institutional cooperation between NATO, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

- ***NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina***

Following the break-up of Yugoslavia, a harsh conflict started in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. The Alliance reacted during the summer of 1992 when it implemented the UN arms





embargo on weapons in the Adriatic Sea and enforced a no-fly -zone declared by the UN Security Council. It was during the supervision of the no-fly-zone that NATO participated in the first combat operations in its history by exterminating four Bosnian Serb fighter bombers attempting a bombing mission on 28 February 1994.

In August 1995 in order to force the elimination of Serb – led violence the peacekeepers of the UN requested NATO airstrikes. Operation Deadeye started on 30 August against Serb-Bosnian air forces, although it was not successful and did not manage to lead Serb Bosnians in compliance with the UN's demands to withdraw. This led to the Deliberate Force operation which was targeting Bosnian Serb ammunition installations. This NATO air campaign was the main factor to bring Serbs to the table of negotiations and end the war in Bosnia.

After signing the Dayton Accord in December 1995, NATO promptly deployed an UN-mandated Implementation Force (IFOR) consisting of approximately 60,000 troops. This operation (Operation Joint Endeavour) was followed in December 1996 by the deployment of a 32,000- intense Stabilisation Force (SFOR).

As a result of the improved security situation, NATO concluded its peace-support operation in December 2004 and European Union developed a new force called Operation Althea. The Alliance maintains a military headquarters in the country for the implementation of distinct tasks, related, more specifically, to assist the government in reforming its defense structures.

### 3.4.2. Current missions:

- ***NATO in Kosovo***

As part of Kosovo's force, today approximately 3,700 Allied and partner troops operate in Kosovo. Having first entered Kosovo in June 1999 aiming for violence's defeat, NATO agreed to maintain its presence in accordance with United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1244. Since then it has contributed to the creation of a professional multi-ethnic Security Force which is not heavily armed and responsible for tasks concerning security that are not appropriate for the police. At the same time, NATO strongly supports the support of the European Union between Belgrade and Pristina. The assimilation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is crucial to solving the political dead end over northern Kosovo.

- ***Securing the Mediterranean Sea***

Nato operations are also taking place in areas outside of conflict zones. Afterward the 9/11 terrorist attacks NATO directly started to take measures in order to expand the already available options to counter the threat of international terrorism. In October 2001 it started the maritime surveillance Operation Active Endeavour, concentrating on the detection and deterrence of terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. The operation came to an end in October 2016 and was



succeeded by Sea Guardian, an adaptable maritime operation able to conduct the full range of maritime security activity tasks.

Sea Guardian at the moment is performing three distinct tasks in the Mediterranean Sea:

1. Maritime situational awareness
2. Fight terrorism at sea
3. Support capacity building.

Generally, it assists in the maintenance of a secure and safe maritime environment while it supports the Alliance's three fundamental tasks: 1. Collective defense, 2. Crisis Management, 3. Cooperative Security

- ***Training mission in Iraq***

Formally the ‘NATO Mission Iraq’ was launched at the Brussels Summit in July 2018, after a request of the Iraqi government and in coordination with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. It is a non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission that targets to improve Iraqi security institutions and forces so they can eventually independently prevent any ISIS threats, eliminate terrorism and stabilize their country. The mission combines civil and military personnel and cooperated closely with other international actors, complementing an international effort to assist Iraq to fight terrorism and promote stability. In order to achieve that NATO advises the responsible Iraqi defense and security officials and professional military education institutions in Baghdad. The special parts of focus include between others leadership development and good governance, particularly in the security sector.

- ***Supporting the African Union***

Except for Euro –the Atlantic region the Alliance insists to support the African Union (AU) in its peacekeeping attempts on the African continent. Since June 2007 NATO provided air and sealift support for AU peacekeepers as assistant to Somalia following renewed AU requests. NATO is additionally providing capacity-building support and expert training assistance to the African Standby Force (ASF) concept at the AU's request. ASF is going to be developed in Africa in a period of crisis and it consists part of efforts of the AU to develop long-term peacekeeping capabilities. It reflects the vision for a continental, on-call security apparatus.



## 4. FORMS OF CRISIS

The effectiveness of crisis management has a fundamental starting point, which is the concrete definition of the term “crisis”. NATO has yet to formally approve a definition for the word, yet an ad hoc working group has elaborated on the term with the exact meaning of “National or international situation where priority values, interests, or ambitions are threatened.” The Alliance has not embraced the abovementioned term; thus, it is detailed and wide enough to apply to all types of crises that NATO controls or aids in managing. In contradistinction from the forms of crisis management operations, which will be furtherly elaborated on in the next chapter, we could safely state that the basic forms of crisis are: military, political, natural, technological, and humanitarian.<sup>16</sup>

In accordance with NATO's official definition (AAP-6), crisis management is defined as "coordinated activities taken to diffuse crises, prevent them from escalating into armed confrontation, and/or contain any ensuing hostilities."

Crisis management is one of NATO's fundamental security tasks. It can involve military and non-military measures to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during, and after conflicts. It is one of NATO's strengths based on experience, tried and tested crisis management procedures, and an integrated military command structure.

NATO is one of few international organizations that have the experience as well as the tools to conduct crisis prevention and management operations. Its robust crisis management capabilities allow it to deal with a wide range of crises, which could pose a threat to the security of the Alliance's territory and population.

Furthermore, it provides the framework within which members can work and train together in order to plan and conduct multinational crisis management operations, often at short notice. It can also train and operate with other actors where appropriate, for combined crisis management operations and missions. Allies decide whether to engage in a crisis management operation on a case-by-case basis and by consensus.

Finally, it is important to note that NATO recognizes that the military alone cannot resolve a crisis or conflict, and lessons learned from previous operations make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management.

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<sup>16</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Crisis management” NATO. ( 7 July 2022)  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49192.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49192.htm)



## 5. NATO'S ACTION PLAN IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT<sup>17</sup>

NATO has always been capable of conducting assessments of anticipated or actual crisis scenarios in order to inform NAC's decisions on how to contribute to international efforts so as to prevent or defuse a rising conflict.

As a crisis unfolds, NATO's first step is to presently examine the situation and plan actions alongside a six-phase Crisis Management Process. This procedure is primarily intended to assist the relevant staff and committees, coordinate their work, and provide the North Atlantic Council with timely and convincing advice. Furthermore, the procedure enables the Supreme Allied Commander Operations (SACEUR) to carry out preparatory military planning steps in a timely manner, hence facilitating and allowing capitals to make strategic political decisions.

Phase 1: Indications and warnings are provided to NATO's intelligence and warning system, either from an ally, or a partner. With these, the Council theoretically has four alternatives to consider: The four possible outcomes are: (i) decide that further consideration is not necessary; (ii) direct targeted NATO vigilance and more information for the Council; (iii) take into account political, diplomatic, and precautionary action, such as civil emergency response, and evaluate whether military implications are appropriate; or (iv) decide to start a thorough evaluation of the crisis situation and advance to Phases 2 and 3.

Phases 2 and 3: The Council charges the pertinent political and military committees with conducting an evaluation of the problem and offering guidance on how it may affect the Alliance's security. This approach is known as the Political-Military Estimate (PME). At this point, the Council will also charge SACEUR with developing a plan of action.

The NATO Military Authorities (NMA) will conduct operations planning for the response option the Council chooses, based on the outcomes of the PME process, by receiving formal political guidance from the Council. With this choice, Phase 4 of the procedure is enforced. The procedure does not, however, indicate that NATO has currently decided to adopt a military action plan.

Phase 4 (Planning): Phase 4 includes the creation of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) from SACEUR, followed by an Operations Plan (OPLAN), and their submission to the Military Committee for authorization, as well as the North Atlantic Council for review and approval. Hence, the NAC must formally approve the execution of the OPLAN in order for any forces to

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<sup>17</sup> Nato, "NATO's Assessment of a Crisis and Development of Response Strategies," NATO, accessed January 11, 2023, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_75565.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75565.htm).

be deployed. Phase 5 of the process is activated after permission to execute moves has been given.

**Phase 5 (Execution):** During Phase 5, NATO carries out the mission and performs periodic mission reviews (PMRs) to assess the operation's progress toward the desired end state and analyze the necessary military posture, capabilities, and force structure. For instance, PMRs often occur twice a year at NATO Headquarters. The Military Committee and the Council take into consideration the recommendations made in these reviews, so to perform adjustments to the operations. For instance, Phase 5 is where ISAF and KFOR are currently.

**Phase 6:** As the situation evolves, NATO enters Phase 6, and if necessary, it arranges and executes a handover to the proper authorities, completes the military mission, and gradually withdraws NATO's forces.



## 5.1. NATO's tools and coordination crisis management

The manner of dealing with a crisis depends on its nature, scale, and seriousness. In some cases, crises can be prevented through diplomacy or other measures, while other situations may require more robust measures, including the use of military force. In this regard, NATO has a holistic approach to crisis management, envisaging involvement at all stages of a crisis and





considering a broad range of tools to be effective across the crisis management spectrum. To ensure effectiveness and resilience, these instruments are continuously adapted to the evolving security context. NATO has had the capacity to deal with crisis management and, more specifically, collective defense and disaster relief operations for a long time.

## 5.2. Decision making

When a crisis occurs, no decisions on planning, deployment, or employment of military forces are taken without political authorization. Decisions are taken by the governments of each NATO member country collectively and may include political, military, or civil preparedness measures, depending on the nature of the crisis.

In addition to the regular consultations that take place to move ongoing activities forward, at any given time, Article 4 of the Washington Treaty gives each Ally the right to bring issues to the table for consultation and discussion with other fellow members: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” Article 4 is critical to NATO’s crisis management process since consultation is at the basis of collective action.

Furthermore, NATO has different mechanisms in place to deal with crises. The principal political decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council (Council or NAC), which exchanges intelligence, information, and other data, compares different perceptions and approaches, harmonizes its views, and takes decisions by consensus, as do all NATO committees. It is the NAC that decides on a case-by-case basis and by consensus whether to engage in a crisis response operation. In this role, it is supported by the Operations Policy Committee, the Political Committee, the Military Committee, and the Resilience Committee. Additionally, NATO communications systems, including a "Situation Centre" (SITCEN), receive, exchange, and disseminate political, economic, and military intelligence and information around the clock, every single day of the year.

Within NATO, the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS) is the overarching process that articulates the Organization’s crisis management role and ability to respond to crises. It coordinates efforts between the national representatives at NATO Headquarters, capitals, and the Strategic Commands by providing a comprehensive set of options and measures to prepare for, manage and respond to crises. It complements other processes such as operations planning, civil preparedness planning, and others, which exist within the Organization to address crises. It was first approved in 2005 and is revised annually.

One of the core components of the NCRS is the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP). The NCMP breaks down a crisis situation into different phases, providing a structure against





which military and non-military crisis response planning processes should be designed. It is flexible and adaptable to different crisis situations.

## 5.3. Crisis Management Operations:

### 5.3.1. Definition of Crisis Management

In accordance with NATO's official definition (AAP-6), crisis management is defined as "coordinated activities taken to diffuse crises, prevent them from escalating into armed confrontation, and/or contain any ensuing hostilities."<sup>18</sup>

NATO follows a comprehensive approach to crisis management in this regard, by being involved at all stages of a crisis and taking into account a wide variety of means to be efficient across the crisis management spectrum. The continuous modification of those instruments to meet the altering security frame reassures the efficiency and resilience of crisis management operations. NATO's key tools for crisis management have been, for a long time, collective defense and disaster relief operations.

### 5.3.2. Military Operations

Military forces, and especially deployed troops in times of war, depend on the civilian sector for transport, communications, or basic supplies such as food and water, to fulfill their missions. However, these assets are vulnerable to external attack and internal disruption.

Civil preparedness means that basic government functions can continue during emergencies or disasters in peacetime or in periods of crisis. It also means that the civilian sector in Allied countries would be ready to provide support to a NATO military operation. The combination of civil preparedness and military capacity constitutes resilience. Resilience is a society's ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from shocks, combining civilian, economic, commercial, and military factors. The individual commitment of each and every member to maintaining and strengthening its resilience reduces the vulnerability of the Organization as a whole. Members can develop resilience through the development of home defense and niche skills such as cyber defense or medical support. When Allies are well prepared, they are less likely to be attacked, making NATO as a whole stronger and better equipped to tackle crises.

Standardization and logistics also play a crucial role in the crisis management process.

Standardization: countries need to share a common set of standards, especially among military forces, to carry out multinational operations. By helping to achieve interoperability – the ability

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<sup>18</sup> Natotermotan, accessed January 16, 2023, <https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc>



of diverse systems and organizations to work together – among NATO’s forces, as well as with those of its partners, standardization allows for more efficient use of resources and greater effectiveness of the Alliance’s defense capabilities. Through its standardization bodies, NATO develops and implements concepts, doctrines, and procedures to achieve and maintain the required levels of compatibility, interchangeability, or commonality needed to achieve interoperability. For instance, in the field, standard procedures allow for the transfer of supplies between ships at sea and interoperable material such as fuel connections at airfields. It enables the many NATO and partner countries to work together, preventing duplication and promoting better use of economic resources.

Logistics: this is the bridge between the deployed forces and the industrial base that produces the material and weapons that forces need to accomplish their mission. It comprises the identification of requirements, the building up of stocks and capabilities, and the sustainment of weapons and forces. As such, the scope of logistics is huge. Among the core functions conducted by NATO are supply, maintenance, movement and transportation, petroleum support, infrastructure, and medical support. The Alliance’s overarching function is to coordinate national efforts and encourage the highest degree possible of multinational responses to operational needs, therefore reducing the number of individual supply chains. While NATO has this responsibility, each state is responsible for ensuring that – individually or through cooperative arrangements – their own forces receive the required logistic resources.

NATO periodically exercises procedures through scheduled crisis management exercises (CMX) in which the Headquarters (civilian and military) and capitals participate, including partners and other bodies that may be involved in a real-life crisis.

### 5.3.3. Article 5 – Collective defense

#### *Article 5<sup>19</sup>*

*The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties,*

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<sup>19</sup> Nato, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” NATO, February 6, 2019, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm).



*such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.*

Since NATO's founding in 1949, the protection and defense of Allied territory and its population against attacks, has been its principal and fundamental duty. Washington Treaty's central principle of collective defense is established in Article 5. According to this clause, if a NATO ally is the target of an armed attack, the members of the Alliance must consider this as an attack against them all, and they shall take whatever steps are deemed necessary to support the afflicted ally.

The first and only time in history when NATO invoked Article 5, was after the 9/11 attack by Al-Qaeda against the United States of America. After it was proven that the attack originated overseas, the North Atlantic Council collectively agreed that this incident fulfilled the requirement to be considered an "armed attack" as described in Article 5. NATO implemented a number of measures to prevent further acts of aggression, including Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, which helped to identify, discourage, and safeguard the area against terrorist activities.

History has proven that the activation of Article 5 is limited, thus its engagement in crisis management is rather confined. To understand the key role of Article 5 thoroughly and extensively in crisis management operations we need to evaluate the nature, dimension, and significance of the crisis at hand. Some crises request diplomatic or other political means while other situations may call for more robust solutions, such as the deployment of armed forces. Eventually, the detailed and specific requirements for the activation of Article 5 have led to limited use of this crisis management tool. In addition to that, nowadays new forms of attacks such as hybrid, cyber and non – conventional overall, dominate the security field. The distinctive characteristics of these attacks (such as the difficulty to prove their origination) imply that it is very rare to consider them as an "armed attack" as described in Article 5. As a result, collective defense, NATO's most fundamental principle has in fact restricted spectrum.

#### **5.3.4. Non Article 5: Political Operations**

Since most crises do not require the activation of Article 5, it would be no exaggeration to state that the majority of NATO's plans in crisis management are found in non-Article 5 operations, as known as "peace-support operations". The abovementioned term is an "umbrella term" used to describe *conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operations*. They are executed with either the support of the UN/OSCE mandate or the invitation of a sovereign government and involve military forces,



diplomatic missions, and humanitarian agencies. These multifunctional operations aim to establish a long-term political settlement or other conditions outlined in the mandate.

- **Conflict prevention:** These activities aim to prevent conflict and include a wide range of measures, from diplomatic measures to preventive force deployments, established to avert disputes from turning into or spreading into armed warfare. Additionally, fact-finding expeditions, discussions, alerts, inspections, and monitoring are used to prevent conflicts. In order to contribute to crisis prevention and early crisis defusing, NATO utilizes partnerships, cooperation, dialogue, and its connections to other international organizations, at their fullest potential. These initiatives are primarily executed under the auspices of Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

- **Preventative deployment:** Preventative deployment is utilized within the context of conflict prevention and includes the deployment of operational forces with adequate deterrence powers to stop hostilities from erupting.

- **Peacekeeping operations:** With the sole purpose of auditing and accelerating the implementation of a peace agreement, peacekeeping operations are often carried out in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, after having reassured the consensus of all Parties involved in a conflict.

- **Peacemaking operations:** These operations refer to diplomatic efforts after a conflict has occurred to prompt a peaceful resolution or a cease-fire. A few examples that showcase the range of the initiative are the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation, diplomatic pressure, or isolation.

- **Peacebuilding operations:** Peacebuilding includes activities that aim to address the root causes of a conflict and covers measures that assist the political, economic, social, and military aspects. This involves methods for identifying and assisting infrastructure that can contribute to the consolidation of peace, enhance feelings of confidence and well-being, and aid in economic recovery.

- **Peace enforcement operations:** These operations are carried out in accordance with UN Charter Chapter VII. They are intended to restore or preserve peace and coerce the conditions described in the mandate. They are persuasive in nature and are implanted when an agreement between the parties involved in the conflict has not been reached or may be ambiguous.

- **Humanitarian operations:** These procedures are conducted so as to lessen suffering among people. Humanitarian actions offered by specialized civilian organizations may introduce or accompany other humanitarian operations



### 5.3.5. Humanitarian, natural or technological disaster operations

When talking about crisis management, we often make the wrong assumption to only include the term, armed conflict. Nonetheless, each, and every day it is proven to us that natural disasters are as much of a crisis as political or military conflict is. NATO's plan for crisis management also includes initiatives to help member and partner nations afflicted by natural catastrophes proving its dedication to protect populations, a goal which was set as early as the 1950s, when the first signs of nuclear threats appeared.

#### **Humanitarian**<sup>20</sup>

Humanitarian operations: these operations are conducted to alleviate human suffering. Humanitarian operations may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialized civilian organizations.

NATO has also helped to tackle the global coronavirus pandemic. Together with other international organizations, is closely monitoring the COVID-19 outbreak and all NATO Allies continue to take preventative measures. Allies are supporting each other – including medical professionals, hospital beds, vital medical equipment, and best practices and ideas on how to fight this deadly disease. They are airlifting critical medical supplies from across the globe, providing medical personnel, essential materials, and vital equipment from military and civilian sources, and harnessing our medical, scientific, and technological knowledge and resources to help deliver innovative responses. Allies are also working together to ensure public access to transparent, timely, and accurate information, which is critical to overcoming this pandemic and to combating disinformation. Because they need a coordinated and comprehensive approach, NATO is working closely with other international organizations, including the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and the European Union<sup>21</sup>.

Moreover, NATO views disinformation as the deliberate creation and dissemination of false and/or manipulated information with the intent to deceive and/or mislead. Disinformation seeks to deepen divisions within and between Allied nations, and to undermine people's confidence in elected governments. The Alliance has been dealing with these challenges since its inception and has been actively countering a significant increase in disinformation and propaganda since Russia illegally annexed Crimea, Ukraine, in 2014.

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<sup>20</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "NATO response to COVID-19" NATO. (4 October 2020) [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_174271.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_174271.htm)

<sup>21</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Declaration by NATO Foreign Ministers" NATO. (2 April 2020) [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_174855.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_174855.htm)



NATO has intensified efforts to counter disinformation, following clear direction from Allied Heads of State and Government in the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, which stated: “We face hybrid challenges, including disinformation campaigns and malicious cyber activities.” In 2019, in their London Declaration, Allied Heads of State and Government said that NATO is “strengthening [its] ability to prepare for, deter, and defend against hybrid tactics that seek to undermine our security and societies.”<sup>22</sup>

NATO is responding in a unified manner, working in close cooperation with Allies and partners. NATO acts in a measured and responsible way, countering disinformation with fact-based, credible public communications. NATO publicly refutes false claims, debunks the main disinformation narratives aimed at the Alliance, and coordinates to share information, insight, and best practice.

NATO also works with the European Union, the United Nations, the G7, and civil society to counter disinformation. Free and independent media is the best response to disinformation and propaganda, with journalists free to ask tough questions and check their sources.

Additionally, as Europe continues to face one of the greatest refugee and migrant crises since the end of the Second World War, NATO is providing support to assist with the consequences of this humanitarian crisis.

The refugee and migrant crisis, caused by conflict and instability on NATO's southern borders, is being fuelled by human trafficking and criminal networks. In February 2016, on the request of Germany, Greece, and Türkiye, NATO decided to join international efforts in dealing with this crisis.

NATO is contributing to international efforts to stem illegal trafficking and illegal migration in the Aegean Sea through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. To this end, NATO is cooperating with the European Union's border management agency Frontex, in full compliance with international law and the law of the sea.

Following a request from Germany, Greece, and Türkiye, NATO defense ministers decided on 11 February 2016 to assist with the growing refugee and migrant crisis in Europe. NATO has deployed a maritime force in the Aegean Sea to conduct reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveillance of illegal crossings, in support of Turkish and Greek authorities and the EU's Frontex agency.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “NATO’s approach to countering disinformation: a focus on COVID-19” NATO. (17 July 2020) <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm>

<sup>23</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Assistance for the refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea” NATO. (6 January 2023) [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_128746.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_128746.htm)





NATO maritime forces are deployed in the Aegean Sea to contribute critical, real-time information to Greece and Türkiye, as well as to Frontex, in light of the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

NATO's Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) is conducting reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveillance of illegal crossings in the territorial waters of Greece and Türkiye, as well as in international waters with its maritime and air assets. It is sharing whatever relevant information it finds with the Greek and Turkish coast guards and authorities. NATO is also sharing this information with Frontex so that it can take even more effective action. Since NATO's ships are larger than Frontex vessels, NATO sensors and radars have a broader reach and complement Frontex's assets.

The purpose of NATO's deployment is to assist the Allies and Frontex in carrying out their duties in the face of the crisis. In accordance with international law, all ships that sail, including NATO ships, have to rescue people in distress at sea. Allied vessels will live up to their national responsibility to assist.

### **Natural Disaster:**

Crisis management is a broad concept that goes beyond military operations to include, for instance, the protection of populations. NATO began developing civil protection measures in the event of a nuclear attack as early as the 1950s. NATO member countries soon realized that these capabilities could be used effectively against the effects of disasters induced by floods, earthquakes, or technological incidents, and against humanitarian disasters such as the coronavirus pandemic.

In 1953, the first disaster assistance scheme was implemented following devastating flooding in northern Europe and, in 1958, NATO established detailed procedures for the coordination of assistance between NATO member countries in case of disasters. These procedures remained in place and provided the basis for NATO to conduct work in this field in subsequent years. They were comprehensively reviewed in 1995 when they became applicable to partner countries in addition to NATO member countries.

In 1998, NATO established the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) to coordinate aid provided by different member and partner countries to a disaster-stricken area in a member or partner country. The Alliance also established the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit, which is a non-standing, multinational mix of national civil and military elements that have been volunteered by member or partner countries for deployment to the area of concern.



<sup>24</sup> The EADRCC has coordinated assistance in many instances such as flood-devastated countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czechia, Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine); earthquake-stricken Türkiye and Pakistan; and countries afflicted by huge fires (for instance Portugal and North Macedonia). It has also supported the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Kosovo and supported Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova after extreme weather conditions had destroyed power transmission capabilities. More recently, it has supported NATO's efforts in assisting member and partner countries hit by the coronavirus pandemic. The EADRCC also conducts consequence management field exercises on an annual basis, bringing together civil and military first response teams to practice interoperability.

In 2005, NATO assisted Pakistan when it was hit by a devastating earthquake that claimed the lives of an estimated 80,000 people. NATO also regularly responds to requests for assistance following natural disasters such as hurricanes, heavy flooding, and forest fires.

In addition to its role as NATO's principal disaster response mechanism, the EADRCC conducts regular capacity-building and training events in Allied and partner countries to enhance national resilience through improved disaster preparedness.

### **Technological Disruptions:**

Technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, and quantum technologies are changing the world, and the way NATO operates. These and other emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) present both risks and opportunities for NATO and its Allies. That's why the Alliance is working with public and private sector partners, academia, and civil society to develop and adopt new technologies, establish international principles of responsible use and maintain NATO's technological edge.<sup>25</sup>

For over 70 years, NATO has stayed at the forefront of technology to ensure the defense of its Allies and the success of its operations. At the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, as part of the NATO 2030 agenda, Allied Leaders agreed to launch the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and to establish a multinational venture capital fund to support innovation throughout the Alliance. A year later, at the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, all Allied Leaders endorsed the charter for DIANA and unveiled its initial footprint of Test Centres

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<sup>24</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre" NATO. (20 September 2021) [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_52057.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52057.htm)

<sup>25</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Emerging and disruptive technologies" NATO. (8 December 2022) [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_184303.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_184303.htm)



and Accelerator sites. Separately, leaders from 22 Allies committed to participate in the EUR 1 billion NATO Innovation Fund, the world's first multi-sovereign venture capital fund, which will begin its investments in 2023.

The NATO Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies provides external advice to NATO and has issued two annual reports. The 2020 Annual Report identified concrete areas for the Alliance to focus on as it develops its EDTs strategies – including technology leadership, fostering innovation ecosystems and developing talent. The 2021 Annual Report highlighted NATO's rapid progress and ambitious approach to maintaining its technological edge, examining the development of DIANA, the NATO Innovation Fund and the Human Capital Innovation Policy. NATO is engaging with other international organizations, including the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), to address emerging and disruptive technologies.<sup>26</sup>

Emerging and disruptive technologies are increasingly touching all aspects of life – from electronics like phones and computers to everyday activities like shopping for food in the grocery store and managing money in the bank. These technologies are also having a profound impact on security. Innovative technologies are providing new opportunities for NATO militaries, helping them become more effective, resilient, cost-efficient and sustainable. These technologies, however, also represent new threats from state and non-state actors, both militarily and to civilian society.

To embrace these opportunities and at the same time counter these threats, NATO is working with Allies to develop responsible, innovative and agile EDT policies that can be implemented through real, meaningful activities. By working more closely with relevant partners in academia and the private sector, NATO aims to maintain its technological edge and military superiority, helping deter aggression and defend Allied countries.

In February 2021, NATO Defence Ministers endorsed “Foster and Protect NATO's Coherent Implementation Strategy on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies.” This is NATO's overarching strategy to guide its relationship with EDTs. It has two main areas of focus: fostering a coherent approach to the development and adoption of dual-use technologies (i.e., technologies that are focused on commercial markets and uses, but may also have defence and security applications) that will strengthen the Alliance's edge, and creating a forum for Allies to help protect their EDTs from being used against them by potential adversaries and competitors. These goals are key to ensuring NATO retains its strategic and effective dominance.

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<sup>26</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Cyber defence” NATO. (23 March 2022)  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_78170.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm)



NATO's innovation activities currently focus on nine priority technology areas: artificial intelligence (AI), data, autonomy, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology, hypersonic technologies, space, novel materials and manufacturing, and energy and propulsion.

The Alliance is developing specific plans for each of these key technology areas, starting with AI and data. These strategies are laying the groundwork for the Alliance to accelerate responsible innovation and the rapid adoption of data and modern technologies, in order to improve decision-making and steer transatlantic innovation for defence and security in accordance with Allied values, norms, and international law.

In October 2021, NATO Defence Ministers endorsed the first two of these strategies: NATO's Artificial Intelligence (AI) Strategy and the Data Exploitation Framework (DEF) Policy. The AI Strategy sets out how the Alliance aims to adapt AI to meet operational requirements and to accelerate and mainstream the secure and trustworthy integration of AI across a range of Alliance capabilities. The DEF Policy lays out NATO's vision to achieve data-driven decision-making across the Alliance by fully leveraging NATO-generated, national, and publicly available data; it enables the delivery of the AI Strategy and NATO's digital transformation efforts. Both policies are centered on principles of responsible use of AI and data exploitation in defense, and the operationalization of these principles. Based on these policies, NATO is translating these principles into practice to build trust with the public, the international community, innovators, and operational end-users.

In October 2022, Allied Defence Ministers endorsed the next set of policies to continue the implementation of the overarching EDT Strategy, including the DEF Strategic Plan, the Autonomy Implementation Strategy, and the Establishment of the Data and Artificial Intelligence Review Board. The DEF Strategic Plan builds off the DEF Policy and is driven by priority Alliance use cases (i.e., situations where the Alliance is leveraging big data to solve problems); it aims to further enable people, processes, and technologies that help NATO advance towards its goal of being a data-driven Alliance. The Autonomy Implementation Plan drives a coherent approach to NATO's autonomy protection and development efforts in line with the Alliance's norms, values, and commitment to international law. The Data and Artificial Intelligence Review Board serves as a forum for Allies and as the focal point of NATO's efforts to govern responsible development and use of AI by helping operationalize the principles of responsible use that were agreed upon under the AI Strategy.

As the Alliance continues to develop its strategic approach to emerging and disruptive technologies, implementation will focus on responsible use, accelerated adoption, and protection against threats.

To meet the critical challenges of today and tomorrow, NATO directly engages innovator communities on the ground. Through new initiatives and bodies designed to foster innovation



in EDTs and protect such efforts from potential adversaries and competitors, NATO plays an active role in cultivating a transatlantic innovation ecosystem for defense and security.

### *Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA)*

At the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allied Leaders agreed to launch the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) to foster transatlantic cooperation on critical technologies, promote interoperability, and harness civilian innovation by engaging with academia and the private sector. DIANA is a new NATO body that works directly with leading entrepreneurs, from early-stage start-ups to more mature companies, to solve critical problems in defense and security through deep technologies (i.e., transformational technologies that solve important challenges through the convergence of breakthrough science and engineering).<sup>27</sup>

### *NATO Innovation Fund*

NATO Leaders also agreed at the 2021 Brussels Summit to establish a NATO Innovation Fund. The EUR 1 billion venture capital fund will provide strategic investments in start-ups developing dual-use emerging and disruptive technologies in areas that are critical to Allied security. The Fund will be the world's first multi-sovereign venture capital fund.

### *NATO Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies*

The NATO Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies is an independent group that provides external advice to NATO on how it can optimize its innovation efforts. The Group was established in July 2020 and consists of 12 experts from the private sector and academia across the Alliance who have led cutting-edge research, developed EDT policy and managed innovation initiatives.

### *NATO Innovation Board*

The NATO Innovation Board is chaired by the Deputy Secretary General and brings together high-level civilian and military leadership from across the Alliance. The purpose of the Board is to look at new ideas from outside of the Organization, provoke discussion, foster the adoption of best practices, and secure cross-NATO support for changes that will help NATO innovate. This includes receiving recommendations from the NATO Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies.

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<sup>27</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Science and Technology Organization" NATO. (27 October 2022) [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_88745.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_88745.htm)





## 5.4. Situation Centre<sup>28</sup>

During times of peace and war, tension, and crisis, when high-level exercises are necessary, the NATO Situation Centre (SITCEN) warns and provides situational awareness to the North Atlantic Council (NATO's top political decision-making body) and the Military Committee (NATO's senior military authority), by receiving, exchanging, and disseminating data from all accessible internal and external resources. Since its establishment in 1968, the Centre works 24/7 to alert and inform the leadership so they will make informed decisions, by creating a smooth flow of intelligence data across its various sections. Through SITCEN's working mechanisms, NATO's leadership gain access to data resources in all areas of interest to the Alliance, and precisely the most current information from internal and external sources, including classified and unclassified/open sources.

The Situation Center works closely not only with several NATO Headquarters' departments, including the International Military Staff's (IMS) Operations and Planning Division, Operations Division, Public Diplomacy Division, Joint Intelligence, and Security Division, and all Permanent Delegations and Military Delegations (also known as Military Representatives), but also with particular international organizations in allied countries such as The Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

### **SITCEN's structure**

This center consists of both civilian and military personnel.

#### **-SITCEN watch**

NATO Headquarters receives constant situational awareness regarding events and trends throughout the world from the SITCEN Watch. They monitor and distribute information and intelligence about the global, political, economic, military, and terrorism situation, especially any events that might have an impact on the Alliance.

#### **-Geospatial section**

The Geospatial Section offers NATO Headquarters complete geographic services in the land, maritime, air, and space domains. This includes everything, from quick mapping to giving the NAC and the MC the most recent Common Operational Picture. Additionally, it involves managing Geo Portals across many network domains and creating fictional geographic settings

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<sup>28</sup>Nato, "Situation Centre (Sitcen)," NATO, accessed January 11, 2023, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_57954.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_57954.htm)





for use in training. The Geospatial Section, housed at NATO Headquarters, is responsible for processing, analyzing, representing, and integrating geospatial information into NATO systems. It can create geospatially enabled applications and strategic dashboards linked to content during times of crisis. Additionally, the Section offers general guidance on all geospatial-related issues to NATO HQ leadership, the IMS, IS, and PDD for geospatial content published on the alliance's open digital platforms. The aforementioned responsibilities give analysts a set of situational awareness tools available around-the-clock and aid in decision-making

### ***-The Situational Awareness Integration Team (SAIT)***

The Situational Awareness Integration Team (SAIT), established in March 2020, aims to create a thorough awareness of the regional and global security environment and how it affects the Alliance as a whole (allies and external partners). By bringing together information and expertise and providing analysis on current events and issues pertinent to the Alliance's interests and mission, the Team helps to create situational awareness. The SAIT also links stakeholders from around NATO and conducts both qualitative and quantitative research. It uses and applies the most recent advancements in data science, data policy, and cyberspace for its research and coordinating activities.

## **5.5. Strategic Concepts<sup>29</sup>**

In a world where ongoing security challenges pose an everyday threat to established political stability, the Alliance needs to address those challenges, in order to reassure not only its effectiveness but above all its survival. To outline and develop the elements of this approach, NATO adopts “Strategic Concepts”, in which they define the alliance’s nature and purpose including the elementary security responsibilities.

Strategic Concepts guide NATO’s political and military development, by providing them with the ability to respond to modern-day security threats and problems and prepare for future ones. They restate the essential security responsibilities of NATO and its enduring goals. Specifically, they are updated to confront changes in the global security environment and to guarantee that NATO can continue to fulfill its main objective and carry out its primary duties, making expansion and adaptation two of the most permanent characteristics of the Alliance.

### **5.5.1. Decision makers behind the strategy**

Strategy Concepts have been the most important NATO tool since 1949. One could say that almost everything has changed since then, except the constant feature of these Concepts,

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<sup>29</sup> Nato, “Strategic Concepts,” NATO, June 29, 2022, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_56626.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm)



meaning their adoption from the allies on the base of consensus. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the body responsible for approving the strategic papers for the Alliance; All but one of the eight NATO Strategic Concepts that have been published since 1949 have received North Atlantic Council's approval.<sup>30</sup> The most current Strategic Concepts were approved at NAC sessions at the level of Heads of State and Government during a NATO Summit.

## 5.5.2. The road to NAC

There are numerous steps of consultation, interaction, drafting, and negotiation that take place prior to reaching the NAC. It's interesting to note that, throughout the Cold War, strategic concepts were mostly developed by the military and approved by the Alliance's political leadership. They were top-secret documents with allusions to the military (MC). Since the end of the Cold War, political leaders have taken the lead while consulting with the armed forces. This shift is the result of NATO adopting a more expansive definition of security since 1999, where cooperation and conversation are key components of NATO's strategic thinking. Additionally, since 1991, all four Strategic Concepts have been publicly available and without classification.

## 5.5.3. 2022 Strategic Concept

Peace in Europe has been shattered by Russia's aggressions against Ukraine since 2014, followed by an unprovoked, full-scale war in 2022. The threat of terrorism remains while authoritarianism and pervasive instability have increased. The aforementioned alongside new challenges like climate change and swift technical advancements call for instant response. Since 2014, Allies have begun to raise defense spending while NATO has greatly strengthened its posture of deterrence and defense and improved the readiness of its forces. When Russia launched a savage and unprovoked war on Ukraine in February 2022, the allies decided to refocus NATO's deterrence and defense for the long term. NATO is adopting a broad concept of security and centers its attention on crucial domains like resilience and combating hybrid threats, combating climate change.

The NATO 2030 agenda, a series of practical steps to advance NATO's adaptation and make sure the Alliance can adapt to a new reality of heightened global competitiveness, was adopted by NATO Heads of State and Government at the 2021 Brussels Summit. One of the crucial choices that the leaders of the Allies made under NATO 2030 were to ask NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to oversee the creation of the 2022 Strategic Concept. The Secretary-General organized internal and external consultations and activities involving members of the Allies, government officials from capitals, experts from various fields, partner nations, and

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<sup>30</sup> In 1968, MC 14/3 was adopted by the then Defence Planning Committee (DPC), which had the same authority as the NAC in its area of responsibility



other international organizations, as well as young people, members of civil society, and business owners. Following that, the revised Strategic Concept was approved by Allied Leaders after the Allies negotiated a document based on suggestions by the Secretary-General.

## 6. RESILIENCE, CIVIL PREPAREDNESS, AND ARTICLE 3

### 6.1. Civil preparedness of member countries

Each NATO member country needs to be resilient to resist and recover from a major shock such as a natural disaster, failure of critical infrastructure, or a hybrid or armed attack. Resilience is a society's ability to resist and recover from such shocks and combines both civil preparedness and military capacity. Civil preparedness is a central pillar of the Allies' resilience and a critical enabler for the Alliance's collective defense, and NATO supports the Allies in assessing and enhancing their civil preparedness.<sup>31</sup>

-The principle of resilience is anchored in Article 3 of the Alliance's founding treaty: "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

-Article 3 helps to give NATO the means to fulfill its core tasks, in particular, that of collective defense.

-The individual commitment of each and every Ally to maintaining and strengthening its resilience reduces the vulnerability of NATO as a whole.

-Resilience is first and foremost a national responsibility. Each Ally needs to be sufficiently robust and adaptable to deal with and address the entire spectrum of crises envisaged by the Alliance.

-Military efforts to defend Alliance territory and populations need to be complemented by robust civil preparedness to reduce potential vulnerabilities and the risk of attack in peacetime, crisis, and conflict.

-Civil preparedness has three core functions: continuity of government, continuity of essential services to the population, and civil support to military operations. These three critical

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<sup>31</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Emerging and disruptive technologies" NATO. (8 December 2022) [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_132722.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm)



functions have been translated into seven baseline requirements for national resilience against which Allies can measure their level of preparedness.

-Military forces, especially those deployed during crises and conflict, heavily depend on the civilian and commercial sectors for transport, communications, energy, and even basic supplies such as food and water, to fulfill their missions. Civil preparedness ensures that these sectors are ready to withstand external attacks or internal disruptions and remain able to provide support to a NATO military operation if needed.

-Overall, NATO policy on resilience and civil preparedness is guided by the Resilience Committee, which reports directly to the North Atlantic Council, NATO's principal political decision-making body.

Today's security environment is unpredictable. Threats can come from state and non-state actors in the form of terrorist attacks but also cyber attacks and hybrid warfare, which can blur the lines between conventional and unconventional forms of conflict. They can also come from climate change and natural disasters such as floods, fires, and earthquakes, and from biohazards such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The challenge of adapting and responding to these different types of threats is compounded by trends that have radically transformed the security environment.

Initially, at the end of the Cold War, defense budgets were cut and although this trend has since been reversed, it increased NATO's overall reliance on civil and commercial assets and capabilities – such as railways, ports, airfields, and energy grids – to support the rapid and effective movement and sustainment of military forces. As a consequence, civil resources and critical infrastructure are, in many areas, owned and operated by the private sector. A few figures illustrate the extent of this:

-around 90 percent of military transport for large military operations is provided by civilian assets chartered or requisitioned from the commercial sector;

-over 70 percent of satellite communications used for defense purposes are provided by the commercial sector;

-approximately 90 percent of transatlantic internet traffic, including military communications, is carried by undersea fiber-optic cable networks maintained by civilian infrastructure;

-on average, some 75 percent of host nation support to NATO operations is sourced from local commercial infrastructure and services.

Despite this, driven by several objectives including maximizing efficiency, the private sector has eliminated most redundancies, which are costly for the business. Nevertheless, different



privately owned assets are critical for maintaining the continuity of government and essential services in a potential high-impact crisis, which represents a greater vulnerability than in the past. During the Cold War, for instance, there were territorial defense mechanisms and capabilities in place ready to support a war effort, but they no longer exist.

Moreover, with the widespread use of new technologies, our societies have become interconnected and interdependent in the economic, financial, information and cyber domains. Such interdependence has been a great strength and of significant benefit to our societies, but it can also create vulnerabilities and establish dependencies. In today's security environment, resilience to such challenges requires a full range of capabilities – military and civilian – and a whole-of-society approach, with active cooperation across government, the private sector and civil society.

## **6.2. Strengthening resilience, partnership, and civil-military cooperation**

### **6.2.1. Historical Facts**

During the Cold War, many key components of civilian infrastructure, such as railways, ports, airfields, energy grids or airspace, were in state hands and easily transferred to NATO control in a crisis or wartime situation.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the significantly reduced conventional military threat to the Alliance led to declining attention to and investment in civil preparedness.

As threats from international terrorism became more prevalent, NATO assumed an expeditionary posture that demanded different capabilities and capacities than those developed during the Cold War. Because Allied operations and missions were increasingly outside of NATO territory, this era did not warrant a large involvement of Allied civil preparedness resources. During this period, outsourcing of non-combat essential military tasks, requirements and capabilities became the norm and was also embraced by new NATO member countries. Although cost-effective, the result was an incremental increase in military dependency on civilian resources and infrastructure.

Recent events have refocused attention on challenges closer to NATO territory. As part of its response, the Alliance is strengthening its deterrence and defense posture. This includes strengthening civil preparedness and national resilience. Consequently, Allies are re-evaluating their own vulnerabilities and preparedness to effectively deter and defend against contemporary security threats.



## 6.2.2. NATO's Efforts

The better-prepared Allies are, the less vulnerable and potentially less likely they are to be attacked, making NATO as a whole stronger. Allies can strengthen resilience, for instance, through the development of their national defense capacity, assured access to critical infrastructure, and the development of backup plans in the event of crises; they can also regularly test their ability to provide vital services and support to military forces, using civil, commercial or other instruments. To deter, counter or recover from threats or disruptions to the civilian sector, effective action requires clear plans and response measures, defined well ahead of time and exercised regularly.

NATO's work to improve resilience follows an all-hazards approach, not specific to any single vulnerability. It contributes to protecting Alliance territory and populations from all potential hazards. At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allied Leaders decided to boost NATO's resilience to the full spectrum of threats and continue developing their countries' individual and NATO collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack. They agreed on seven baseline requirements for national resilience against which member states can measure their level of preparedness:

Assured continuity of government and critical government services: for instance the ability to make decisions, communicate them and enforce them in a crisis;

Resilient energy supplies: backup plans and power grids, internally and across borders;

Ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people, and to de-conflict these movements from NATO's military deployments;

Resilient food and water resources: ensuring these supplies are safe from disruption or sabotage;

Ability to deal with mass casualties and disruptive health crises: ensuring that civilian health systems can cope and that sufficient medical supplies are stocked and secure;

Resilient civil communications systems: ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks function even under crisis conditions, with sufficient backup capacity. This requirement was updated in November 2019 by NATO Defence Ministers, who stressed the need for reliable communications systems including 5G, robust options to restore these systems, priority access to national authorities in times of crisis, and thorough assessments of all risks to communications systems;

Resilient transport systems: ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian services can rely on transportation networks, even in a crisis.





These requirements reflect the three core functions of continuity of government, essential services to the population, and civil support to the military, which must be maintained even under the most demanding circumstances. They are all connected, which means if one area is impacted, another may suffer as a result.

Together with a package of resilience guidelines, evaluation criteria, assessments, and a tailored toolbox, the objective of the baseline requirements is to support Allies in enhancing their resilience and to provide benchmarks against which to assess their state of civil preparedness.

The NATO Summit in 2016 laid the groundwork for the Alliance to bolster resilience, with the development of evaluation criteria to support Allies in conducting national resilience self-assessments. Since 2018, based on these assessments, NATO has been conducting analyses of the overall state of the Alliance's resilience every two years. These analyses identify areas for further work and NATO is supporting Allies by providing guidelines on how to increase the level of preparedness across the seven baseline requirements.

In 2019, NATO leaders recognized the need to increase the resilience of societies, as well as of the Allies' critical infrastructure and energy security. They also committed to ensuring the security of communications, including 5G, recognizing the need to rely on secure and resilient systems.

The COVID-19 pandemic has severely tested the resilience of NATO member countries. The Alliance's response has underlined the importance of civil-military engagement and cooperation and demonstrated the vital roles that the Allied armed forces play in supporting civil societies. NATO and individual member countries have been working continuously to enhance preparedness across the whole of government, especially in the health sector.

Since 2016, the resilience of NATO members has improved, but challenges and shortfalls remain. At the same time, Allies are confronted with new challenges that could undermine the assured access to essential critical infrastructure by national governments and the military in times of crisis.

In 2021, Allied Heads of State and Government agreed on a Strengthened Resilience Commitment to further enhance national and collective resilience and civil preparedness. Allies agreed to step up efforts to secure and diversify supply chains; to ensure the resilience of critical infrastructure and key industries, including by protecting them from harmful economic activities; and deal with the impact of natural hazards that are being exacerbated by climate change, among other commitments.



Allies have also agreed to establish, assess, review and monitor collective resilience objectives to guide nationally developed resilience goals and implementation plans. This helps to build a more integrated and better-coordinated approach towards strengthening resilience at NATO. Supported by a new planning and review cycle, the national resilience goals are intended to operationalize the collective resilience objectives, the purpose of which is to address the Alliance's vulnerabilities across the seven baseline requirements.

Renewed attention to resilience is leading to increased collaboration between civil and military stakeholders. Collaborative arrangements between them are proving of mutual benefit, both in peacetime and crisis. For example, as the COVID-19 pandemic has shown, military assistance to civil authorities has been of critical support when civilian resources are under severe stress.

Exercises are an effective way to conduct stress tests of national arrangements, in particular when it comes to large-scale contingencies such as an attack with weapons of mass destruction or dealing with certain aspects of hybrid warfare. In this respect, resilience is an important area for analysis, and new assessment tools are being developed in order to improve how the Alliance and its members identify vulnerabilities, evaluate their preparedness, and improve their capacity. To test Allies' responses to crisis situations, civil preparedness elements are being built into NATO's military exercises at all levels, from strategic-level crisis management exercises and high-visibility exercises to lower-level command-post and field exercises.

Enhancing resilience and civil preparedness is also part of NATO's support to partners and a way to project stability in the Alliance's neighborhood. Examples of practical cooperation include the deployment of teams of civil preparedness experts in support of Ukraine in 2014, Jordan in 2015, and Iraq in 2019. The cooperation with Jordan, which runs from 2019 until 2022, resulted in a joint United Nations-NATO three-year project to assist Jordan in improving its preparedness in the field of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

Continued engagement with the private sector and other international organizations like the European Union (EU) and the United Nations is also key to strengthening resilience, especially by developing shared situational awareness. The EU, in particular, remains a unique and essential partner for the Alliance, particularly through staff-to-staff consultations and practical cooperation in a number of resilience-related areas.

## 7. NATO and E.U

The close cooperation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union has been and will always be at the center of political discussions. With 21 shared members, the EU and NATO are working together more successfully than ever to solve global issues and



handle emergencies<sup>32</sup>. From joint statements on strategic collaboration, reciprocal invites, summits, and other high-level events, to 74 projects across seven policy areas, their common response to crisis management is fundamental. Recent discussions about transatlantic burden sharing and European strategic autonomy underly the truth of partners-of-last-resort cooperation and shoulder-to-shoulder initiatives. Despite those discussions, the EU and NATO precede the ongoing demand for their partnership and synergy. This demand stems from the fact that both organizations were crucial to maintaining peace and stability in Western Europe during the post-war era and continue to be so, as evidenced by their commitment to values such as democracy, individual freedoms, and the rule of law. As a result of the contemporary difficulties that the post-industrial era created, these organizations are called upon to coordinate their activities, regardless of their different mandates (NATO is intergovernmental, while the EU has strong supranational characteristics).<sup>33</sup>

## 7.1. Fighting new security challenges in Europe: NATO's and EU's contribution

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is primarily focused on Euro-Atlantic security, and the European Union is focused on security on the European continent. The common ground of interest is de facto, and thus it comes as no surprise that both organizations are key factors in maintaining security in Europe. During the last decade, geopolitical circumstances have intensified the feeling of unsafety and insecurity among the European population.

The invasion of Ukraine by Vladimir Putin in February marked a turning point in European security because it proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that Putin has expansionist goals that extend over much of eastern Europe. As long as Putin or any leader with a similarly aggressive, imperialist attitude is in charge of Russia, there will be a danger to European security. Additionally, the situation in Ukraine will make existing issues among Europe's southern neighbors worse. Since the invasion of Crimea, in 2014, the EU and NATO have faced a rapid increase in a variety of different crises and new threats, such as terrorist attacks, migration and

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<sup>32</sup> Nato. "Relations with the European Union." NATO, January 11, 2023.  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49217.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm)

<sup>33</sup>The NATO - EU Partnership in a changing global context, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2020:  
<https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2020-revised-draft-report-nato-eu-partnership-changing-global-context-krimi-037-pcnp-20-e>



refugee crises, and the rising threat of hybrid and cyber war. Last but not least, China continues to be a worry for the EU and NATO.

Strengthening deterrence against Russia while maintaining the ability to combat other threats will be the main challenge that European security will face in the upcoming years. The EU acknowledges NATO's centrality and continues to view the alliance as the organization that undeniably shapes the framework for deterrence and defense. Both the EU and NATO can greatly contribute in terms of bolstering allies, bringing about regional stability, and enhancing military prowess.

Putin's aggressive war has resulted in massive deaths, the destruction of cities, and the eviction of millions of residents, significantly changing the security landscape in Europe. Both the EU and NATO have updated their processes of strategic reflection: the EU issued its Strategic Compass in March, while NATO published its most recent Strategic Concept during the June Madrid Summit. They outline medium- to long-term goals for Europe's defense and security in light of China's ascent, Russia's reassertion of aggression, and the rise of instability in Europe.

The security environment in Europe is intricate. Once Finland and Sweden formally join NATO, there will be 23 nations that are members of both organizations. Furthermore, European nations cooperate in a variety of "minilateral" configurations. For instance, the majority of cooperative military purchase initiatives take place in small groups of like-minded nations. Other small groups, such as the British-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force (comprising the Nordic and Baltic countries plus the Netherlands), or the French-led European Intervention Initiative, are dedicated to promoting interoperability between military forces (which includes 11 EU member-states, plus Norway and the UK). Each of these frameworks has the potential to improve European security. The issue is what each structure's proper function should be.

Both the EU and NATO have a key role in supporting allies, fostering stability, and, if required, getting involved in conflicts. The E.U. values NATO's training, which fosters connections between NATO and partner country officials. In contrast to NATO, the EU is able to offer partners substantial financial and military support, particularly since the creation of the European Peace Facility (EPF), which is used in Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and other southern EU neighbors. Moreover, 16 EU training missions can be beneficial for allies as well because the EU may be able to operate in nations where NATO finds it challenging, whether due to allies' political preferences or a lack of consensus within NATO.

## 7.2. NATO and EU cooperation



As analyzed above, NATO and the EU have separate crisis management plans in order to ensure safety and stability in the European continent. However, these two parallel plans collide when the two organizations decide to cooperate in security fields so as to ensure the most efficient way to combat the existing threats.

## Cyber Security

Through a Collaboration Framework Agreement, signed in 2013, between the European Defense Agency (EDA) and the NATO-certified Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CDCoE), the grounds for NATO-EU cooperation on cyber defense were arranged. This agreement was supplemented in February 2016 by signing a technical agreement to share operational-level data between the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability and the Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU (CERT-EU) (NCIRC). Using the Malware Information Sharing Platform, the NATO Communications and Information Agency and CERT-EU exchanged data on 86 occurrences between June 2019 and June 2020. (NATO, 2020). There are frequent cross-briefings, coordinated cyber exercises, and staff debates on concepts, doctrines, and training programs. Rapid response cyber defense teams are now being assembled by the EU and NATO so that they can be sent to assist an affected member state. Six EU Member States are also establishing Cyber Crisis Rapid Response Teams (CRRTs), which can be deployed in cyber-crisis scenarios, as part of the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). These teams will be provided with specially created, collaboratively developed toolkits for identifying and countering cyberattacks. However, NATO and the EU will need to make sure that the task distribution remains clear and that their various Rapid Response Teams do not compete for the same resources. The dialogue between NATO and EU personnel regarding cyberattacks has generally improved, although the opportunities for sharing sensitive information remain limited.

## Counter-terrorism

The Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016) terror attacks and the call by US President Donald Trump for NATO to step up its fight against terrorism have prompted the leaders of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to flag the issue as a priority for their cooperation

The two organizations can complement each other since NATO focuses on defeating ISIS and counter-insurgency, and the EU, on the other hand, provides opportunities for cooperation in law enforcement and judicial arenas. The two organizations also complement each other in supporting the Iraqi authorities through the NMI (NATO Mission Iran), which provides expertise and training to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, while the EU assists the EUAM (EU Advisory Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq). Since 2016, the European Union has adopted several financing instruments to fight counter-terrorism and prevent money laundering against illegal cash movements—matters outside of NATO's mandate. The





cooperation between the two organizations includes interactions such as participation in each other's working groups and seminars. Also worth mentioning is the fact that NATO cooperated with the EU to develop a counterterrorism reference curriculum that was introduced in July 2020 and assisted the allies and partners to improve their education programs in the field of counterterrorism. Lastly, actions related to other areas of the Joint Declarations of 2016 and 2018, such as partner capacity building, maritime security, and cyber security, played an undeniably important role in the counter-terrorism process.

## Hybrid Threats:

Hybrid threats have proven to be one of the most pressing issues for EU-NATO cooperation. The EU's hybrid fusion cell and NATO's hybrid analysis branch have developed a technical capability for automatically sharing information to improve situational awareness. Another significant example of collaboration in that field is the creation of a European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), which was also certified by both the EU and NATO in April 2017. This center provides a platform where experts and both organizations' state members can exchange better practices, and ideas and produce analysis on hybrid threats. NATO allies can learn from non-NATO EU countries like Sweden (which pioneered the whole-of-society approach to defense: the Total Defense concept) and Finland (which has extensive experience building societal resilience in the face of Russian misinformation and covert operations) in the age of hybrid threats.

## Operational Maritime Cooperation

The humanitarian refugee and migration crisis in the Mediterranean in 2015 created the need for the existence and operation of a tool to identify networks of human smugglers and traffickers. Therefore, the EU launched Operation Sophia to achieve the above-mentioned goals, while the EU Coast Guard and the EU Agency Frontex also enforced border security and search and rescue operations in Poseidon and Triton (later replaced by Themis) in the central and eastern Mediterranean. A detachment of the Standing NATO Maritime Group, complemented by allied naval assets, was also deployed to the Aegean to assist with the detection of human trafficking and illegal immigration. In this way, NATO was providing active support to Operation Sophia and Frontex operations as well as relevant national authorities in the Aegean Sea through the provision of operational information in real-time and logistical support. The successful collaboration between the two organizations in the Mediterranean is a result of the agreements between both parties.

## 2023 Joint Declaration





NATO and the European Union have recently signed the third Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, on January 10, 2023, following the previous declaration signed in 2018 and aims to promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.<sup>34</sup>

The Joint Declaration, which was signed in 2023, consisted of fourteen articles. Four of them concern the Russian invasion and war in Ukraine. Articles 2, 3, and 6 refer to Russia's violations, the action that the European Union is planning to take, and the competition and opportunity that Russia created for upcoming terrorism, respectively. Additionally, it refers to the common values and challenges that the two organizations share, such as NATO's and EU's commitment to promoting a safe environment that includes freedom and peace

To be more precise, the first article declares the cooperation between NATO and the EU based on their common target, which is part of an intensified work and cooperation aiming to condemn Russia's aggressive war while also showing their support for Ukraine's efforts to defend itself and its population.<sup>35</sup>

Furthermore, the declaration condemns Russia's war in article 2, since it:

1. *Violates International Law*
2. *Undermines European stability and Security*
3. *Causes a food and energy crisis, affecting billions of people around the world*

In addition to Article 2, Article 3 expressly condemns Russian aggression and outlines their repeated warnings to Russia to end the war and leave Ukraine. Notably, the EU and NATO vividly express their support for Ukraine's efforts to regain its independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

Moreover, issues like the authoritarian actors that challenge the EU's and NATO's interests, values, and principles, the growing strategic competition, for instance, China's growing aggressiveness and policies, and a persistent conflict on the European continent are also addressed in the declaration. The conflict in Europe's neighborhood, in particular, undermines

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<sup>34</sup> Nato. "Relations with the European Union." NATO, January 11, 2023.  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49217.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm)

<sup>35</sup> "EU-NATO Cooperation." Consilium, January 18, 2023.  
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/eu-nato-cooperation/#2016>



European security and creates a fertile ground for competitors and terrorist groups to further destabilize European societies and jeopardize European security.

The declaration, among other things, calls for closer EU-NATO cooperation and aims for a transatlantic bond by emphasizing the importance of Euro-Atlantic security, which will be critical to protecting stability and security.

Article 8 of the declaration clarifies that NATO remains the foundation of collective defense for its allies, which is significant and essential for Euro-Atlantic security, and at the same time, it recognizes the need for a powerful and more capable European defense power to contribute positively to global and transatlantic security.

In summary, Article 12 shows the intentions of the two organizations to strengthen the already existing partnership in distinct areas such as growing geostrategic competition, resilience issues, protection of critical infrastructures, emerging and disruptive technologies, space, the security implications of climate change, as well as foreign information manipulation and interference. Additionally, Article 13 brings all NATO allies and EU member states together under the umbrella of mutual compliance with the decision-making autonomy of the respective organizations, taking into account the specific character of the security and defense policies of each of the members. In this context, the declaration highly encourages all NATO members that are not members of the EU to get involved in the alliance's initiatives.

## 8. NATO and international cooperation

Increasingly, NATO contributes to efforts by the wider international community to preserve or restore peace and prevent conflict. It is committed to a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach to crisis management. As a consequence, it is building closer partnerships with civilian actors – including non-governmental organizations and local authorities – and is focusing on several key areas of work such as cooperation with external actors; planning and conduct of operations; lessons learned, training, education, and exercises; and public messaging. In this context, the record of NATO's sustained cooperation in the Balkans with the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union (EU) stands as a precedent.

NATO's partnerships are and will continue to be essential to the way NATO works. Partners have served with NATO in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and other operations, as well as in combating terrorism and piracy. NATO has built a broad and cooperative security network that involves countries participating in the Partnership for Peace program, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as with partners across the globe and troop-contributing countries that do not work with NATO through a formal partnership framework.



## 9. Article 10: ENLARGEMENT AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

NATO is currently facing one of the most urgent crises in Eastern Europe which threatens each and every member state, especially the ones located in this area of conflict. Russia, as we have already explained in detail, is undoubtedly the main factor behind the variety of crises that NATO is called upon to face. In the long road of crisis management in Ukraine, NATO will find key stakeholders through enlargement and expansion.

Any European nation capable of fulfilling the requirements for membership and making a positive contribution to regional security is still welcome to join NATO. The "open door policy" of NATO is based on Article 10 of the organization's founding treaty. Any decision to invite a country to Join the Alliance is taken by the North Atlantic Council. Basis of consensus among all Allies.<sup>36</sup>

Through eight rounds of enlargement, NATO's membership has grown from 12 to 30 nations since 1949. On March 27, 2020, the Republic of North Macedonia joined the Alliance as its newest member. Currently, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Sweden, and Ukraine are the five partners who have stated their desire to join NATO. In July 2022, the Allies signed the accession protocols for Finland and Sweden, marking the conclusion of their accession negotiations. They currently attend NATO meetings as invitees and have formal status. The Finnish and Swedish ambassadors to NATO simultaneously conveyed their intent to join the alliance by submitting official letters of application to NATO on May 18, following Russia's brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. They concluded accession talks on July 4, and allies signed their accession protocol on July 5.

Finland's and Sweden's inclusion will significantly alter European security. If handled correctly, it might result in a net gain. With their highly proficient armies, both countries would be able to offer security. They would improve NATO's capacity to modernize its defense planning and capability development and significantly contribute to burden-sharing among the allies. Their inclusion will increase NATO's deterrence by making it more difficult for the Russian military to plan operations in the Baltic Sea region, which is a geostrategic hotspot. The High North, the Arctic, and dealing with Russia in that area would likewise move up in importance in NATO's posture and strategy.<sup>37</sup> With Finland's entry, Russia will have an additional 1,340 kilometers of land border with Europe. To counter Russian land, sea, and air might, the two nations will together add 7,818 kilometers of the Baltic Sea coastline. Additionally, Europe's geostrategic center of gravity will keep moving north and east. The difficulty of protecting and strategically utilizing this space will be substantially reduced for NATO after Sweden's and Finland's

<sup>36</sup>"EU-NATO Cooperation." Consilium, January 18, 2023.  
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/eu-nato-cooperation/#2016>

<sup>37</sup>William Alberque & Benjamin Schreer, Finland Sweden and NATO Membership, Taylor & Francis, 2022:  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078046?needAccess=true>



membership. With Finland and Sweden on board, the Alliance will undoubtedly be better able to hinder Russia's capacity to carry out successful military operations in the Baltic Sea region and pose fresh dangers to its nuclear assets in the Arctic. However, seamless integration will need some alterations to operational concepts, plans, and capabilities, as well as careful alliance management.

## 10. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE SOUTH<sup>38</sup>

Changing the alliance's defense and deterrence posture in Eastern Europe is undoubtedly a strategic focus for NATO. However, the alliance shouldn't disregard other issues, as well, like upholding security in its southern neighborhood. NATO's "South," which includes regions like North Africa, the Sahel, the Balkans, and the Middle East, is nonetheless rife with expanding vulnerabilities and is not immune to the greater geopolitical battle with China and Russia. The future strategic idea gives NATO the chance to rethink its strategy toward the South rather than making it a unidirectional organization. NATO will need to be creative and expand its collaboration with other organizations, starting with the European Union, in order to promote "forward resilience."

It is likely impossible to avoid a de facto preference for collective defense over crisis management and collective security, but this decision is not without cost. Notably, the southern neighborhood of NATO continues to be structurally weak. Undoubtedly, international problems like terrorism, organized crime, the spread of small arms, and illegal migration will continue to be major causes of instability and insecurity in the South. The Sahel continues to see rising extremist violence, internal displacement, and food insecurity despite years of international intervention in security, development, and diplomacy. In contrast to Tunisia, which has witnessed recent unsettling political unrest, the political process in Libya to end a protracted civil conflict is still in a highly precarious state. The Islamic State is still active and tenacious despite losing its territorial stronghold in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, fears that Russia's actions may inspire nationalists to act violently have grown throughout the Western Balkans due to the conflict. As evidenced by the intense, long-standing political conflicts within Bosnia and Herzegovina and between Serbia and Kosovo, are proof that even the Western Balkans' appearance of peace and stability is deceiving.

The war in Ukraine is likely to make the instability already present in NATO's Southern flank even worse. Already, spillover impacts are affecting nations in Africa and the Middle East. These implications range from rising energy prices to food shortages. These nations are especially vulnerable to the dramatic decline in Russian and Ukrainian wheat exports, which raises concerns that decreasing food supplies could exacerbate the unrest in Egypt and Lebanon and feed continuing problems in Ethiopia or Syria. Russia's assault against Ukraine is "creating the seeds for political instability and discontent around the globe," as UN secretary general António Guterres stressed.

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<sup>38</sup>"NATO and the South after Ukraine," NATO and the South after Ukraine | Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed January 18, 2023, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-and-south-after-ukraine>.



In the West's geopolitical confrontation with Moscow and Beijing, NATO's southern region is also a theater that is becoming more and more important. A topic of growing concern is the expansion of Russia's diplomatic and military involvement in the South, whether directly (as in Syria) or indirectly (as in Libya and Mali) through proxies and private military firms. As recently seen in the Sahel, this expanding military presence is already having an impact on coalition counterterrorism activities. Russia's Wagner Group established itself in Mali by taking advantage of the nation's political turmoil, which finally led to the evacuation of French and European soldiers in February 2022.

NATO's goals are also impacted by China's expanding political and economic power. The long-term political and military challenge posed to NATO by China's acquisition of digital infrastructure across the South—and its de facto monopoly on the development of fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks in Africa—could make it more difficult for the alliance to cooperate with its allies. Similarly to this, China's significant investments in the southern European energy and transportation infrastructure might potentially hinder NATO's military readiness and mobility during a crisis. In addition, Beijing is steadily increasing its military presence along NATO's southern border, as shown by naval exercises between China and Russia in the Mediterranean.

The stability of the southern neighborhood continues to be essential to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region, and this is consistent with NATO's overarching objectives in relation to the South. The nature of the threats and challenges coming from the South as well as the larger geopolitical situation are changing. As a result, NATO's involvement in the South should also change.

## 11. KEY STAKEHOLDERS

### United States of America

The United States' relations with NATO have become significantly better since the Biden administration; this is evident, as Biden said after the Brussels summit, that the US alliance with NATO is unshakeable. In countering rising threats from China and Russia, it is clear that the US shares a common goal and position with NATO; Biden noted that "the democratic values that undergird our alliance are under increasing pressure both internally and externally". Regarding the issue of expanding membership, the US will remain open and grounded and support Ukraine and Georgia's alliance with NATO as long as it can effectively counter/limit Russia's and China's threats.

### Russian Federation

Russia's tensions with NATO have reached one of the highest levels since the Cold War; by suspending its mission to NATO and NATO office in Moscow, the possibility of the Russia-





NATO alliance in the near future remains relatively low. Since the Ukraine Crisis- annexation of Crimea, Russia has viewed NATO's actions in Ukraine as hostile and aggressive. In considering expanding NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia, Russia openly opposed it and will continue attempting to prevent it. According to Russia's interest, its near border countries remain non-NATO members; otherwise, NATO poses too much influence and threats against Moscow. Finally, NATO condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia's brutal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine - which is an independent, peaceful and democratic country, and a close NATO partner. NATO and its Allies continue to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defense.<sup>39</sup>

## China

China's interests will be similar to Russia's in one way or another, though one needs to consider their competing relations at the same time. Both are considered significant threat that needs to be countered; NATO expanding its membership to Asia Pacific will certainly provoke and irritate China. Therefore, it is in China's best interest to limit NATO's influence in the Asia Pacific and Asian countries while maintaining peaceful relations with NATO.

## Ukraine

Ukraine's best interest will be continuing to work with and strengthen its relations with NATO (as allies agree with Ukraine that it will become a NATO member), especially after the Ukraine Crisis, alliances with NATO provide Ukraine security protection to a certain degree. There are few significant pieces of evidence indicating Ukraine-NATO cooperation, one being the set up of the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine in 2016. Another is the Ukrainian Parliament's adoption of legislation reinstating membership in NATO as a strategic foreign and security policy objective in 2017 and Ukraine's 2020 new National Security Strategy "which provides for the development of the distinctive partnership with NATO with the aim of membership in NATO".<sup>85</sup> Their cooperation ranges from Cyberdefense, Medical Rehabilitation, Military Career Transition to building capabilities.

At the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, Allies agreed to strengthen the CAP and provide even more support to Ukraine. The strengthened CAP includes initiatives to boost NATO's long-term support to Ukraine and to provide the country with immediate, short-term, non-lethal military assistance. Under the Ukraine CAP Trust Fund, since March 2022, NATO has delivered projects providing support in multiple areas, including combat rations, fuel material

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<sup>39</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Relations with Russia" NATO. ( 5 January 2022). [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_50090.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm)





(including jet fuel), army boots, medical supplies (including first aid kits and pharmaceuticals), military training equipment and explosive ordnance disposal equipment. Additional projects, including further support to Ukraine in the area of C4 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computers), are in various stages of development and implementation

In the longer term, the Alliance is exploring its options for supporting Ukraine's future efforts on its path of post-war reconstruction and reforms. The strengthened CAP therefore also includes initiatives to further strengthen and modernize Ukraine's defense and security institutions. Allies also agreed to help Ukraine transition from Soviet-era equipment to modern NATO equipment, boosting interoperability with Allied forces.

In parallel, NATO Allies have significantly stepped up their bilateral support and provision of weapons and equipment, helping Ukraine to uphold its right of self-defense, which is enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Allies are also providing substantial financial and humanitarian aid, including by hosting millions of refugees in countries all across the Alliance. NATO Allies have agreed to step up and sustain their support for as long as necessary so that Ukraine prevails.

NATO stands with the people of Ukraine and its legitimate, democratically elected president, parliament, and government. The Alliance will always maintain its unwavering support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders extending to its territorial waters.<sup>40</sup>

## Georgia

Georgia is also considered one of NATO's closest partners and "Allies agreed ... that Georgia will become a NATO member". After the Russia-Georgia crisis in 2008, NATO provided various support to Georgia, including a "call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states." Moreover, NATO launched a substantial package of measures to strengthen Georgia self-protection capability after the 2014 Wales Summit, and further support was given after the Warsaw summit in 2016 and the Brussels summit in 2018. Crucially, Georgia also supported NATO during the Sea Guardian operation – an operation operating at the Mediterranean aiming at 'maritime security capacity building, and support to maritime situational awareness and to maritime counter-

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<sup>40</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Relations with Ukraine" NATO. ( 6 January 2022). [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_37750.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm)



terrorism'. Therefore, the Georgia-NATO alliance should remain strong in the future, especially in the face of Russia.<sup>41</sup>

## 12. CONCLUSION

*“We have slain a large dragon. But we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of” (R. James Woolsey quoted in Garthoff 2005: 221).*

R. James Woolsey made the aforementioned statement on February 2, 1993, just before he was appointed Director of Central Intelligence, during his hearing before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He argued that intelligence was still required, and in fact more so than ever, in the post-Cold War age by using the vivid metaphor. The metaphor illustrates the striking evolution of security concerns. During the Cold War, the US and its European allies concentrated on the threat posed by the Soviet Union, but with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, they confronted a number of new security challenges. Every part of the

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<sup>41</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Relations with Georgia” NATO. ( 25 August 2021). [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_38988.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm)



world has experienced a crisis over the past 25 years. Armed warfare, terrorism, and piracy are just a handful of the many security issues we face today.<sup>42</sup>

The term "crisis management" has gained popularity in the post-Cold War security discussion. For better or worse, it has largely superseded deterrence as the foundational idea of Western security strategy and policy. Institutions that are often built around the idea of deterrence must now change to meet the new requirement. This is especially true for NATO, which has long served as the cornerstone of Western efforts to maintain political and military self-preservation. The political upheavals of 1989 compelled the Atlantic Alliance to reconsider its conception of "crisis" as merely the purportedly brief period between peace and war, as well as to create a politico-military plan that would have to go beyond practicing for a war that was unlikely to occur.

NATO's efforts to meet the new challenges are clearly portrayed in the Madrid Summit. Even though the Alliance did not make any new cooperation program announcements in the strategy, however, the new obstacles and dangers, such as those connected to healthcare, climate change, and hybrid operations, were nevertheless noted. This is a new step to help the Alliance's work with certain partners become more comprehensive. NATO has recently announced changes to the NRF model, which will improve defense and deterrent capabilities as well as make it more useful for potential counter-crisis missions.

In the war against crises, NATO could not domain without aid from its external partners. Over the course of three decades, the Alliance has established partnerships with 40 nations in Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf (e.g., Australia, Japan, South Korea, Colombia, New Zealand), and with what it refers to as global partners, especially the E.U, in order to enhance its response in crisis management. The cooperation programs cover a variety of topics, including non-proliferation of WMDs, civilian crisis management, cybersecurity, protection of sea lines of communication, and counterterrorism. They aid in enhancing partners' capabilities and their ability to work with NATO forces, including during missions involving crisis response. This collaboration makes possible, among other things, joint military drills, political discussions, and the sharing of information that improves crisis early warning systems and situational awareness.

Through this journey of crisis management, one of the greatest dangers can be found in the neglect of many areas of concern, outside Eastern Europe. The South still remains a crucial region, in which crisis management still poses a challenge for the world, while China's "wolf warrior diplomacy" leads the way to political instability in the five continents.

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<sup>42</sup> Claudia Fahren-Hussey, *Military Crisis Management Operations by NATO and the EU the Decision-Making Process* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2019), 1.



In conclusion, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization undoubtedly has developed a detailed, technical, and conclusive plan of action so as to manage the crises arising in today's world. In the antipode of this plan, it comes reality, with its ongoing conflicts, that in the 21st century tends to use technological means to achieve the disruptiveness of peace and prosperity. These new forms, "technological crises" require a holistic and collective approach. more than ever before. Hopefully, the Alliance, the most important peace-maintaining organization, is ready to meet up the world's expectations.

## 13. POINTS TO BE ADDRESSED

- Should NATO finally adopt a formal definition for the term "crisis"? If yes, which forms should be included?

Which are the new forms of challenges the world is currently facing, apart from the Ukrainian War?

Should NATO enhance the use of military operations as a form of crisis response?

- Have the crisis management tools set in the 2023 Joint NATO - EU Declaration proved to be effective yet? If not, what changes should the Alliance make?



- What are the crises that the South is currently facing and how can NATO change its involvement to face them?
- What are some of the procedural and practical preparation plans that NATO must enact in order to strengthen its partnership with politically unstabilized countries?
- Which forms of crisis management can be applied to the Russian-Ukrainian situation and how can similar crises be avoided in the future?
- How can member countries use article 3 in order to be prepared as a collective for current and future crises?

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