



THESSISMUN



Study Guide

UN Future Security Council



Table of Contents

1. Welcoming Letter	3
2. Introduction to the Committee	4
3. Introduction to the Topic	6
4. Key Terms and Definitions	7
5. Legal Framework	9
6. Current situation in the region	13
7. Key Stakeholders	16
8. Impact on the International Community	26
9. Closing Remarks	28
10. Points to be addressed	30
11. Further Reading	32
12. Bibliography	33



1. Welcoming Letter

Distinguished Delegates,

It is our utmost honour and pleasure to welcome you all to the United Nations Future Security Council (UNFSC) of ThessISMUN 2025.

We are extremely delighted to present to you this year's topic of our Committee: "*Nile at Risk: Navigating Post-GERD Geopolitical Turbulence*". We believe that this is a unique, demanding and unexplored topic, which combined with the nature of our Committee requires innovative, spontaneous and critical thinking on your behalf. During our sessions, you are expected to carefully handle different scenarios which may arise, while at the same time towing the line of your respective country's policy and interests.

For the aforementioned reasons, we have decided to create this detailed study guide, in order to provide you with advanced and relevant information concerning our topic. It will undoubtedly be of use in your own preparation and writing. Nevertheless, we also strongly encourage you to further research into the details and intricacies of this complex topic, and its different aspects based upon your individually allocated countries. In this way, you will be sufficiently prepared for whatever may come your way! After you have concluded with your individual preparation, we expect well-structured position papers. Be confident in your research and abilities!

As your Board Members, during our sessions we will remain at your disposal for any questions concerning procedural and substantive matters. Throughout the conference, we will ensure that your experience, whether that of a first timer or of an experienced delegate, will be remarkable and unforgettable.

From your behalf, we expect full compliance with the rules of the Conference and those of the Committee, respectively. In this way, we can ensure that everything will be conducted accordingly, much to the benefit of both us and yourselves. A smooth procedure will allow for your hard work to be better displayed during our sessions.

We are looking forward to meeting each and every one of you this coming April! We wish you the best of luck in your research and preparation. We hope that this Study Guide proves useful and addresses any questions or concerns that may arise. Should you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact us directly.

Kind regards,

The Board of the UN Future Security Council

Evangelos Chatzis, President

Panagiotis Spanos, Vice-President



2. Introduction to the Committee

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC)¹ was established on the 24th of October 1945, the same date as the United Nations themselves, and has ever since been the single committee that benefits from direct executive authority. It is the foremost body of the United Nations entrusted with the sole purpose of maintaining international security and peace.

The United Nations Future Security Council (UNFSC) is virtually identical to the UNSC, with the sole exception being that it deals with conflicts and crises which are placed in the future. It covers all types of conflicts, from currently emerging conflicts that we're already familiar with, to scenarios which may seem fantastical and highly unlikely to some. The goal is to anticipate future events, deal with them as if they are currently occurring and prevent escalation while providing practical and effective solutions. As such, this Committee requires quick and critical thinking, a deep historical understanding of events and, perhaps most importantly, quick thinking on your feet.

The U.N. Future Security Council is composed of 15 United Nations member states, of which five are permanent members (Russian Federation, People's Republic of China, France, United States of America, United Kingdom) and the remaining ten are non-permanent members. With regard to the five permanent members of the UNSC (commonly known as the **P5**), they possess the ability to unilaterally **veto** (block) any document or resolution put to vote in the Council, without requiring the otherwise necessary amount of votes to render it as a failed resolution. The non-permanent members are elected by the United Nations General Assembly every two years with rotating terms. Moreover, there are certain criteria which ought to be fulfilled for a candidate state to join the Security Council. In particular, it is imperative that the state can contribute to the sustenance of international peace and security, while at the same time certain geographical parameters apply, so as to ensure the equal representation of all geographical areas of the world.

The scope, function, composition, abilities, mandate and all other relevant information regarding the UNSC can be found in detail in the United Nations Charter, Chapter V (Articles 23-32)².

The United Nations Charter established six main organs, each one for a different purpose, with the Security Council being responsible for the establishment and ultimately the

¹The United Nations - Security Council. χ.χ. 'What is Security Council?' <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/what-security-council>.

²“Chapter V: The Security Council (Articles 23-32).” *United Nations*, United Nations, www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-5. Accessed 10 Dec. 2024.



maintenance of world peace in the face of many threats plaguing the international community.

This year's topic under discussion could very well be considered as one of the most important, yet underreported, emerging crises around the globe³.

Given all the aforementioned information about the Security Council, it is more than obvious that the Committee demands a great effort of work, determination and thus, it is vital for all delegates to be well prepared in understanding the mandate of the UNSC.

³ The United Nations. γ.γ. 'Role of the Security Council'. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/role-of-security-council>.

3. Introduction to the Topic

Northeast Africa is a region with a tumultuous and complex history that has only been exacerbated in recent times. Arguably one of the most critical developments was the construction of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia, which altered the geopolitical, economic, diplomatic and societal currents in the broader area⁴. The dam, which was completed in October 2024 and is Africa’s largest hydroelectric project, aimed at resolving the chronic energy shortages that Ethiopia had been facing— proving largely successful. The dam stands as a symbol of Ethiopian economic prosperity and energy independence. Situated on the Blue Nile river, one of the two tributaries to the Nile river and which contributes “85% of the latter’s water flow”⁵, the GERD has raised alarms and concerns among many of the surrounding nations, particularly those of Egypt and Sudan.

The Nile River, being the largest river in Africa whose waters flow from the South to the North, has long been a lifeline for its riparian nations. For Egypt, it sustains 90% of its freshwater needs and is central to its large agricultural economy⁶. Sudan, while benefiting from flood control and electricity potential, has from the beginning been wary of disruptions in water flow. Ethiopia, for its part, argues that the GERD is essential for electrifying the nation, fostering regional energy trade, and lifting millions out of poverty⁷. Moreover, it contends that such a project would be of great



⁴ Bearak, Max, and Sudarsan Raghavan. “Africa’s Largest Dam Fills Ethiopia with Hope and Egypt with Dread - Washington Post.” *The Washington Post*, www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2020/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-egypt-nile/. Accessed 18 Aug. 2024.

⁵ Attia, Hana, and Mona Saleh. *The Political Deadlock on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam*. German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2021. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33478>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.

⁶ Polakovic, Gary. “Water Dispute on the Nile River Could Destabilize the Region.” *USC Today*, 19 Sept. 2023, today.usc.edu/nile-river-water-dispute-filling-dam-egypt-ethiopia-usc-study/.

⁷ Bearak, Max, and Sudarsan Raghavan. “Africa’s Largest Dam Fills Ethiopia with Hope and Egypt with Dread - Washington Post.” *The Washington Post*, www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2020/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-egypt-nile/. Accessed 18 Aug. 2024.



economic benefit to the surrounding nations, by lowering energy costs through the cheap and mass production of energy.

The hydropolitics of the region go back to the colonial era where treaties, such as the ones signed in 1929 and 1959⁸, tried to set a legal framework and precedent for resolving disputes surrounding the Nile and its management by the riparian nations. The practical efficacy of these initiatives has been minimal at best and non-existent at worst, something which has continued after the period of colonialism and into the modern era of independent African nation-states.

Now, after the efforts that were undertaken by Ethiopia have been completed and the dam's reservoir is quickly being filled, so as to swiftly energize the nation, the water flow of the Nile has dropped consistently over the past few years, leading to an overall 15% reduction thus far. This has had a significantly negative impact on the agricultural and energy production sectors of Egypt, which is evident from the reduction in agricultural output and the ever-increasing power outages. Surrounding riparian nations have also had to deal with these issues. Thus, it is no wonder that relations have swiftly deteriorated between the two main stakeholders and that the escalations— which could potentially take an armed dimension if no solution is found— have no apparent end in sight.

Lastly, it is extremely important to highlight the international aspect of this issue. The dominant world powers, whether those be the United States of America or the People's Republic of China, have vested economic and geopolitical interests in this ongoing dispute. Hence, this issue has been brought to the United Nations Security Council, in hopes of resolving the dispute and establishing a foundation for the nations involved to move forward together in peace and prosperity.

For the aforementioned reasons, this Study Guide aims at providing a comprehensive historical and contemporary analysis of the relevant facts and dynamics that pertain to this topic.

4. Key Terms and Definitions

Dam: A barrier that controls and stops the natural flow of water, thus creating a reservoir which functions as a way to produce electricity and supply water. Examples include the GERD in Ethiopia and the Hoover dam in Nevada, USA⁹.

⁸“Sudan-United Arab Republic.” *International Water Law Project*, www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/UAR_Sudan1959_and_Protocol1960.pdf. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.

⁹ ‘Dams’, accessed 27 January 2025, <https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/dams>.



Reservoir: An enlarged body of water that forms behind a dam¹⁰.

Riparian: A part of a land that is directly connected with river waters or an area which is related to the surrounding river¹¹.

Basin: Rivers and tributaries that traverse the entire geographical area with a natural depression in the surface of the land which surrounds the water that flows towards a specific direction and outlet¹².

Blue Nile: One of the two main tributary rivers to the Nile river, the other being the White Nile. It originates in Lake Tana in Ethiopia and provides around 85% of the Nile's water flow¹³.

Axis of Resistance: An informal term used to denote the growing tripartite alliance between the nations of Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia, with the shared goal of curtailing Ethiopian influence in the region.

Cubic Meter: A unit of measurement, mainly for water; its capacity is equal to 1000 liters.

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU): A memorandum of Understanding is defined as a type of agreement between two or more parties. It however, does not involve a legal commitment from either party¹⁴.

Sahel region: Located in Africa, the Sahel is a biogeographical region with a very warm semi-desert climate, reaching across the southernmost part of North Africa. Many nations, such as Sudan, Chad and Niger fall within this region. Droughts and food shortages are a common phenomenon all throughout the Sahel¹⁵.

¹⁰ 'Reservoir', accessed 27 January 2025, <https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/reservoir>.

¹¹ 'Definition of RIPARIAN', 20 January 2025, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/riparian>.

¹² 'Definition of BASIN', 22 January 2025, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/basin>.

¹³ 'Blue Nile River | Map, Facts, Location, & Length | Britannica', accessed 27 January 2025, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Blue-Nile-River>.

¹⁴ 'Memorandum of Understanding (MOU): Definition, Contents, Pros/Cons, vs. MOA', Investopedia, accessed 27 January 2025, <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mou.asp>.

¹⁵ 'Sahel | Location, Facts, Map, & Desertification | Britannica', Encyclopedia Britannica, 23 January 2025, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sahel>.



5. Legal Framework

5.1. International Water Law

Helsinki Rules (1966): The 1966 Helsinki rules is an international guideline concerning the proper regulatory use of rivers, their connected groundwaters and international waters¹⁶. Such rules must be applicable unless, a convention, agreement or binding custom among the basin States emerges¹⁷. It was superseded in 2004 by the Berlin Rules on Water Resources.

Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997): The UN Convention about the watercourses emphasizes the legal and indicated use of waters. The convention aims to deter anything that could disrupt or affect, by any means, the appropriate navigation of waters¹⁸.

Berlin Rules on Water Resources (2004): A more comprehensive and expansive document, addressing all freshwater resources and the growing threat of climate change, which was adopted by the International Law Association (ILA)¹⁹.

5.2. Agreements

Nile Waters Agreement of 1929: An agreement between Britain and Egypt aimed to address the allocation and the management of the Nile Waters²⁰. With this agreement, Egypt claimed 65 per cent (approximately 48 billion cubic meters) of the total flow of Nile waters measured at Aswan Dam which ensures the potable water for civilians, water flood for Egyptian cultivation and provision of electricity. Sudan claimed 4 billion cubic meters

¹⁶ International Law Association. 1966. 'International Law Association The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers', August. https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/ILA/ILA-HelsinkiRules1966-as_amended.pdf.

¹⁷ The Fifty-second ILA Conference. 1966. 'The Helsinki Rules'. https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/ILA/Helsinki_Rules-original_with_comments.pdf.

¹⁸ 'Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses'. 1997, December. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1998/09/19980925%2006-30%20PM/Ch_XXVII_12p.pdf.

¹⁹ Glen Bryson, 'INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION', n.d.

²⁰ Joseph Kieyah and Daniel Kang'ethe. 2012. 'The Nile Agreement of 1929: Legal and Economic Analysis'. <https://repository.kippra.or.ke/bitstream/handle/123456789/2695/WP19.pdf>.



(bcm) annually while the rest water flow was not allocated to other riparian States²¹. Additionally, Egypt, claimed the right to veto in every construction project which could affect the water flow of the Nile while the agreement, really emphasized on the Egyptian needs, being indifferent for any other country in the region²². Countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda considered the 1929 Agreement as non-binding because of their independence from the United Kingdom; Ethiopia, Eritrea, Burundi, Rwanda and Congo were not complied to the agreement while they strived to acquire a part of Nile Waters.

Nile Water Agreement of 1959: With the Nile Water Agreement of 1959 between Egypt and the Republic of Sudan depended on the similar one of 1929, Nile Waters reallocated, and Egypt occupied 55.5 billion cubic meters (henceforth bcm) and Sudan received 18.5 bcm while the annual flow was estimated at 84 bcm. The rest of the bcm's were not allocated to any other riparian State. Specifically, Egypt and Sudan, took under their control the waters of Nile offering themselves abundant water flood²³; Egypt's right to veto was maintained and the state had the ability to approve or control any construction project while this is the reason why Aswan High Dam evolved, and Sudanese reservoir Roseires Dam built. Mainly the Agreement of 1959 about Nile Waters, favoured only two states (Egypt and Sudan) as they acquired even more cubic meters and full control of the Nile River, prohibiting any other riparian country to take advantage of the Nile Waters -even for basic needs²⁴.

Nile Basin Initiative (NBI): Officially launched in 1999, initially by the water ministers of 9 countries, the NBI has come to be a partnership between 10 riparian states of the Nile river. These include: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The NBI's goal is to ensure sustainable economic, social and political development "through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from the shared Nile Basin water resources"²⁵. In terms of its institutional framework, the NBI is composed of three distinct bodies:

²¹ Natalie Regoli. 2018. '17 Pros and Cons of Aswan High Dam', December. <https://connectusfund.org/17-pros-and-cons-of-aswan-high-dam>.

²² Valerie Knobelsdorf. χ.χ. 'The Nile Waters Agreements: Imposition and Impacts of a Transboundary Legal System'. https://www.jurisafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Valerie_Knobelsdorf_Nile_Note.pdf

²³ Mekdelawit Messay Deribe. 2022. 'The 1959 Agreement "for the full utilization of the Nile waters": The crux of the problem in the Nile Basin water use', February. <https://www.weaspire.info/the-1959-agreement-for-the-full-utilization-of-the-nile-waters-the-crux-of-the-problem-in-the-nile-basin-water-use/>.

²⁴ 'Agreement (with annexes) for the full utilization of the Nile waters.' 1959, November. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20453/volume-453-I-6519-English.pdf>.

²⁵ "Our Goals - Nile Basin Initiative." *Our Goals | Nile Basin Initiative*, nilebasin.org/our-goals. Accessed 1 Jan. 2025.



- 1) The Nile Council of Ministers of Water Affairs, which guides the NBI in its policy pursuit and decision making process.
- 2) The NBI Technical Advisory Committee composed of experienced senior civil servants, with the stated goal of providing expert analysis, technical advice and assistance to the Council of Ministers.
- 3) The NBI Secretariat (Nile-SEC) is the executive arm of the NBI, provides administrative support to the Council of Ministers and the Technical Committee and is responsible “for the overall corporate direction as well as the lead center for two programs: Basin Cooperation and Water Resource Management”²⁶.

Furthermore, the NBI has a plethora of programs, such as the Shared Vision Program and the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Program (the latter being enforced by the Eastern Nile Regional Technical Office, also known as ENTRO), aimed at collaborative development, equitable water usage and investment to develop water resources in an environmentally sustainable way. The NBI derives its funding from the NBI countries and international financial and developmental institutions, such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

The International Panel of Experts (IPoE): In 2012, as part of the early negotiation process between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan concerning the GERD, the three countries decided to form a panel which would include representatives from each of the states, as well as relevant international experts. It was initially Ethiopia who decided to invite the other two riparian nations to join this panel. Widely regarded at the time as a milestone, its mandate was to review the design documents of the GERD, provide transparent information, and conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the dam’s effects to the three countries²⁷. More broadly it sought to determine the negative impact the dam would have and ways it could be successfully mitigated²⁸. The IPoE, during its term, conducted six meetings and four field visits to the GERD construction site.

In the end, the panel’s final report found no flaws in the construction plans and schematics of the GERD, however it recommended that further studies were taken up, so as to more

²⁶ “Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat (Nile-SEC): Nile Basin Initiative.” *Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat (Nile-SEC) | Nile Basin Initiative*, nilebasin.org/center/nilesec. Accessed 1 Jan. 2025.

²⁷ *Report of the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) on the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP)*, 31 May 2013, www.scidev.net/wp-content/uploads/site_assets/docs/international_panel_of_experts_for_ethiopian_renaissance_dam-_final_report.pdf.

²⁸ Attia, Hana, and Mona Saleh. *The Political Deadlock on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam*. German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2021. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33478>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.



precisely understand the impact this project would have on the downstream nations of Sudan and Egypt.

The Tripartite National Council/Committee (TNC): In 2014, a 12 member technical committee was set up by the three aforementioned states. Each state was represented respectively by 4 of its own experts. The committee was a result of previous negotiations held in Khartoum²⁹. Its primary task was to seek international consultancy groups, so as to conduct the studies proposed by the International Panel of Experts (IPoE). Initially there was optimism surrounding the process, however the studies were never completed due to disagreements in selecting the aforementioned consultancy groups by the TNC. Finally, given the lack of results and the inability to produce the technical studies, Egypt demanded that the dam's construction be put on pause, until the completion of said studies. Ethiopia ignored their demands and proceeded with the construction of the GERD³⁰.

Declaration of Principles (DoP) 2015: In 2015, the three states, Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, came to an agreement and signed a framework to secure the even cooperation around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)³¹. One of the most important principles was the mutual agreement for collaboration and proper use of the Nile Waters without affecting negatively any other State. Also, by signing the 2015 principles, Egypt and Sudan pledged not to disrupt or cause any ensnarement during the operation of the GERD whereas as soon as the operation concluded, the GERD would safeguard the equal water flood and electricity production in the region and ultimately the reduction of civilian mortality because of the drought. With the DoP of 2015, Ethiopia acquired the right to use Nile Waters but also operate in the area restricting the unlimited control of the Waters by the Egyptian and Sudanese States³².

The National Independent Research Scientific Group (NIRSG) 2018: In 2018 Ethiopia took the initiative to create this 9-party mechanism with members from all 3 countries, in order to discuss and generate different scenarios around the dam's impact, filling and operations. Initially, the NIRSG made significant progress towards reaching some agreement about the

²⁹ Sekle, Tesfa-Alem. "Tripartite National Committee to Re-Examine Nile Dam." *Sudan Tribune*, 22 Sept. 2014, sudantribune.com/article51213/.

³⁰ Attia, Hana, and Mona Saleh. *The Political Deadlock on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam*. German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2021. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33478>. Accessed 6 Jan. 2025.

³¹ Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan. 2015. 'Agreement on Declaration of Principles between The Arab Republic of Egypt, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia And The Republic of the Sudan On The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP)', March

³² Curated Content. 2015. 'Official Text: Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan – Declaration of Principles', March. <https://hornaffairs.com/2015/03/25/egypt-ethiopia-sudan-agreement-on-declaration-of-principles-full-text/>.



first filling of the dam³³. However, agreement could not be reached on important baseline issues, such as the long term operation of the dam and the coordination between the three states, mostly due to Egypt's stance surrounding its current water use as a baseline. In the end, the study group did not provide any tangible results, propositions or solutions, as a result of the gridlock and was thus, a failure³⁴.

Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement 2024: The Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Project was formally confirmed, before coming to an agreement, by the African Union on 4th September 2024, and ultimately with the cooperation between the nine riparian states (Burundi, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda) the party conclude that the Nile River not only is the biggest river in the African continent, but also, it constitutes a significant life-source of all eleven Basin States and thus, more measures concerning the equal and proper use of Nile Waters, need to be taken. Nevertheless, the agreement was signed and ratified only by six States: Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi, and South Sudan, while Egypt, Sudan, DR Congo, and Kenya did not sign yet. Specifically, the agreement and its principles, promotes the equal and safe water use of Nile river, where every riparian state could take advantage in order to accomplish their needs, such as agricultural production, electricity and civilian alimentation. Additionally, all the participated States noted that respect, collaboration, equality and thus, peaceful dialogue should constitute the milestone to this agreement in order conflicts not to emerge or be escalated in the region³⁵. The CFA became legally binding for all the NBI states on the 13th of October 2024³⁶.

6. Current situation in the region

The year is 2040. After decades of diplomatic gridlock and heightened tensions between the riparian nations of the Nile revolving around the project of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Northeast Africa is at a crossroads. Exactly 16 years after Ethiopia concluded its construction of the GERD, Addis Ababa hasn't pursued a foreign policy of appeasement towards its neighbors— in fact it has done quite the opposite. It

³³ Attia, Hana, and Mona Saleh. *The Political Deadlock on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam*. German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2021. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33478>. Accessed 6 Jan. 2025.


³⁴ *Ibid*.

³⁵ Nile Initiative Basin. 2024. 'Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework', October. <https://nilebasin.org/sites/default/files/2024-10/Announcement%20of%20the%20Entry%20into%20force%20of%20the%20CFA%20on%2013%20October%202024.pdf>.

³⁶ Muhumuza, Rodney. "Nile Basin Nations Say Water-Sharing Accord Has Come into Force without Egypt's Backing." *AP News*, AP News, 15 Oct. 2024, apnews.com/article/nile-river-accord-egypt-ethiopia-water-sharing-e245661a016bb75d9337d3e45a7753f7.

went on to increase the size and capacity of its controversial dam back in 2030, as a result of its ever growing population and the need to provide electricity to the nation. It now stands at a structural height of 210m. Such a move was met with wide condemnation from the afflicted riparian nations— such as Egypt and Sudan— as well as major world powers, like the United States of America.

Ethiopia’s decisions have had a severe impact on the water flow of the Nile River downstream from the GERD, leading to a staggering and unprecedented 35% drop in the Nile’s water level. As such, the effects have been devastating for the local agriculture, wildlife and economies. The mortality rate due to famine and dehydration has risen significantly over the past years, with no sign of stopping. Nations such as Egypt and Sudan have been most severely affected, given that the region of the Sahel is often plagued by severe droughts, which only exacerbate the issue. Egypt has gone as far as to accuse the Ethiopian government of deliberately facilitating widespread famine in the region, as a means of exerting its power and influence, while simultaneously diminishing that of its rival neighboring nations. Appeals for a U.N. intervention in the region to restore some semblance of order have been made with little to no progress so far.



Internal political turmoil has also seen an increase in many of the riparian nations, as the situation continues to become more dire by the day, given that the people afflicted,



particularly in Egypt and Sudan, begin to riot and protest against the harsh living conditions and lack of humanitarian assistance, which have arisen due to the effects of the GERD on the Nile river. As such, Ethiopia and Sudan have taken to deploying their respective military forces and affording them greater operational autonomy within the respective nations, so as to quell the disorder.

Given the heightened tensions, Ethiopia in the month of April of 2039 decided to further militarize its borders with Sudan, particularly the region of Benishangul-Gumuz— which is where its infamous dam is located. It has also increased its border security in the region of Amhara, which lies to the North. In addition, it has deployed its military around the GERD, so as to ensure its protection from potential outside attacks. Ethiopia has indeed on multiple occasions claimed that it is under threat by its surrounding nations—as well as rogue non-state entities— who seek to undermine its sovereignty and position in Northeast Africa. The location of the GERD, which sits at a mere 20 km distance from the Egyptian-Sudanese border is another reason for the militarization of the region by Ethiopia.

In the context of the broader region, Cairo has found itself a useful ally in Somalia, in hopes of restraining Ethiopian influence in the region³⁷. As such, Cairo and Mogadishu have strengthened their diplomatic, economic, and military relations, a move firmly opposed by the Ethiopian government. The latter has for decades collaborated with the internationally unrecognized breakaway state of Somaliland³⁸, as a means of gaining sea access to the Gulf of Aden— much to the disapproval of Somalia. It is thus important to highlight that the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland in 2024 has allowed for Ethiopia to gain access to the Gulf of Aden, via a naval port in Somaliland³⁹. As for Egypt, it has in the past 10 years steadily increased its economic support for Somalia, through grants and development schemes around the areas of agriculture and civilian and military infrastructure. These efforts are coordinated both on a bilateral level, but also through the Arab League⁴⁰.

³⁷ Staff, The New Arab. “Egypt, Somalia Sign Defence Pact amid Tensions with Ethiopia.” *The New Arab*, 15 Aug. 2024, www.newarab.com/news/egypt-somalia-sign-defence-pact-amid-tensions-ethiopia.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Yibeltal, Kalkidan. “Ethiopia Signs Agreement with Somaliland Paving Way to Sea Access.” *BBC News*, BBC, 2 Jan. 2024, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566.

⁴⁰ Woldemariam, Yohannes, and Geneviene Donnellon-May. “The Politics of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” *Climate Diplomacy*, 2 Feb. 2024, climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/conflict/politics-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam.



Internationally speaking, the African Union has repeatedly tried to mediate between both sides by maintaining a neutral position, so as not to alienate any of the nations involved⁴¹. It has also called for the need to resolve the famine crisis plaguing the region. The United States of America have firmly supported the claims of Egypt and have called for Ethiopia to moderate its stance by allowing more water to flow into the Nile⁴². On the other hand, China— while having vested economic interests with both Egypt and Ethiopia— has been mostly supportive to Addis Ababa, seeing as an important part of the cost for the construction of the GERD was covered by China⁴³.

In essence, this complex situation necessitates a careful examination of the particular dynamics between the different nations, their respective claims and abilities to project power. Addis Ababa has maintained a clear stance with regard to its objectives and has no plans of slowing down. The pleas of its affected riparian neighbor do not seem to particularly bother Ethiopia and it is up to the international community and the countries involved to figure out how to stop the humanitarian crisis currently plaguing the people of Northeast Africa, as well as the impending confrontation between the two main poles of power in the region— those of Cairo and Addis Ababa.

7. Key Stakeholders

7.1. Ethiopia

From the very beginning, Ethiopia had long struggled to overcome a great number of obstacles such as drought within the Nation, lack of food supplies and electricity⁴⁴, while

⁴¹ “Communiqué of the 2nd Extraordinary African Union (AU) Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Video-Teleconference Meeting on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).” *African Union*, 24 July 2020, <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200724/hosg-communication-2nd-meeting-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gerd>.

⁴² “The United States Is Committed to Egypt’s Water Security and Advancing a Resolution on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” *U.S. Embassy in Egypt*, 26 July 2022, eg.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-is-committed-to-egypts-water-security-advancing-a-resolution-on-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/.

⁴³ Klaassen, Lisa. “‘Everywhere and Nowhere to Be Seen’: How China’s Role in the GERD Dispute Challenges Beijing’s Non-Interference Principle.” *London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)*, 27 Oct. 2021, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2021/10/27/everywhere-and-nowhere-to-be-seen-how-chinas-role-in-the-gerd-dispute-challenges-beijings-non-interference-principle/>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.

⁴⁴ Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. n.d. ‘Get to Know the Backstory of Ethiopia’s Latest Groundbreaking Achievement’. <https://mygerd.com/page/about-gerd>.



these were the reasons why human lives were being lost. Nevertheless, back in 2011 Ethiopian government during the administration of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi from the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) considered the construction of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) extremely beneficial not only for Ethiopian civilians but also for the rest of the basin States as bigger capacities of electrical power could be produced and ultimately shared in regions where more than 60 million people live without access to electricity and more than 25 million people live without potable water.⁴⁵

In 2023, Ethiopia was one of the top-listed countries which were in the most at risk humanitarian need. Food insecurity⁴⁶, starvation and drought were some of the factors that made the situation worse for Ethiopian people. In general, Ethiopia claims that the construction of the GERD was one of the wisest decisions for the African continent while others -such as Egypt- enunciate their deep concerns stating that the GERD could cause more damage than advantages. Egypt, also, recalls the 1929⁴⁷ and 1959⁴⁸ agreements in order to alienate Ethiopian interference in Nile River; however Addis Ababa demands its right to freely access the waters as a riparian State⁴⁹ considering that its people were suffering for centuries in lack of clean water and electricity⁵⁰. In 2024 Ethiopia fulfilled the construction of the dam which caused even more ardour in the region while the latter considers the GERD as a symbol for national pride, representing aspirations for economic development and energy independence factors that could easily turn into a conflict.

Given the relations between the two riparian states, in 2030s Ethiopia decided to increase its military bases not only in its borders in Amhara Region⁵¹ but also in the Dam area -

⁴⁵ International Crisis Group. 271AD. 'Https://Www.Crisisgroup.Org/Africa/Horn-Africa/Ethiopia/271-Bridging-Gap-Nile-Waters-Dispute'. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/271-bridging-gap-nile-waters-dispute>.

⁴⁶ International Rescue Committee. 2023. 'Crisis in Ethiopia: Drought and Conflict Put 28 Million in Need', March. <https://www.rescue.org/article/crisis-ethiopia-drought-and-conflict-put-28-million-need>.

⁴⁷ Ministry Of Public Works. 1950. 'Nile Water Agreement (1929)'. https://www.academia.edu/12727424/Nile_Water_Agreement_1929.

⁴⁸ Mekdelawit Messay Deribe. 2022. 'The 1959 Agreement "for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters": The Crux of the Problem in the Nile Basin Water Use', February. <https://www.weaspire.info/the-1959-agreement-for-the-full-utilization-of-the-nile-waters-the-crux-of-the-problem-in-the-nile-basin-water-use/>.

⁴⁹ RODNEY MUHUMUZA. 2024. 'Nile Basin Nations Say Water-Sharing Accord Has Come into Force without Egypt's Backing', October. <https://apnews.com/article/nile-river-accord-egypt-ethiopia-water-sharing-e245661a016bb75d9337d3e45a7753f7>.

⁵⁰ Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). 2021. 'Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) Ethiopia's Breakthrough in Hydro-Power Production and Its Potential Implications on Sudan and Egypt', July. <https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/298d91e83c94410b8105887bb49541fe>.

⁵¹ The Editors Encyclopaedia Britannica, Adam Zeidan. n.d. 'Amhara'. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Amhara>.

specifically near to Guba⁵²- as the Minister of the Foreign Affairs stated that *'there is no doubt that a neighbouring country could provoke an attack that might escalate tensions as the GERD might improve Ethiopia's economy and this is something that other states consider as a threat'*. Besides the challenges amongst Cairo and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia had also to confront the Egyptian-friendly Sudan which also benefited from the 1929 and 1959 Agreements because of the well-constructed allocation . The Sudanese government and experts in water resources are deeply concerned about the damages that the GERD could provoke in case the dam collapses.



In such a catastrophic situation and its unprecedented environmental and socioeconomic effects, water resources specialists stated that *'Sudan would completely submerge'*⁵³. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Sudanese State – as all riparian countries in the region- could positively be affected by the existence of the GERD as more than 500,000 hectares of land could be irrigated due to the impact of the Dam if a joint venture between the two states emerge. What also needs to be underlined, is the fact that common ground had been found between Ethiopian and Somaliland government⁵⁴ whereas the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)⁵⁵ formed the

springboard to a collaboration and thus, the access to the Red Sea which could easily let Ethiopia to lease a military base in the maritime area⁵⁶.

⁵² DB media. n.d. 'Guba (Ethiopian District)'. [https://dbpedia.org/page/Guba_\(Ethiopian_District\)](https://dbpedia.org/page/Guba_(Ethiopian_District)).

⁵³ DABANGA SUDAN. 2023. 'Sudanese Decry Ethiopia's 4th Filling of GERD as a "Water Bomb"', September. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudanese-decry-ethiopias-4th-filling-of-gerd-as-a-water-bomb#google_vignette.

⁵⁴ Ahmed El-Affendi. 2022. 'Impact of Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD) on Agriculture in the Sudanese Blue Nile Basin', December. <https://infonile.org/en/2022/12/impact-of-grand-renaissance-dam-gerd-on-agriculture-in-the-sudanese-blue-nile-basin/>.

⁵⁵ Dr Mohamed Farah Hersi and Martin Plaut. 2024. 'Africa, Ethiopia, Horn of Africa, Somalia, Somaliland The Ethiopia – Somaliland Deal'. *Academy for Peace and Development*, February. <https://martinplaut.com/2024/02/05/the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal/#:~:text=On%20January%201st%2C%202024%2C%20Ethiopia%20and%20Somaliland%20announced,which%20it%20will%20lease%20%20kilometers%20of%20coastline>.

⁵⁶ Kalkidan Yibeltal and BBC News. 2024. 'Ethiopia Signs Agreement with Somaliland Paving Way to Sea Access', January. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566>.



After a number of decades, in 2038 Ethiopian government considered the accomplishment of the upgrade of the GERD – with the financial assistance of People’s Republic of China— as a necessary measure, which accumulated even more of the River Nile waters and as a result, more electricity and potable water were produced and ultimately offered to the civilians and some surrounded basin States⁵⁷. Such an operation intensified the rapture amongst Addis Ababa and Cairo, as the latter internationally complained and stated that ‘*Ethiopia has crossed the boundaries*’, insinuating that Egypt could use any means necessary in order to retrieve its position and role in the River. However, the involvement of the Eastern State complicated the situation in the region, due to the support by the Chinese government in return of military bases establishment in the area and thus, a United States’ intervention seemed to be actualised.

7.2. Egypt

The perennial cornerstone of Egypt and its history has been none other than the river Nile. From ancient times it has provided a lifeline for Egypt and all civilizational development has taken place around it. This is due to the fact that it provides very fertile land for agriculture all along its banks— thus ensuring food production— but also because it has historically functioned as an important trade route. Thus, it should be of no wonder that Egypt considers the Nile as an extremely important asset, especially given that nowadays it is also used for power generation through the Aswan Dam. Egypt’s economic and political fate is inextricably linked with this world-renowned river.

For decades now, Egypt has been a part of a “shadow” war with its neighbor to the south, Ethiopia. Tensions dramatically arose when Ethiopia announced and began construction of its dam in late 2011, much to the disapproval of Egypt. Cairo has consistently contended that such a project would be detrimental to the amount of water that the Nile carries downstream, to Sudan and subsequently to Egypt. On multiple occasions, the Egyptian government has in the past demanded that the construction of the GERD ceases, until a viable agreement regarding the economic, environmental, agricultural and hydration impacts of the dam could be reached. Such an agreement unfortunately never came. Egypt has tried to advocate for its interests, by pursuing negotiations and talks with Ethiopia, such as the ones during the “Tripartite National Council”⁵⁸ in 2014 and during the 2020 round

⁵⁷Horn Affairs and Curated Content. 2015. ‘Agreement on Declaration of Principles between the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Republic of the Sudan on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP)’, March.
<https://hornaffairs.com/2015/03/25/egypt-ethiopia-sudan-agreement-on-declaration-of-principles-full-text/>.

⁵⁸Attia, Hana, and Mona Saleh. *The Political Deadlock on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam*. German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2021. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33478>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.



of negotiations led by the African Union, however the result was always a deadlock⁵⁹. Moreover, Cairo has sought to restrain Ethiopia by strengthening its relations with Somalia and Eritrea, thus attempting to formulate a kind of “Axis of Resistance” against Ethiopian hegemony in the region⁶⁰.

The issue has also been brought to the attention of the United Nations Security Council in the past. In particular, Egypt has sent several letters to the UNSC addressing the issue⁶¹. The UNSC even issued a statement as early as September of 2021, however up until now it had remained largely dormant in actively engaging the topic⁶².

As it pertains to the construction of the GERD however, there was little that Egypt could accomplish despite its pleas for a termination of construction on the dam and in 2024 its completion was achieved⁶³. Subsequently, Cairo called for a gradual filling of the dam’s reservoir by Ethiopia, with the latter not entertaining such an idea, opting for an immediate filling. As a result, Egypt has had to bear the brunt of Ethiopia’s decisions, with Sudan also being affected but to a lesser extent. From a 35% drop in the Nile river’s water flow and an ongoing famine crisis to the devastation of Egyptian agriculture and hydro-electric energy production, the situation in Egypt is dire. The Egyptian authorities have voiced their concerns about the situation and have called on the United Nations Security Council, as well as the international community more broadly, to step in and resolve the gridlock between the two nations, by achieving an agreement between the riparian nations, while also ameliorating the humanitarian crisis.

Lastly, the rhetoric with which Egyptian officials have addressed the issue in the past should be noted. Former Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi stated during his presidency that the Nile constituted “a matter of life and death”⁶⁴, evidently being correct in hindsight. In 2013 the then President Morsi stated that a decrease in the share of the

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Amin, Shahira. “Egypt Is Cozying up to Somalia to Thwart Ethiopia.” *Atlantic Council*, 19 Sept. 2024, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/egypt-somalia-ethiopia-gerd/.

⁶¹ “Egypt Addresses Security Council on Gerd Developments.” *State Information Service of Egypt*, sis.gov.eg/Story/194550/Egypt-Addresses-Security-Council-on-GERD-Developments?lang=en-us. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.

⁶² “Security Council Presidential Statement on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Gerd).” *Security Council Report*, 15 Sept. 2021, www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/09/security-council-presidential-statement-on-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gerd.php.

⁶³ Staff, Anadolu. “Egypt Declares Dead End in Renaissance Dam Negotiations with Ethiopia, Sudan.” *Anadolu Ajansı*, 20 Dec. 2023, www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/egypt-declares-dead-end-in-renaissance-dam-negotiations-with-ethiopia-sudan/3087456.

⁶⁴ Asiedu, Michael. *The Construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and Geopolitical Tension between Egypt and Ethiopia with Sudan in the Mix*. Global Political Trends Center (GPoT), 2018. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep14136>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.



Nile's river would lead to "our blood being the alternative"⁶⁵. This sort of rhetoric indicates the gravity of the situation for Egypt and pinpoints the lengths to which Cairo is willing to go, if a substantive negotiation and solution is not found. Obviously, however, such a scenario should be either avoided or of last resort, but the possibility of it should not be cast aside negligently.

7.3. Sudan

Similarly to Egypt, Sudan is also heavily dependent on the Nile. Sudan also finds itself to be within the Sahel region, where drought seasons are frequent and water scarcity can skyrocket. This makes the Nile the only truly reliable and consistent source of water throughout the year for Sudan⁶⁶. Traditionally, it has been an ally of Egypt on water issues, but broader relations have fluctuated significantly. Tensions remain regarding certain territorial disputes, such as that of the Hala'ib Triangle⁶⁷. In fact, back in 2018, Sudan even recalled its ambassador to Egypt because of the ownership dispute.

It has been a well established fact that in the past Sudan was embroiled in internal political unrest. Starting in 2023, a civil war ruptured within the military government that was in power at the time, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)— a paramilitary group under the Sudanese military officer Hemedti. Throughout the duration of the war, famine and atrocities were widespread, leaving a long-lasting impact on Sudan. The war, although de jure ongoing, has de facto reached its concluding stages for a few years now, with the SAF emerging victorious after many years of conflict. The RSF have been relegated to a few provinces to the south, including the Sennar and Blue Nile states.

The unilateral decision of Ethiopia to construct the GERD was met with condemnation from Khartoum as well, citing similar concerns with those that were expressed by Cairo⁶⁸. However, in the past Sudan had showcased a willingness to cooperate with Ethiopia as well, seeing potential benefits in electricity imports and flood prevention. Moreover, Sudan has also faced territorial issues with Ethiopia in the past. In particular, between 2020-2022

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Attia, Hana, and Mona Saleh. *The Political Deadlock on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam*. German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2021. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33478>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.

⁶⁷ Mohyeldeen, Sherif. "The Egypt-Sudan Border: A Story of Unfulfilled Promise." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 11 June 2020, carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/01/the-egypt-sudan-border-a-story-of-unfulfilled-promise?lang=en¢er=middle-east.

⁶⁸ "Sudan Threatens Legal Action If Ethiopia Dam Filled Without Deal." *Al Jazeera*, Al Jazeera, 23 Apr. 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/23/sudan-threatens-legal-action-if-ethiopia-rejects-nile-dam-talks.



Sudanese forces were engaged in conflict with Amhara militias from Ethiopia in the contested and disputed region of Al-Fashaga⁶⁹.

Nowadays, Sudan, having seen the effects of the dam on the Nile's water flow and expressing worries over dam safety, has taken a more neutral approach. Its position regarding water issues is proximate to that of Egypt, however Khartoum wishes to pursue a policy which suits its own interests first and foremost. Nonetheless, Sudan could potentially stand to gain important benefits in cheap electricity imports from Ethiopia.

7.4. Somalia

While not directly related to the hydropolitics of the Nile and the disputes surrounding the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Somalia's role in the geopolitical developments of the Horn of Africa and more broadly Northeast Africa is of paramount importance. It is a nation fraught with conflict and political instability, often cited as an example of what a failed state looks like⁷⁰.

The history between Somalia and Ethiopia is a long and arduous one, however what is important to understand is the fundamental geopolitical reality underpinning that relationship. Ethiopia is a landlocked country (after Eritrean independence in 1993) deprived of direct sea access, having to occasionally rely on Djibouti. The loss of its coastline had a negative impact on the Ethiopian economy and raised important security concerns. On top of that, Ethiopian intervention in the failing Somali state in the past and the growing relationship between Ethiopia and the breakaway state of Somaliland (note that Somaliland has not been recognized as an independent country) have in the past contributed to the deterioration of Ethiopian-Somali relations. Somaliland provides Ethiopia with an opportunity to firmly enshrine its presence in the Gulf of Aden. This is perhaps most emblematically demonstrated in the 2024 Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and the breakaway region, with Addis Ababa standing to gain access to the strategic port of Berbera, in exchange for the possibility of formal recognition. Furthermore, a few years later in 2030, Addis Ababa acquired a 30% ownership share in the port of Berbera, provided a certain amount of investment and with the possibility of further acquisition of shares from the Ethiopian side in the future.

⁶⁹ Soliman, Ahmed, and Elise Lannaud. "Securitizing the Ethiopia–Sudan Border: How Cross-Border Conflict Is Shaping Trade and the Control of Land." *Chatham House*, 4 Apr. 2024, www.chathamhouse.org/2024/04/securitizing-ethiopia-sudan-border-how-cross-border-conflict-shaping-trade-and-control-land.

⁷⁰ Rotberg, Robert I. "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States." *Brookings Institute*, Jan. 2003, www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/statefailureandstateweaknessinatimeoferror_chapter.pdf.



This, of course, provoked a strong reaction from Somalia and made the relations between the two states even more strained. As such, it should be of no surprise that Somalia has since moved to strengthen its ties with Egypt and Eritrea, both strategic adversaries of Ethiopia. In mid-August 2024, Egypt and Somalia signed a military cooperation agreement, a defense pact, which saw the deployment of Egyptian military troops in Somalia, along with the supply of arms and military hardware.

Internally, Somalia is rife with sectarian violence and instability. Militant and terrorist organizations, such as Al-Shabaab, play an active role in the Somali Civil War and constantly seek to undermine the power of the Federal Government of Ethiopia. All the above variables have forged instability in the region, with foreign interventions often being employed to sustain order⁷¹.

What's in the interest of Mogadishu is, first and foremost, ensuring control and stability over the areas they control, in addition to potentially expanding their control over the entirety of Somalia. To such an end, Somalia could potentially stand to gain from its alliance with Egypt and Eritrea. Moreover, the containment of Ethiopia is in the broader interests of the Somalis, since it could develop into an opportunity to separate it from the breakaway region. At the same time, it could also trigger an opposite reaction from Addis Ababa, driving it closer to Somaliland.

7.5. People's Republic of China

The People's Republic of China is one of the P5 members, and simultaneously one of the most important industrial, military, and economic powers around the globe, thus, it is easily involved in international affairs even when it is not directly affected. While Egypt and Ethiopia are the mainsprings of the situation, Chinese funds⁷² in the African continent have extremely altered the status quo. Specifically, China has funded more than 3.300 projects in the region, reaching approximately the amount of 5 billion USD, meaning that they could express an opinion concerning their own interests in the region⁷³.

It is well known that in addition to the 5 billion USD that the Ethiopian state also invested for the construction of the GERD between 2011 and 2024⁷⁴, China assisted the creation of

⁷¹ Tubbs, James O. "Intervention in Somalia: UNITAF and UNOSOM II." *Beyond Gunboat Diplomacy: Forceful Applications of Airpower in Peace Enforcement Operations*, Air University Press, 1997, pp. 31–46. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13793.10>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.

⁷² UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (UNIDO). n.d. 'China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund)'. <https://www.unido.org/node/84747>.

⁷³ Simone McCarthy and CNN. 2023. 'China Has Poured Billions into Africa's Infrastructure. Is It Now Tightening the Tap?', September. <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/26/china/china-african-loans-development-belt-and-road-intl-hnk/index.html>.

⁷⁴ Vincent Rush. 2024. 'How Much Did the Ethiopia Dam Cost?', June. <https://www.ncesc.com/geographic-faq/how-much-did-the-ethiopia-dam-cost/>.



the dam with more than 1 billion USD, altering the balances between the two major riparian states but also for the rest of the basin countries⁷⁵.

In 2038, when the upgrade of the GERD was fulfilled, the State of Ethiopia managed to accumulate more cubic meters (henceforth cm³), water capacity and eventually greater electricity production, China due to its financial assistance⁷⁶, established military bases allowing the state not only to control the situation in the region but also to access the region with armed forces.

7.6. United States of America

While the main protagonists in this conflict are Egypt and Ethiopia, the role of the United States and the importance of its influence must not be taken for granted. The United States has a vested interest in ensuring stability in the region and avoiding unnecessary escalations. A key focus of the United States is to tend to the appeals made by Egypt regarding the GERD, the Nile's water flow and the humanitarian crisis. A potential worsening of the famine crisis in Egypt, could possibly lead to mass migration crisis throughout the Middle East and Europe, but even to a potential regime overthrow or emergence of sectarian violence within the country. These are things the United States has an interest in avoiding.

It is no secret that Washington has made itself an ally of Egypt, with the latter being one of the biggest recipients in U.S. foreign aid⁷⁷. Moreover, the Americans have in the past withheld aid from Ethiopia due to their dam policy, but they have consistently encouraged a peaceful resolution of the conflict under the auspices of the African Union and have in the past considered Ethiopia to have been a valuable ally in the Global War on Terrorism.

Lastly, it should be noted that the United States maintains a military presence in Northeast Africa⁷⁸. U.S. troops have been stationed both in Djibouti and Somalia, making their

⁷⁵ Lisa Klaassen. 2021. 'Everywhere and Nowhere to Be Seen': How China's Role in the GERD Dispute Challenges Beijing's Non-Interference Principle', October. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2021/10/27/everywhere-and-nowhere-to-be-seen-how-chinas-role-in-the-gerd-dispute-challenges-beijings-non-interference-principle/>.

⁷⁶ Xinhua writers Habtamu Worku, Liu Fangqiang. 2024. 'Yearender: Ethiopia-China All-Weather Strategic Partnership Solidified in 2024', December. <https://english.news.cn/20241228/b1a20fa4d1b74d6686d84d51835c1ffa/c.html>.

⁷⁷ U.S. Foreign Assistance. <https://www.foreignassistance.gov/cd/egypt/2022/obligations/0>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.

⁷⁸ Turse, Nick. "Pentagon's Own Map of U.S. Bases in Africa Contradicts Its Claim of 'Light' Footprint." *The Intercept*, 23 Aug. 2023, theintercept.com/2020/02/27/africa-us-military-bases-africom/.



presence a factor of stability and security in the region. The strategic importance of their whereabouts with regard to this topic should be taken carefully into account.

7.7 Permanent members of the Security Council

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project has been facing multiple reviews and criticism; even the P5 Members have expressed their opinion about the construction of the Dam, and apart from the USA and China, other powers such as France, Russia, and the UK laid emphasis on the crisis as it could affect the status quo of the international balances.

In general, either the Western or the Eastern powers maintain mutual position in the matter with minor alterations to their policies according to their benefits; the French republic⁷⁹ and the United Kingdom⁸⁰ for instance, are alarmed about the ongoing issues that emerge in the African continent concerning Africa's biggest hydroelectric dam and the interference of some foreign states such as China. Nevertheless, as President Macron stated, France is concerned about the humanitarian crisis in the region and especially around Tigray. The states of France and the UK consider that the GERD could constitute the expedient in order starvation and drought to be eliminated but also claim that the tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia could easily escalate. The West additionally, encourages the continuation of the dialogues between the two riparian states and undoubtedly the mediation role of the African Union.

The Russian Federation, correspondingly to the aforementioned states and its policies concerning the GERD, also expressed a mutual position and behaviour towards the Ethiopian and the Egyptian state⁸¹. However, Russia supports the principle of sovereignty believing that Ethiopia has the right to take advantage of its natural resources. Besides the fact that Russia distanced its interests for the situation in 2017, two years later stated that it would reserve the mediator alongside with the African union in order peace and stability

⁷⁹ Dr Mohamed Farah Hersi and Martin Plaut. 2024. 'Africa, Ethiopia, Horn of Africa, Somalia, Somaliland The Ethiopia – Somaliland Deal'. *Academy for Peace and Development*, February. <https://martinplaut.com/2024/02/05/the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal/#:~:text=On%20January%201st%2C%202024%2C%20Ethiopia%20and%20Somaliland%20announced,which%20it%20will%20lease%2020%20kilometers%20of%20coastline>.

⁸⁰ Ahram Online. 2022. 'UK Is Focused on Encouraging Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia to Reach Solution in GERD Dispute under AU', April. <https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/1234/463959/Egypt/Foreign-Affairs/UK-is-focused-on-encouraging-Egypt,-Sudan,-Ethiopi.aspx>.

⁸¹ Samuel Ramani and Middle East Institute. 2021. 'Russia and the GERD: An Uneasy Balancing Act', August. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-and-gerd-uneasy-balancing-act>.



to be established in the region. Russia's Federation involvement -in general- has been limited but in fact, aims to strengthen ties with the African States.

8. Impact on the International Community

While it is fairly easy to understand the impact the GERD has had on specific nations and the broader region of Northeast Africa, its impact on the international community must also not go unnoticed. The preeminent world powers, particularly the P5 countries of the UN Security Council, all approach the issue from their own geopolitical and economic frameworks. The GERD— being Africa's largest hydroelectric project and one of its most important infrastructure undertakings— was a key point of interest for foreign investments from other nations. For instance, China has been heavily involved in many different infrastructure projects in Africa, including that of the GERD⁸² investing billions of dollars. Infrastructure development and investments are two very important ways in which states increase their share of influence in internal and regional politics and as such, developments concerning the GERD could reverberate all the way to Beijing and beyond. On the other hand, in such a situation, the US are alarmed due to the Chinese appearance in the area while the US are currently trying to expand their influence not only in the Middle East -as we have seen already- but also to the African continent. An intense dispute between the two superpowers in the region could escalate the situation and additionally cause even more damage in the international security field.

Moreover, another crucial aspect that could potentially affect the whole of Africa, is the production of electricity. One of the main arguments for the creation of the dam— apart from energizing Ethiopia— was the potential to export said energy to other nations⁸³. In this manner, Ethiopia has become an important exporter of energy to other African nations, like Sudan and South Africa, through its vast array of electrical grids. By this way the


⁸² Klaassen, Lisa. "‘Everywhere and Nowhere to Be Seen’: How China's Role in the GERD Dispute Challenges Beijing's Non-Interference Principle." *London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)*, 27 Oct. 2021, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2021/10/27/everywhere-and-nowhere-to-be-seen-how-chinas-role-in-the-gerd-dispute-challenges-beijings-non-interference-principle/>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.

⁸³ Bearak, Max, and Sudarsan Raghavan. "Africa's Largest Dam Fills Ethiopia with Hope and Egypt with Dread - Washington Post." *The Washington Post*, www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2020/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-egypt-nile/. Accessed 18 Aug. 2024.

Egyptian state would lose a great number of electricity export trading in the surrounding states . As such, the GERD plays an important role in the broader African energy production and distribution industry and a shift in the volume produced and distributed would potentially impact other states.

Furthermore, the role of the African Union should also be taken into consideration, as an organization which could provide important mediation, especially since they have, for decades, maintained an attitude of neutrality and solidarity with both of the African nations. In the past, the African Union has tried to resolve the issue, but to no avail. It has also issued a plethora of documents and communiques further elucidating its attempted efforts⁸⁴.

Undoubtedly, it must be underlined that before the creation and construction of the GERD the living conditions were extremely degrading for ethiopian people. Ethiopia suffered due to the lack of clean water and such a catastrophe and its effects led to the mortality of thousands of people while simultaneously some remote areas such as Amhara and Oromiawere excluded from electricity provision in combination with food insecurity and lack of water.



⁸⁴ “Communiqué of the 2nd Extraordinary African Union (AU) Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Video-Teleconference Meeting on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).” *African Union*, 24 July 2020, <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200724/hosg-communication-2nd-meeting-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gerd>.



Nowadays, -when the GERD was constructed- Egypt started to complain about the water flow reduction and the impact of it in everyday human life and agriculture. As a result, Egyptian mortality percentages have arisen; alarming the international community for another humanitarian crisis as the Egyptian government would take every essential measure to protect its people, economy and sovereignty.

9. Closing Remarks

An abbreviation of all the aforementioned information would be really beneficial in order not only to understand the essence of the topic but additionally, to pinpoint which matters you should emphasize your research on.

The Nile River is one of the largest life sources in the African continent, out of which Egypt draws significant capacities to cover its fresh water needs and to produce electricity and ultimately develop its agricultural production and economy. At the same time, Sudan also has benefited from the minor legal frameworks -those of 1929 and 1959- when a great number of bcm's were allocated to the Sudanese state and thus, the latter legally owned a demesne in the basin area.

When Ethiopia managed to complete the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), balances were altered in the region. More specifically, the GERD evolved into the 'biggest hydro-electric dam in the African continent' affecting the water flow towards Sudan and eventually Egypt. Besides, both Cairo and Khartoum condemned the construction of the Dam and also required complete control of the river, recalling the agreements concerning the river's waters

Nevertheless, Addis Ababa introduced the GERD as a 'lifesaver project' because of its ability to achieve the potable water and electricity provision not only within the Nation - where millions of people live without any access to that-but also in other surrounding riparian States. Even Soudan could acquire more irrigated land because of the higher levels of waters near the dam's area. Moreover, this is the reason why Ethiopia disregarded the already existing agreements and demanded a position in the river considering the previous allocations disproportionate.

Given the tensions between the riparian states and especially Ethiopia and Egypt, greater turbulence emerged when vital powers from the international community became involved. The Chinese embroilment and financial support for the dam, further motivated United



States of America interference and thus, the escalation of the situation seems more possible day by day. Additionally, to the new relations between Addis Ababa and Beijing it must be underlined the reconciliation amongst Somaliland and Ethiopia which seemed to be beneficial for the latter as the access to the Red Sea and eventually to the East -where not only well termed trading could emerge- was finally even closer to reality.

Taking into consideration all the detailed information provided in this study guide, it is more than vital to emphasize your personal scientific research according to your allocated countries, while simultaneously it is very important that all delegates should think of all existing variables and aspects of this topic.



10. Points to be addressed

1. Is the GERD the nascence of the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia? What is the nature of the conflict?
2. Is the existing legal framework effective at addressing the conflict and resolving the issue in and of itself?
3. Can the existing legal framework be reconciled with Ethiopia's position? If not, what might be the potential geopolitical impact in the region?
4. What are the potential environmental consequences for ecosystems in Sudan and Egypt? Could these consequences affect other riparian states? How does the growing threat of climate change fit into this?
5. How does the "hydro-conflict" affect the states involved and the broader regional affairs of Northeast Africa? Inversely, how do regional geopolitics, interests and alliances affect the attainment of a possible resolution?
6. In what ways could the United Nations Security Council prevent further escalation of the situation? What are the measures that the UNSC and the International Community should take in order to achieve this?
7. Can Ethiopia and the GERD be held accountable for the humanitarian crisis in Egypt? If so, is it possible for Ethiopia to address its own mortality rates without relying on the GERD?



8. What measures should be taken in order to ameliorate the humanitarian crisis in Egypt? Are there any actors that are liable for the crisis and, if yes, what ought to be done?
9. How effective have third party mediators been in negotiating the resolution of the conflict? Should the African Union take more drastic measures in order stability to be established in the region?
10. What would a potential armed escalation between Ethiopia and the “Axis of Resistance” mean for regional security, safety and politics? What could the United Nations Security Council do, in order to restore stability and peace in the region?
11. Should the riparian Member States be alarmed by Egypt’s armed-friendly position towards Ethiopia? What steps should be taken to deter a military escalation in the region?
12. Could Egyptian extremism and exclusiveness towards the Nile river be considered as a barrier to Ethiopian sovereignty of using its natural resources? Is the prohibition of national rights against international law?



11. Further Reading

1. Verhoeven, Harry. “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Africa’s Water Tower, Environmental Justice & Infrastructural Power.” *Daedalus*, vol. 150, no. 4, 2021, pp. 159–80. *JSTOR*, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48620145>. Accessed 6 Jan. 2025.
2. BOOTH, CHRISTOPHER D. *THE TEMPERATURE IS RISING, THE FEVER WHITE HOT: THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM AS FLASHPOINT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ETHIOPIA*. Atlantic Council, 2020. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29331>. Accessed 6 Jan. 2025.
3. Asiedu, Michael. *The Construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and Geopolitical Tension between Egypt and Ethiopia with Sudan in the Mix*. Global Political Trends Center (GPoT), 2018. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep14136>. Accessed 6 Jan. 2025.
4. “Egypt Brands Ethiopia’s Move to Fill Nile Mega-Dam as ‘Illegal.’” *RFI*, RFI, 11 Sept. 2023, www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20230911-egypt-brands-ethiopia-s-move-to-fill-nile-mega-dam-as-illegal.



12. Bibliography

1. 'Agreement (with annexes) for the full utilization of the Nile waters.' 1959, November.
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20453/volume-453-I-6519-English.pdf>.
2. 'Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses'. 1997, December.
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1998/09/19980925%2006-30%20PM/Ch_XXVII_12p.pdf.
3. "Communiqué of the 2nd Extraordinary African Union (AU) Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Video-Teleconference Meeting on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)." *African Union*, 24 July 2020, <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200724/hosg-communique-2nd-meeting-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gerd>.
4. "Communiqué of the 2nd Extraordinary African Union (AU) Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Video-Teleconference Meeting on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)." *African Union*, 24 July 2020, <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200724/hosg-communique-2nd-meeting-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gerd>.
5. "Egypt Addresses Security Council on Gerd Developments." *State Information Service of Egypt*, sis.gov.eg/Story/194550/Egypt-Addresses-Security-Council-on-GERD-Developments?lang=en-us. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.
6. "Security Council Presidential Statement on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Gerd)." *Security Council Report*, 15 Sept. 2021, www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/09/security-council-presidential-statement-on-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gerd.php.



7. “Sudan Threatens Legal Action If Ethiopia Dam Filled without Deal.” *Al Jazeera*, Al Jazeera, 23 Apr. 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/23/sudan-threatens-legal-action-if-ethiopia-rejects-nile-dam-talks.
8. “Sudan-United Arab Republic.” *International Water Law Project*, www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/UAR_Sudan1959_and_Protocol1960.pdf. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.
9. “The United States Is Committed to Egypt’s Water Security and Advancing a Resolution on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” *U.S. Embassy in Egypt*, 26 July 2022, eg.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-is-committed-to-egypts-water-security-advancing-a-resolution-on-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/.
10. Ahmed El-Affendi. 2022. ‘Impact of Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD) on Agriculture in the Sudanese Blue Nile Basin’, December. <https://infonile.org/en/2022/12/impact-of-grand-renaissance-dam-gerd-on-agriculture-in-the-sudanese-blue-nile-basin/>.
11. Ahram Online. 2022. ‘UK Is Focused on Encouraging Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia to Reach Solution in GERD Dispute under AU’, April. <https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/1234/463959/Egypt/Foreign-Affairs/UK-is-focused-on-encouraging-Egypt,-Sudan,-Ethiopi.aspx>.
12. Amin, Shahira. “Egypt Is Cozying up to Somalia to Thwart Ethiopia.” *Atlantic Council*, 19 Sept. 2024, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/egypt-somalia-ethiopia-gerd/.
13. Attia, Hana, and Mona Saleh. *The Political Deadlock on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam*. German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2021. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33478>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.
14. Attia, Hana, and Mona Saleh. *The Political Deadlock on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam*. German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2021. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33478>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.
15. Attia, Hana, and Mona Saleh. *The Political Deadlock on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam*. German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2021. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33478>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.



16. Bearak, Max, and Sudarsan Raghavan. "Africa's Largest Dam Fills Ethiopia with Hope and Egypt with Dread - Washington Post." *The Washington Post*, www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2020/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-egypt-nile/. Accessed 18 Aug. 2024.
17. Bearak, Max, and Sudarsan Raghavan. "Africa's Largest Dam Fills Ethiopia with Hope and Egypt with Dread - Washington Post." *The Washington Post*, www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2020/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-egypt-nile/. Accessed 18 Aug. 2024.
18. Bearak, Max, and Sudarsan Raghavan. "Africa's Largest Dam Fills Ethiopia with Hope and Egypt with Dread - Washington Post." *The Washington Post*, www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2020/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-egypt-nile/. Accessed 18 Aug. 2024.
19. Curated Content. 2015. 'Official Text: Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan – Declaration of Principles', March. <https://hornaffairs.com/2015/03/25/egypt-ethiopia-sudan-agreement-on-declaration-of-principles-full-text/>.
20. DABANGA SUDAN. 2023. 'Sudanese Decry Ethiopia's 4th Filling of GERD as a "Water Bomb"', September. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudanese-decry-ethiopias-4th-filling-of-gerd-as-a-water-bomb#google_vignette.
21. DB media. n.d. 'Guba (Ethiopian District)'. [https://dbpedia.org/page/Guba_\(Ethiopian_District\)](https://dbpedia.org/page/Guba_(Ethiopian_District)).
22. Dr Mohamed Farah Hersi and Martin Plaut. 2024. 'Africa, Ethiopia, Horn of Africa, Somalia, Somaliland The Ethiopia – Somaliland Deal'. *Academy for Peace and Development*, February. <https://martinplaut.com/2024/02/05/the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal/#:~:text=On%20January%201st%2C%202024%2C%20Ethiopia%20and%20Somaliland%20announced,which%20it%20will%20lease%2020%20kilometers%20of%20coastline>.
23. Dr Mohamed Farah Hersi and Martin Plaut. 2024. 'Africa, Ethiopia, Horn of Africa, Somalia, Somaliland The Ethiopia – Somaliland Deal'. *Academy for Peace and Development*, February. <https://martinplaut.com/2024/02/05/the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal/#:~:text=On%20January%201st%2C%202024%2C%20Ethiopia%20and%20Somaliland%20announced,which%20it%20will%20lease%2020%20kilometers%20of%20coastline>.



- [deal/#:~:text=On%20January%201st%2C%202024%2C%20Ethiopia%20and%20Somaliland%20announced,which%20it%20will%20lease%2020%20kilometers%20of%20coastline.](#)
24. Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan. 2015. 'Agreement on Declaration of Principles between The Arab Republic of Egypt, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia And The Republic of the Sudan On The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP)', March
 25. Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). 2021. 'Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) Ethiopia's Breakthrough in Hydro-Power Production and Its Potential Implications on Sudan and Egypt', July. <https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/298d91e83c94410b8105887bb49541fe>.
 26. Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. n.d. 'Get to Know the Backstory of Ethiopia's Latest Groundbreaking Achievement'. <https://mygerd.com/page/about-gerd>.
 27. Horn Affairs and Curated Content. 2015. 'Agreement on Declaration of Principles between the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Republic of the Sudan on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP)', March. <https://hornaffairs.com/2015/03/25/egypt-ethiopia-sudan-agreement-on-declaration-of-principles-full-text/>.
 28. International Crisis Group. 271AD. 'https://Www.Crisisgroup.Org/Africa/Horn-Africa/Ethiopia/271-Bridging-Gap-Nile-Waters-Dispute'. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/271-bridging-gap-nile-waters-dispute>.
 29. International Law Association. 1966. 'International Law Association The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers', Αύγουστος. https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/ILA/ILA-HelsinkiRules1966-as_amended.pdf.
 30. International Rescue Committee. 2023. 'Crisis in Ethiopia: Drought and Conflict Put 28 Million in Need', March. <https://www.rescue.org/article/crisis-ethiopia-drought-and-conflict-put-28-million-need>.



31. Joseph Kieyah and Daniel Kang'ethe. 2012. 'The Nile Agreement of 1929: Legal and Economic Analysis'. <https://repository.kippra.or.ke/bitstream/handle/123456789/2695/WP19.pdf>.
32. Kalkidan Yibeltal and BBC News. 2024. 'Ethiopia Signs Agreement with Somaliland Paving Way to Sea Access', January. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566>.
33. Klaassen, Lisa. "'Everywhere and Nowhere to Be Seen': How China's Role in the GERD Dispute Challenges Beijing's Non-Interference Principle." *London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)*, 27 Oct. 2021, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2021/10/27/everywhere-and-nowhere-to-be-seen-how-chinas-role-in-the-gerd-dispute-challenges-beijings-non-interference-principle/>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.
34. Klaassen, Lisa. "'Everywhere and Nowhere to Be Seen': How China's Role in the GERD Dispute Challenges Beijing's Non-Interference Principle." *London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)*, 27 Oct. 2021, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2021/10/27/everywhere-and-nowhere-to-be-seen-how-chinas-role-in-the-gerd-dispute-challenges-beijings-non-interference-principle/>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.
35. Lisa Klaassen. 2021. 'Everywhere and Nowhere to Be Seen': How China's Role in the GERD Dispute Challenges Beijing's Non-Interference Principle', October. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2021/10/27/everywhere-and-nowhere-to-be-seen-how-chinas-role-in-the-gerd-dispute-challenges-beijings-non-interference-principle/>.
36. Mekdelawit Messay Deribe. 2022. 'The 1959 Agreement "for the full utilization of the Nile waters": The crux of the problem in the Nile Basin water use', February. <https://www.weaspire.info/the-1959-agreement-for-the-full-utilization-of-the-nile-waters-the-crux-of-the-problem-in-the-nile-basin-water-use/>.
37. Mekdelawit Messay Deribe. 2022. 'The 1959 Agreement "for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters": The Crux of the Problem in the Nile Basin Water Use', February. <https://www.weaspire.info/the-1959-agreement-for-the-full-utilization-of-the-nile-waters-the-crux-of-the-problem-in-the-nile-basin-water-use/>.
38. Ministry Of Public Works. 1950. 'Nile Water Agreement (1929)'. https://www.academia.edu/12727424/Nile_Water_Agreement_1929.



39. Mohyeldeen, Sherif. "The Egypt-Sudan Border: A Story of Unfulfilled Promise." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 11 June 2020, carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/01/the-egypt-sudan-border-a-story-of-unfulfilled-promise?lang=en¢er=middle-east.
40. Natalie Regoli. 2018. '17 Pros and Cons of Aswan High Dam', December. <https://connectusfund.org/17-pros-and-cons-of-aswan-high-dam>.
41. Nile Initiative Basin. 2024. 'Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework', October. <https://nilebasin.org/sites/default/files/2024-10/Announcement%20of%20the%20Entry%20into%20force%20of%20the%20CFA%20on%2013%20October%202024.pdf>.
42. Polakovic, Gary. "Water Dispute on the Nile River Could Destabilize the Region." *USC Today*, 19 Sept. 2023, today.usc.edu/nile-river-water-dispute-filling-dam-egypt-ethiopia-usc-study/.
43. RODNEY MUHUMUZA. 2024. 'Nile Basin Nations Say Water-Sharing Accord Has Come into Force without Egypt's Backing', October. <https://apnews.com/article/nile-river-accord-egypt-ethiopia-water-sharing-e245661a016bb75d9337d3e45a7753f7>.
44. Samuel Ramani and Middle East Institute. 2021. 'Russia and the GERD: An Uneasy Balancing Act', August. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-and-gerd-uneasy-balancing-act>.
45. Simone McCarthy and CNN. 2023. 'China Has Poured Billions into Africa's Infrastructure. Is It Now Tightening the Tap?', September. <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/26/china/china-african-loans-development-belt-and-road-intl-hnk/index.html>.
46. Soliman, Ahmed, and Elise Lannaud. "Securitizing the Ethiopia–Sudan Border: How Cross-Border Conflict Is Shaping Trade and the Control of Land." *Chatham House*, 4 Apr. 2024, www.chathamhouse.org/2024/04/securitizing-ethiopia-sudan-border-how-cross-border-conflict-shaping-trade-and-control-land.
47. Staff, Anadolu. "Egypt Declares Dead End in Renaissance Dam Negotiations with Ethiopia, Sudan." *Anadolu Ajansı*, 20 Dec. 2023, www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/egypt-declares-dead-end-in-renaissance-dam-negotiations-with-ethiopia-sudan/3087456.



48. Staff, The New Arab. “Egypt, Somalia Sign Defence Pact amid Tensions with Ethiopia.” *The New Arab*, 15 Aug. 2024, www.newarab.com/news/egypt-somalia-sign-defence-pact-amid-tensions-ethiopia.
49. The Editors Encyclopaedia Britannica, Adam Zeidan. n.d. ‘Amhara’. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Amhara>.
50. The Fifty-second ILA Conference. 1966. ‘The Helsinki Rules’. https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/ILA/Helsinki_Rules-original_with_comments.pdf.
51. The United Nations - Security Council. χ.χ. ‘What is Security Council?’ <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/what-security-council>.
52. The United Nations. χ.χ. ‘Role of the Security Council’. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/role-of-security-council>
53. Turse, Nick. “Pentagon’s Own Map of U.S. Bases in Africa Contradicts Its Claim of ‘Light’ Footprint.” *The Intercept*, 23 Aug. 2023, theintercept.com/2020/02/27/africa-us-military-bases-africom/.
54. U.S. *Foreign Assistance*. <https://www.foreignassistance.gov/cd/egypt/2022/obligations/0>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.
55. UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (UNIDO). n.d. ‘China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund)’. <https://www.unido.org/node/84747>.
56. Valerie Knobelsdorf. χ.χ. ‘The Nile Waters Agreements: Imposition and Impacts of a Transboundary Legal System’. https://www.jurisafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Valerie_Knobelsdorf_Nile_Note.pdf.
57. Vincent Rush. 2024. ‘How Much Did the Ethiopia Dam Cost?’, June. <https://www.ncesc.com/geographic-faq/how-much-did-the-ethiopia-dam-cost/>.
58. Woldemariam, Yohannes, and Geneviene Donnellon-May. “The Politics of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” *Climate Diplomacy*, 2 Feb. 2024, climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/conflict/politics-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam.



59. Xinhua writers Habtamu Worku, Liu Fangqiang. 2024. 'Yearender: Ethiopia-China All-Weather Strategic Partnership Solidified in 2024', December. <https://english.news.cn/20241228/b1a20fa4d1b74d6686d84d51835c1ffa/c.html>.
60. Yibeltal, Kalkidan. "Ethiopia Signs Agreement with Somaliland Paving Way to Sea Access." *BBC News*, BBC, 2 Jan. 2024, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566.
61. Tubbs, James O. "Intervention in Somalia: UNITAF and UNOSOM II." *Beyond Gunboat Diplomacy: Forceful Applications of Airpower in Peace Enforcement Operations*, Air University Press, 1997, pp. 31–46. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13793.10>. Accessed 30 Dec. 2024.
62. Rotberg, Robert I. "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States." *Brookings Institute*, Jan. 2003, www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/statefailureandstateweaknessinatimeoferror_chapter.pdf.
63. "Chapter V: The Security Council (Articles 23-32)." *United Nations*, United Nations, www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-5. Accessed 10 Dec. 2024.
64. *Report of the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) on the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP)*, 31 May 2013, www.scidev.net/wp-content/uploads/site_assets/docs/international_panel_of_experts_for_ethiopian_renaissance_dam-final_report.pdf.
65. Sekle, Tesfa-Alem. "Tripartite National Committee to Re-Examine Nile Dam." *Sudan Tribune*, 22 Sept. 2014, sudantribune.com/article51213/.
66. Muhumuza, Rodney. "Nile Basin Nations Say Water-Sharing Accord Has Come into Force without Egypt's Backing." *AP News*, AP News, 15 Oct. 2024, apnews.com/article/nile-river-accord-egypt-ethiopia-water-sharing-e245661a016bb75d9337d3e45a7753f7.
67. "Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat (Nile-SEC): Nile Basin Initiative." *Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat (Nile-SEC) | Nile Basin Initiative*, nilebasin.org/center/nilesec. Accessed 1 Jan. 2025.



68. "Our Goals - Nile Basin Initiative." *Our Goals | Nile Basin Initiative*, nilebasin.org/our-goals. Accessed 1 Jan. 2025.
69. 'Ultimately develop its agriculture production and economy':Kaif Shaikh. 2024. 'Powering Africa: 6,450-MW Ethiopian Dam to Harness Nile Waters for Energy', October. <https://interestingengineering.com/culture/grand-renaissance-dam-ethiopia>.
70. 'By this way the Egyptian state would lose a great number of electricity export trading in the surrounding states.' ghana web. 2024. 'Top 10 African Countries with the Highest Electricity Generation', December. <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Top-10-African-countries-with-the-highest-electricity-generation-1965771>.
71. 'Ethiopia suffered due to the lack of clean water ': Aleksandre Jgarkava. 2021. 'Ethiopia's Access to Clean Water', July. <https://borgenproject.org/ethiopias-access-to-clean-water/>.
72. 'Egypt started to complain about the water flow reduction and the impact of it in everyday human life and agriculture': Farah Khayry. 2022. 'The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Egypt's Water Security', March. <https://fount.aucegypt.edu/urje/vol8/iss1/2/>.
73. 'Blue Nile River | Map, Facts, Location, & Length | Britannica'. Accessed 27 January 2025. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Blue-Nile-River>.
74. Bryson, Glen. 'INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION', n.d.
75. 'Dams'. Accessed 27 January 2025. <https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/dams>.
76. 'Definition of BASIN', 22 January 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/basin>.
77. 'Definition of RIPARIAN', 20 January 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/riparian>.
78. Encyclopedia Britannica. 'Sahel | Location, Facts, Map, & Desertification | Britannica', 23 January 2025. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sahel>.
79. Investopedia. 'Memorandum of Understanding (MOU): Definition, Contents, Pros/Cons, vs. MOA'. Accessed 27 January 2025. <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mou.asp>.
80. 'Reservoir'. Accessed 27 January 2025. <https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/reservoir>.





THESSISMUN